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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH 
 
 Human factors play an important, but often overlooked, role in the management of 
safety and quality in the work environment. Both safety and quality programs in the 
workplace depend on team-oriented employees who can spot potential issues and correct 
them on the floor or the line (Das, Pagell, Behm, and Veltri, 2008). Researchers and experts 
from several academic areas have noted the importance of positive employee involvement in 
the success of quality management systems and possible linkages between quality and safety 
(Brown, 1996; Das et al., 2008; Goetsch, 2008; Hurburgh & Hansen, 2002; Salazar, 1989; 
Voigt, 2005).  
 One human factor which is believed to influence employee safety and quality of work 
is trust. Although linkages between safety outcomes and employee trust have been explored 
by some researchers (Conchie & Donald, 2008; Conchie, Donald, & Taylor, 2006; Cox, 
Jones, & Collinson, 2006), few have examined the linkages between occupational safety and 
quality programs or the relationship between employee trust and the implementation of 
quality programs (Das et al., 2008). Furthermore, the success of both workplace safety and 
quality programs are dependent on the decisions employees make on the job (Zohar & Erev, 
2007). For this reason, an increased understanding of factors influencing employee decision-
making processes is an important component of occupational safety and quality management 
programs as well as associated employee educational intervention.  
Safety hazards in agricultural production and handling represent a perennial concern 
for workers, management, and other agricultural professionals (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
2008). Management and supervisory personnel at commercial grain handling facilities deal 
with a wide variety of safety issues spanning several safety standards and guidelines. Other 
challenges of agricultural handling facilities include working with a large number of seasonal 
and temporary laborers and the intense pressure for high productivity during the busy spring 
and fall seasons (Brandon, 2009; Chapman & Husberg, 2008; Lehtola, Brown, & Becker, 
2009). Based on the incident rate and historical patterns of both injuries and fatalities, it is 
well established that managing safety at a commercial grain elevator is a challenge (Laviana, 
2010). 
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 Another challenge for the commercial grain elevator is that the management of 
quality in agricultural commodities is changing (Hurburgh & Lawrence, 2003). Production 
agriculture is becoming more focused on product isolation, source verification, traceability 
and other differentiation processes to add value to bulk commodity crops (Miranowski, 
Jensen, Batres-Marques, & Ishdorj, 2004), but even without specialized markets, the quality 
of grain is a key consideration in its storability, marketability, and end uses (Reed, 2006). In 
both existing and emerging agricultural markets, management of and increased efficiencies in 
bulk grain handling can be facilitated through a quality management system (Laux, 2007; 
Laux & Hurburgh, 2010 Thakur et al., 2009). These systems have been used in 
manufacturing to improve efficiency and maintain high levels of quality (Bowersox, Closs, & 
Cooper, 2007; Das et al., 2008; Deming, 2000; Saraph, Benson, & Schroeder, 1989), but 
have not been widely used in bulk commodity agricultural handling (Hurburgh & Lawrence, 
2003).  
 Laux’s (2007) case study examined the effectiveness of quality management systems 
in a grain handling organization. While the research illustrated several key benefits of tighter 
management of grain quality factors in a grain elevator environment, one area which remains 
unexamined by researchers is how the participation of employees impacts a quality 
management system. Employees, their perceptions, and the management of their 
accumulated knowledge which result from these perceptions have been shown to be an 
important component of significant changes in the workplace (Chrusciel, 2004; Chrusciel & 
Field, 2003; Liebowitz, 1999). In the grain handling industry, quality management systems 
which go beyond the conventional commodity-based grades can most certainly be defined as 
significant change (Hurburgh & Lawrence, 2003; Laux & Hurburgh, 2010). Directing 
significant workplace changes involves appropriate knowledge management strategies 
(Chrusciel & Field, 2003). 
 Scholars of knowledge management posit that employee knowledge should be 
managed as an organizational resource (Baskerville & Dulipovici, 2006). Bjornson (2007) 
describes the focus of knowledge management as a way to create and transfer knowledge 
within an organization and notes the dynamic nature of the process. A more expansive view 
of organizational knowledge is defined as the information which results in routines and 
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processes which facilitate appropriate actions (Baskerville & Dulipovici, 2006). Employee 
decisions constitute a major portion of this action in both positive and negative ways.  
Consequently, the decision making patterns of employees have the potential to work for or 
against organizational quality management processes (Luning & Marcelis, 2007). The 
variability introduced by employee decisions is difficult to scientifically estimate or control, 
but this variation has the potential to substantially impact the success of the quality processes 
(Lunning & Marcelis, 2007).  
 This research will address an important element of safety and quality programs in the 
workplace – personnel and their interpretation of the importance of safety and quality in 
comparison with other organizational goals delegated to them by their supervisors and 
management. Safe workplaces benefit both workers and the organization (Goetsch, 2008). 
Quality management systems increase revenue, improve inventory management, and allow 
increased compliance with legal regulations (Laux, 2007). None of these improvements can 
be realized if employees do not make positive safety and quality-oriented decisions on the 
job. 
PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
This project will examine the level of employee trust in two levels of administration 
(the immediate supervisor and the top management team) at three grain handling 
organizations. In addition, the project will measure the employee perceptions of the priority 
of safety and quality in the work environment as compared with other organizational goals. 
The term used in the literature to describe employee perceptions of the relative importance of 
safety and quality is climate (Cooper& Phillips, 2004; Zohar, 2000) and this term will be 
used throughout the dissertation.  
The goal is to determine if the degree of employee trust and employee perceptions of 
quality and safety climate can predict 1) the final decision of the employee or 2) the process 
of decision-making in scenarios involving workplace safety (taking shortcuts) and 
compliance with quality processes (following orders which undermine product quality). The 
decision making process will involve measuring the relative priorities the employee 
emphasizes among four dimensions to help him or her make the final decision.  
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The project also examines whether the climate measures of employee trust, safety, 
and quality have a predictive relationship. Two measurement parameters are used to define 
climate (Zohar, 2000). The level of a climate describes the employee’s perception of the 
attribute in question (trust, safety, or quality) by the employees. The mean perception score 
of each employee reflects the numerical value of this measurement. The strength measures 
the agreement employees have regarding the perception score. The standard deviations of all 
employee strength scores provide a numerical measure for strength, which is the level of 
consensus employees have concerning the level of safety climate.  
Demographic characteristics have been identified as another possible factor in 
organizational safety attitudes and in individual safety situations (Gyekye & Salminen, 2009; 
Henning et al., 2009). Although demographic characteristics such as gender, age, and length 
of organizational service were collected as part of this research, these variables will be 
controlled when measuring the effect of climate measures on the model.  
Using this information, more targeted and responsive educational intervention can be 
developed for safety and quality management programs within the country grain elevator, 
leading to improvements in organizational knowledge management. Improved knowledge 
management in turn may encourage conditions which lead to superior performance, 
organizational creativity, operational effectiveness, and a higher quality of products and 
services (Baskerville & Dulipovici, 2006).  
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The study will be guided by the following research questions: 
1. Does the level of an employee’s trust in the management and supervisors predict the 
level and strength of the employee’s ratings of safety climate? 
2. Does the level of employees’ trust and safety climate concerning the management and 
supervisors predict employees’ decision choice in safety decision-making tasks? 
3. Does the level of employees’ trust and safety climate concerning the management and 
supervisors predict employees’ orientation to information acquisition in safety 
decision-making tasks?  
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4. Does the level of employees’ trust in the management and supervisors predict the 
level of the employees’ ratings of quality climate? 
5. Does the level of employees’ trust and quality climate concerning the management 
and supervisor predict employees’ decision choice in quality decision-making tasks?  
6.  Does the level of employees’ trust and quality climate concerning the management 
and supervisors predict the employees’ orientation to information acquisition in 
quality decision-making tasks?  
7. Does the level of organizational and group safety climate predict the level of 
organizational and group quality climate?  
8. Does the level of employees’ organizational and group quality climate predict 
employees’ decision choice in safety decision-making tasks? 
9. Does the level of employees’ organizational and group safety climate predict 
employees’ decision choice in quality decision-making tasks?  
10. Does the level of employees’ organizational and group safety climate predict 
employees’ decision choice in safety decision-making tasks? 
11. Does the organizational level and strength of safety and quality climates predict the 
group level of safety and quality climates?  
 
MEASUREMENT AND METHODOLOGY 
 To gather information needed to answer the research questions, the methodology was 
completed in three parts. First, a three-part survey was conducted. Grain handling personnel 
from three Iowa grain handling organizations were surveyed. Using an electronic 
questionnaire (Survey Monkey), employees were asked about their level of trust in their 
supervisor and in the management at their organization. Employees were also surveyed on 
their perceptions of the safety and quality climates from both management and supervisory 
perspectives at their organizations. Two of the three instruments used in the project were 
previously validated (Zohar & Luria, 2005; Levin, 1999) and the third was modified from the 
validated safety climate instrument (Zohar & Luria, 2005).   
 Testing the validity of an instrument involves an assessment of how well it measures 
what it claims to measure. In this case, the factor in question was trust.  The focus of the 
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validation procedure was construct validity which tested how well the instrument scales 
measured the constructs of credibility and consistency. This is done by examining findings 
across different researchers and different studies (Levin, 1999) and by factor analysis.  Factor 
analysis is typically used for two purposes: to reduce the number of variables to a smaller set 
of non-redundant factors and to test the validity of research instruments (Bryman & Cramer, 
2009; Agresti & Finlay, 1999).  
 Several steps are involved in a factor analysis. First, a correlation matrix is calculated 
using all of the variables measuring a specific concept.  If all or nearly all correlations 
between variables are significant at the 0.05 level, this can be interpreted to mean the concept 
may be described adequately by combining several variables, lowering the number of factors 
entered into the final model (Bryman & Cramer, 2009). If the variables are not significantly 
correlated, the interpretation is that each variable measures a specific concept. Consequently, 
several variables cannot be combined into one factor without substantial loss of explanatory 
power. 
Once it is determined that the existing variables exhibit a significant level of 
correlation, all variables in question are entered into a software program such as SPSS which 
will characterize the variance. Researchers are concerned with three types of variance in 
factor analysis: specific variance, unique variance, and error variance. Specific variance 
measures the variance of one specific variable and is not present in any other variable. 
Common variance measures the variance which is shared across the responses for more than 
three variables. Error variance is variation which occurs as a result of measurement and other 
uncontrollable errors inherent to data collection (Bryman & Cramer, 2009). Of interest to 
most researchers is the variance which is shared by variables, allowing the researcher to 
combine several variables into a smaller set of factors (Agresti & Finlay, 1999).  
 After the variables are entered into a software program, each variable’s influence on 
the variance of a test is measured by extracting factors. The first factor extracted measures 
the most amount of variance, the second factor extracted measures the second highest amount 
of variance and so on. Therefore, the first few factors extracted are the most important in 
terms of the variance explained. The quantitative measure for variance explained by the 
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factors is a value called an Eigenvalue. The greater amount of variance explained by the 
factor, the greater the value of the Eigenvalue (Bryman & Cramer, 2009).  
 The next step is to determine how many factors to retain in the model. To help 
researchers with this task, two criteria are used: Kaiser’s criterion and the scree test (Bryman 
& Cramer, 2009). Kaiser’s criterion posits that factors with an Eigenvalue of one or greater 
should be retained in the model. The basis for this decision is the assumption that the 
variance of each entered variable has been standardized as one; therefore, a factor must 
explain at least the amount of variance contained in one variable.  The scree test shows 
graphically the factors which explain the greatest amount of variance. Above the point on the 
plot where the Eigenvalue drops drastically is where the most influential factors lie, while the 
gentle slope of the remaining values illustrates the factors with less explanatory power. The 
factors which exhibit an Eigenvalue of one or greater and are graphically shown on the scree 
plot are those which are retained in the model (Bryman & Cramer, 2009; Agresti & Finlay, 
1999).  
 Previously validated instruments were used to measure behavioral trust and safety 
climate. The quality climate instrument was developed based on the safety climate 
instrument (Zohar and Luria, 2005). The Management Behavior Climate Assessment (Levin, 
1999) was used to evaluate employee trust levels in their management and their supervisor, 
as well as provide demographic data such as age, gender, and length of time with the 
organization. This instrument was developed as a behavioral measurement of trust in top tier 
and executive tier (supervisory) management. Levin (1999) validated the survey by testing it 
on 601 individuals from seven diverse organizations including manufacturing, academic, 
military, and government. In the resulting factor analysis, two factors were identified by 
Levin (1999) to explain the concept of trust: consistency and credibility. A copy of the 40 
item survey is shown in Appendix A.   
To measure employee perceptions of safety climate, the Organization and Group 
Level Safety Climate instrument (Zohar & Luria, 2005) was used. The instrument surveyed 
employees concerning their perceptions of two tiers: organizational level (management) and 
group (supervisory) level. Zohar and Luria administered the instrument to 3,952 employees 
from 36 manufacturing plants in several industries. Johnson (2007) further validated the 
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instrument with an additional 292 employees at three heavy manufacturing locations. 
Although both researchers (Johnson, 2007; Zohar & Luria, 2005) found evidence to support a 
three factor structure for a safety climate measure, both also noted high significant 
correlations between the factors and a substantial number of variables loading on more than 
one factor. Johnson (2007) and Zohar and Luria (2005) concluded the possibility of a single 
factor, termed global commitment or global safety priority, which could adequately explain 
the concept of safety climate.     
Factor analysis completed for this project on the safety climate instrument had similar 
results to Johnson (2007) and Zohar and Luria (2005). Highly significant correlations 
between variables, a large number of cross-loadings, and the initial principal component 
analysis indicating one factor all contributed to the decision to use a single factor to describe 
organizational safety climate and a second single factor to describe group safety climate. A 
copy of the 32 item Organization and Group Level Safety Climate is shown in Appendix B.  
The quality climate instrument was modified from the Organization and Group Level 
Safety Climate instrument (Zohar & Luria, 2005). Questionnaire items were modified 
slightly to better reflect quality concerns within an agricultural processing organization. 
Results from the instrument were similar to the safety climate instrument. Highly significant 
correlations between variables, substantial cross-loadings of variable items, and the 
identification of a single factor to explain quality climate at both the organizational and group 
levels led to the decision to use one factor to describe quality climate at each administration 
tier. The 31 item Organization and Group Level Quality Climate is displayed in Appendix C.  
 Trust, safety, and quality climates were assessed at two tiers – management and 
supervisory - based on recommendations from previous research (Zohar, 2008). While 
employees may have daily communication with their supervisor, the communication with 
management may be limited to infrequent meetings or other sporadic contacts so perceptions 
may be very different between tiers. Moreover, concerning safety and quality perceptions, 
while the management team may create and promote the daily policies and procedures, it is 
the supervisors that actually implement and interpret these policies on a daily basis (Zohar, 
2000, 2008). The focus of this research explores which perspective plays a stronger role in 
the decision choices of employees.   
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 The second portion of the study was the decision-making scenarios, with one safety 
scenario and one quality scenario presented to each employee in random order. Employees 
were provided with specific directions on completing the decision scenarios. Decision 
choices were presented in a matrix format as shown in Table 1 with four dimensions that 
were hypothesized to play a role in making the decision choice. With each decision 
simulation, employees read the hypothetical situation and then were presented four 
alternatives. Each square of the matrix (V) represents the evaluation of a given choice (C) on 
a given dimension (D) and a weighted numerical score (contained within V). Weighted 
scores were assigned by panels of experts in agricultural safety and quality on a scale from -
10 to +10. Scores less than zero denote a negative evaluation and scores greater than zero 
designate a positive evaluation. Using the information contained within the matrix squares, 
employees viewed the information and then selected a decision choice. The Decision Mind™ 
software tracked all of the matrix squares which were viewed, how many times each were 
viewed, the time used by the employee to make the decision choice, and the employee’s final 
decision. The safety and quality scenarios are shown in Appendices D and E. 
Table 1. Decision Mind
TM
 Decision Simulation Matrix 
 C1 C2 C3 C 4 
D1 V11 V21 V31 V41 
D2 V12 V22 V32 V42 
D3 V13 V23 V33 V43 
D4 V14 V24 V34 V44 
  
 The scenarios were created based on information gathered from published literature, 
current events in the agricultural handling industry, and the professional opinions of experts 
in both agricultural safety and grain quality. Surveys and scenarios were pilot tested on a 
sample of individuals who had moderate levels of knowledge in agricultural safety and/or 
grain quality (n=12). Slight modifications were made to improve the clarity of the survey 
instruments and the decision scenarios as the result of the pilot tests.  
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 The safety scenario is based on a fundamental safety issues in all work environments 
– failing to follow standard operating procedures (SOPs) (Keren et al., 2009; Mills, 2007). 
The National Safety Council (1999) has linked the act of “taking a shortcut” to occupational 
injuries and accidents. The safety decision scenario was written to reflect a potential shortcut 
opportunity in the grain handling industry. The situation is fairly common in the industry - 
the bridging of out of condition grain as it is being unloaded from a grain storage bin, which 
delays the speed of the grain flow out of the bin (Brandon, 2009; Freeman, Kelley, Maier, & 
Field, 1998; Kingman & Field, 2005). Following SOPs will resolve the issue, but require 
additional time, slowing productivity. Fixing the problem quickly presents a major 
engulfment hazard to the employee. The dilemma presented to the employee asks him or her 
to decide whether to follow safety procedures and take additional time or fix the problem 
quickly but with an increased risk of injury or death.  
 Engulfments involving bulk agricultural materials do not occur frequently, but the 
survival rate of victims is low (Brandon, 2009; Freeman et al., 1998; Roberts & Field, 2010). 
Several factors add to the danger of an engulfment situation. A lack of awareness of the 
danger of flowing grain, the speed total engulfment can occur, storage of wetter and more 
out-of-condition grains, and larger storage facilities all make a dangerous situation even more 
hazardous (Roberts & Field, 2010). In the past, entrapments were noted in larger numbers on 
farms, but recent data gathered by Purdue University has shown a shift to include more 
engulfment events at commercial grain elevators than previously (Brandon, 2009). 
 The quality scenario was based on the concept of choosing between following orders 
and acting in the best interest to preserve and/or maintain quality of the product. Adapted for 
the grain handling environment, the situation was one very familiar to both producers and 
commercial grain elevators in recent years – the handling and management of high moisture 
grain. The employee is asked to dump wet grain onto a pile with an unknown (but likely wet) 
moisture level. He or she knows this action will have a very negative impact on the grain’s 
quality attributes, but the orders are very clear from management and the supervisor – accept 
the grain and dump it on the specified pile.  
 A fundamental aspect of grain preservation is to control and manage moisture very 
carefully (Reed, 2006). In 2008 and 2009, this basic guideline was difficult for many grain 
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handlers to follow. Unusual weather patterns, limited drying time, high moisture corn, and 
abundant harvests limited the options for preservation and storage of grains (Hurburgh & 
Elmore, 2009). Conventional methods were not effective when corn was coming into the 
grain elevator at 25% moisture rather than the more typical 14-15% (Hurburgh, Bern, & 
Brumm, 2008). Situations typical of the one used as the decision scenario challenged many 
grain handling and storage facilities to think about quality in a different way than they had 
previously. 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
A wide variety of data were collected for this dissertation. Because of this, several 
descriptive and inferential statistics were used for analysis. First, all manuscripts will include 
demographic information on the sample, which numbered 197 total participants. After 
sorting out duplicates and eliminating invalid entries, the sample included 178 valid 
responses on the climate instruments (trust, safety, and quality) and 160 for the safety 
decision and 158 for the quality decision respondents. Descriptive data on decision choice is 
presented, as well as bivariate correlation relationships between the variables.  
 The process used in the development of the climate measures and decision scenarios 
was described in detail earlier in the chapter, so discussion of them here will be brief. The 
instruments used to collect climate data were validated previously (Levin, 1999; Zohar & 
Luria, 2005); therefore, a factor analysis was performed to verify previous factor loadings 
(Agresti & Finlay, 1999; Bryman & Cramer, 2009). Factor analysis was also performed to 
verify that the sample of agricultural workers evaluated trust and safety climate in a 
statistically similar way to previous sample groups. The quality climate instrument was 
modified from the safety instrument, and its factor analysis outcome behaved in the same 
way as did the safety climate instrument.  Based on the outcomes of the factor analysis and 
the properties of the data, a decision was made to use a single factor to interpret safety and 
quality climate at each level of administration. Trust at both management and supervisory 
levels were represented by two factors: consistency and credibility.   
 To explore relationships and determine the predictive nature of the variables, linear 
regression techniques were used. To study the relationship between trust and safety climates, 
the safety decision choice, and safety decision process, stepwise and hierarchical regression 
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techniques were used to evaluate the amount of variance in employee decision choice and 
decision-making process is explained by organizational and group level factors of trust 
(consistency, credibility, and relevancy) and safety climate (Bryman & Cramer, 2009). 
Stepwise regression was used first to identify control variables (demographic variables) and 
variables of interest (organizational and group trust and safety climate) which explained a 
significant portion of variance in the model. Next, the control variables were held constant 
and hierarchical linear regression was used to determine if the variables of interest explained 
a significant incremental amount of variance in the decision choice and decision-making 
process of employees. Then, models with the significant variables (the reduced model) were 
re-run and compared with models which included all of the variables (the complete model) to 
test for differences between the full and reduced models (Agresti & Finlay, 1999).  
 A similar procedure was used in the quality model and in the safety/quality model. 
For the quality model, control variables were entered into the stepwise regression model. 
Next, the significant control variables were held constant while variables of interest were 
entered, including organizational and group level trust and quality climate data. Finally, the 
reduced models were compared with the complete models using the coefficient of 
determination and F-values. In the safety/quality model, control variables were entered first, 
and then the safety/quality climate variables, and finally, the decision choice variables.  
 For all regression models, the coefficient of determination (r
2
) and the F-value was 
computed to determine the amount of variance explained by all of the variables entered into 
the model. In all models, decision data were reverse coded, with positive safety and quality 
decisions coded as higher numbers (i.e. 3 and 4) and less positive safety and quality decisions 
coded as lower numbers (i.e. 1 and 2). This is the opposite of values assigned to the climate 
instruments, so negative relationships between the decision choice and the climate variables 
are expected.  
ORGANIZATION OF DISSERTATION 
 This dissertation is written in the alternative manuscript format as defined by Iowa 
State University’s Graduate College. Chapter one is the general introduction which outlines 
the basic ideas behind the research and summarizes the goals and objectives. Chapter two 
serves as the literature review of research used as a basis for and justification of the 
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dissertation research. Chapters three, four, and five are three manuscripts formatted for 
submission to specified journals. Chapter six is a general summary and interpretation of 
findings, recommendations for further research, and conclusions. Appendices include the 
three climate instruments (trust, safety, and quality) as well as the two decision scenarios.  
 
REFERENCES 
 
Agresti, A. & Finlay, B. (1999). Statistical methods for the social sciences (3
rd
 ed.). Upper 
 Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
 
Baskerville, R. & Dulipovici, A. (2006). The theoretical foundations of knowledge 
 management. Knowledge Management Research and Practice, 4(1), 83-105. 
 
Bjornson, F.O. (2007). Knowledge management in software process improvement. 
 Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Norwegian University of Science and Technology. 
 Doctoral theses at NTNU, 2007: 152.  
 
Bowersox, D., Closs, D., & Cooper, M.B. (2007). Supply chain logistics management. New 
 York, NY: McGraw Hill. 
 
Brandon, H. (August 4, 2009). Grain storage – deadly dangers. Delta Farm Press. 
 Downloaded August 6, 2009 from:  
 http://deltafarmpress.com/com/grain-storeage-0804/ 
  
Brown, K.A. (1996). Workplace safety: A call for research. Journal of Operations 
 Management, 14(2), 157-171. 
 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2008). National Census of fatal occupational injuries in 2007. 
 United States Department of Labor: Washington, D.C. Downloaded March 16, 2009 
 from: http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/cfoi.pdf.  
 
Bryman, A. and Cramer, D. (2009). Quantitative data analysis with SPSS 14, 15, and16. 
 New York, NY: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.  
 
Chapman, L.J. & Husberg, B. (2008). Agriculture, forestry, and fishing sector. Journal of 
 Safety Research, 39(2), 171-173.  
 
Chrusciel, D. (2004). Considerations for dealing with significant organizational change. 
 Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Iowa State University. Dissertation Abstracts 
 International A65/08. 
 
 
 
14 
 
 
 
Chrusciel, D. & Field, D. (2003). From critical success factors into criteria for performance 
 excellence – An organizational change strategy. Journal of Industrial Technology, 
 19(4).  
 
Conchie, S.M.  & Donald, I.J. (2008). The functions and development of safety-specific trust 
 and distrust. Safety Science, 46(1), 92-103.  
Conchie, S.M., Donald, I.J, & Taylor, P.J. (2006). Trust: Missing piece(s) in the safety 
 puzzle. Risk Analysis, 26(5), 1097-1104. 
Cox, S., Jones, B. & Collison, D. (2006). Trust relations in high-reliability organizations. 
 Risk Analysis, 26(5), 1123-1138.  
 
Das, A., Pagell, M., Behm, M., & Veltri, A. (2008). Toward a theory of the linkages 
 between safety and quality. Journal of Operations Management, 26(4), 521-535. 
 
Deming, W.E. (2000). Out of the crisis. Boston, MA: MIT/CAES. 
 
Freeman, S.A., Kelley, K.W., Maier, D.E., & Field, W.E. (1998). Review of entrapments  in 
 bulk agricultural materials at commercial grain facilities. Journal of Agricultural 
 Safety and Health, 4(2), 119-130.  
 
Goetsch, D.L. (2008). Occupational safety and health for technologists, engineers, and  
 managers, 6
th
 edition. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson/Prentice Hall. 
 
Gyekye, S.A. & Salminen, S. (2009). Educational status and organizational safety 
 climate: Does educational attainment influence workers’ perceptions of workplace 
 safety? Safety Science, 47(1), 20-28. 
Henning, J.B., Stuffy, C.J., Payne, S.C., Bergman, M.E., Mannan, M.S., and Keren, N. 
 (2009). The influence of individual differences on organizational safety attitudes. 
 Safety Science, 47(1), 337-345.  
Hurburgh, C.R., Bern, C.J. & Brumm, T.J. (2008). Grain moisture and weight. In Managing 
 grain after harvest, an internal textbook used in the Department of  Agricultural and 
 Biosystems Engineering, Iowa State University.  
 
Hurburgh, C.R. & Lawrence, J.D. (2003). The need for QMS. Resource: Engineering and 
 Technology for a Sustainable World, 10(9), September 2003, 29.  
 
Hurburgh, C.R. & Hansen, R.S. (2002). Quality management systems for agriculture: 
 Principles and case studies. Presentation given at the 2002 Integrated Crop 
 Management Conference, Ames, IA, December, 2002.  
 
 
 
15 
 
 
 
Kingman, D.M. & Field, W.E. (2005). Using fault tree analysis to identify contributing 
 factors  to engulfment in flowing grain in on-farm grain bins. Journal of Agricultural 
 Safety and Health, 11(4), 395-405. 
 
Keren, N., Mills, T.R., Freeman, S.A., & Shelley, M.C. (2009). Can level of safety climate 
 predict level of orientation toward safety in a decision-making task? Safety Science, 
 47(10), 1312-1323.  
 
Laux, C.M. (2007). The impacts of a formal quality management system: A case study of 
 implementing ISO 9000 at Farmer’s Cooperative Company, Iowa. Unpublished 
 doctoral dissertation, Iowa State University. Dissertation Abstracts International 
 B68/07.  
 
Laux, C.M. & Hurburgh, C.R. (2010). Using quality management systems for food 
 traceability. Journal of Industrial Technology, 26(3).  
 
Laviana, H. (May 23, 2010). 60 killed in grain elevators in Kansas since 1980. The 
 Wichita Eagle. Downloaded May 28, 2010 from 
 http://www.kansas.com/2010/05/24/v-print/13261/60-killed-in-grain-elevators-
 since.html   
 
Lehtola, C.J., Brown, C.M. & Becker, W.J. (2008). Grain handling facilities – OSHA 
 standard 1910.272. (ABE208). Gainesville, FL: Institute of Food and Agricultural 
 Sciences, University of Florida. Downloaded June 16, 2008 from 
 http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/pdffiles/OA/OA11000.pdf.  
 
Levin, S.L. (1999). Development of an instrument to measure organizational trust. 
 Unpublished doctoral dissertation, The George Washington University. Dissertation 
 Abstracts International A60/02. 
 
Liebowitz, J. (1999). Key ingredients to the success of an organization’s knowledge 
 management strategy. Knowledge and Process Management, 6(1), 37-40. 
 
Luning, P.A. & Marcelis, W.J. (2007). A conceptual model of food quality management 
 functions based on a techno-managerial approach. Trends in Food Science and 
 Technology, 18, 159-166. 
 
Mills, T.R. (2007). The effects of a safety climate on safety decision-making. Unpublished 
 master’s thesis, Iowa State University.  
 
Miranowski, J.A., Jensen, H.H., Batres-Marquez, P., & Ishdorj, A. (2004). Product 
 differentiation and segregation in agricultural systems: Non-Genetically modified 
 and specialty corn and soybean crops in Iowa. (Paper No. 04-WP 354). Ames, IA: 
 Center for Agricultural and Rural Development.  
 
 
 
16 
 
 
 
National Safety Council (1999). Injury facts. Itasca, IL.  
 
Reed, C.R. (2006). Managing stored grain to preserve quality and value. St. Paul, 
 Minnesota: American Association of Cereal Chemistry International.  
 
Roberts, M. & Field, B. (2010). A disturbing trend: U.S. grain entrapments on the  increase.  
 Resource: Engineering and Technology for a Sustainable World, July/August 2010,  
 10-11.  
 
Salazar, N. (1989). Applying the Deming philosophy to the safety system. Professional 
 Safety,  34(12), 22-27. 
 
Saraph, J.V., Benson, P.G., & Schroeder, R.G. (1989). An instrument for measuring the 
 critical factors of quality management. Decision Sciences, 20(4), 810-829. 
 
Thakur, M., Mosher, G.A., Brown, B., Bennet, G.S., Shepherd, H.E.  & Hurburgh, C.R. 
 (2009). Traceability in the bulk grain supply chain. Resource: Engineering and 
 Technology for a Sustainable World, April/May 2009, 20-22.  
 
Voigt, J. (2005). Maintaining quality and purity in commercial elevators and equipment. 
 Proceedings of the Grain Elevator and Processing Society (GEAPS). Downloaded 
 on February 23, 2009 from http://www.geaps.com/proceedings/2005/voigt.cfm.  
 
Zohar, D. (2000). A group-level model of safety climate: Testing the effect of group climate 
 on micro-accidents in manufacturing jobs. Journal of Applied Psychology, 85(4), 
 587-596. 
 
Zohar, D. (2008). Safety climate and beyond: A multi-level multi-climate framework. Safety 
 Science, 46(3), 376-387.  
 
Zohar, D. & Erev, I. (2007). On the difficulty of promoting workers’ safety behavior: 
 Overcoming the underweighting of routine tasks. International Journal of Risk 
 Assessment and Management, 7(2), 122-136. 
 
Zohar, D. & Luria, G. (2005). A multilevel model of safety climate: cross-level relationships 
 between organization and group-level climates. Journal of Applied  Psychology, 
 90(4),  616-628.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 This literature review addresses five broad topics. The review is not intended to be 
exhaustive. Topics addressed provide the theoretical grounding for topics included in the 
research articles and the overall dissertation research. The topics reviewed include: (1) the 
definition and meaning of trust as it has been described and interpreted by researchers, (2) a 
review of previous findings on the impact managerial and supervisory trust has on 
organizational safety outcomes (3) previous research and theory on worker behavior, 
focusing on the central question of why workers continue to make decisions which run 
counter to workplace safety and quality, (4) an examination of the role trust levels play in 
quality and quality management in the workplace, including past research on quality 
management in agricultural production and processing, and (5) decision-making theory and 
its use in the measurement and prediction of decisions in safety and quality scenarios.  
TRUST 
 Several factors may influence employee perceptions of safety and quality within an 
organization. One of these factors is believed to be trust, which has been shown to play a role 
in several workplace dynamics such as employee cooperation, problem solving, and high 
quality communication (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002; Kramer, 2006). The concept of trust has been 
examined from researchers in a variety of disciplines. Researchers have framed antecedents, 
meaning, and conditions of the deceptively complex topic of trust. Exploration in disciplines 
such as psychology, business, management, leadership, and safety has also made important 
contributions to the understanding of trust in the workplace.  
 Most theoretical definitions of trust acknowledge two parts: 1) a willingness to be 
vulnerable to another party to perform expected and desirable actions even though the party 
cannot be managed or scrutinized and 2) the implication that this vulnerability leads to a 
certain degree of risk or dependency on the other party to act in a benevolent manner  (Dirks 
& Ferrin, 2002;  Kramer, 1999; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Shockley-Zalabak, Ellis, 
& Wingrad, 2000;  Slovic, 1993; Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard, & Werner, 1998). Both parts 
play an important role in defining trust. Vulnerability is central to the definition because 
trusting relationships must have meaningful incentives on the line, leading to the possibility 
of the trust being breached from the trustee’s perspective (Davis, Schoorman, Mayer, & Tan, 
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2000). Without the uncertainty inherent to risk and vulnerability and the possibility of the 
second party not following through on promised actions, no trust would be necessary within 
relationships. The need for trust only becomes important when an uncertain situation occurs 
(Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Cameter, 1998). 
 Trust has been identified as an important factor in several positive organizational 
outcomes, including high quality communication, performance levels, constructive 
citizenship behaviors, increased problem solving, and employee cooperation (Whitener et al., 
1998). Employee trust levels in the management team and the supervisor may be dependent 
on items such as the prior beliefs of employees, organizational change, supervisory and 
management practices, and perception of risk (Albrecht, 2002; Cufaude, 1999; Poortinga & 
Pidgeon, 2004; Slovic, 1993; Zohar, 2000, 2002). However, even when considering multiple 
contributing factors, employee trust levels are fundamentally based on the employees’ 
perceptions of the top management and supervisor. 
 Various dimensions of trust have also been explored by researchers, including trust 
relations between managers and workers (Albrecht, 2002; Dirks & Ferrin, 2002; Mayer & 
Gavin, 2005; Mayer et al., 2005; Whitener et al., 1998; Willemyns et al., 2003); the violation 
and repair of trust (Kim et al., 2006; Schweitzer et al., 2006; White & Eiser, 2006); trust in 
high-reliability organizations (Conchie & Burns, 2008; Cox et al., 2006; Flin et al., 2000; 
Mullen, 2004); and the relationship between conditions and constructs of trust and distrust 
(Conchie & Donald, 2008; Jones & George, 1998; Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998).  
 The meaning of trust is deceptively complex. Several constructs of trust appear in 
multiple definitions and use different words to describe similar concepts across several 
definitions.  Although researchers have not come to complete agreement on the constructs 
which explain trust, the following five constructs are frequently used to describe its meaning.  
 Consistency is identified by several researchers as a condition of trust (Butler, 1991; 
Clark & Payne, 1997; Levin, 1999; Whitener et al., 1998). Other researchers use alternate 
words to describe the same action, including reliability (Mishra, 1996; Shockley-Zalabak et 
al., 2000), past actions (Currall & Epstein, 2003) and predictability (Gabarro, 1978). 
Although predictability, reliability, and past actions may play a role in a trusting relationship, 
significant trust must surpass these. Depending on the resulting action, predictability, 
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reliability and history of past actions can be a positive or negative characteristic (Mayer et 
al., 1995). For example, if a supervisor continually makes poor decisions, employees may be 
able to accurately forecast his or her decision, but still not trust him or her to make positive 
organizational and group level decisions.  
 Given this, consistency does form a basis for trust because of its emphasis on reliable 
behavior and its significance in leader actions (Mishra, 1996). Dependable and consistent 
behavior is grounded in a correspondence between the actions and the words of management 
and supervisory personnel across both events and experiences over a period of time 
(Shockley-Zalabak et al., 2000). Nearly all trust definitions include an aspect of vulnerability, 
but consistent behavior on the part of the management and supervisors allows employees to 
increase their confidence in their ability to predict behavior. Consistent behavior and 
congruence between words and actions helps lower the vulnerability of the employee, 
increasing his or her trust levels, while inconsistencies between words and actions decrease 
trust levels in employees (Shockley-Zalabak et al., 2000; Levin, 1999). 
 A second common construct of trust which has been proposed by several researchers 
is credibility. Many words can be used to describe credibility (integrity, honesty, moral 
character, fairness, etc.), but from an employee perspective, high credibility is characterized 
by consistency between words and deeds (Whitener et al., 1998). Although credibility is 
similar to consistency, the construct goes beyond the expected alignment of the 
administrator’s actions and words.  Mayer et al. (1995) suggests that a key additional point is 
the role of the trustor as an important component of credibility perceptions and the 
importance of congruence between the values of the trustor and the trustee. Without 
agreement on values, the actions of the trustee may be perceived as only consistent rather 
than credible.   
 Another construct of trust identified by several researchers is competence. 
Competence is characterized by level of knowledge and skill and how these are employed by 
the organizational leadership to make decisions (Clark & Payne, 1997; Mishra, 1996). Davis 
et al. (2000) and Shockley-Zalabak et al. (2000) expand the definition to include trust in the 
effectiveness of the leadership and of the organization’s potential survival in the marketplace. 
Mayer et al. (1995) add an important condition to the construct of competence – the limited 
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amount of trust given to supervisors or management when they are outside of their area of 
expertise.  
 A fourth construct frequently identified when defining trust is concern or 
benevolence. Mayer et al. (1995) defines benevolence as the extent of concern the trustee has 
for the trustor. Mishra (1996) characterizes concern as the perception that one party will not 
take advantage of another when the other is vulnerable. Whitener et al. (1998) consolidates 
both definitions into three actions: 1. demonstrating thought and responsiveness to the needs 
and interests of employees, 2. protecting employee interests by sensitive actions, and 3. 
balancing personal interests against the interests of others. Shockley-Zalabak et al. (2000) 
and Edmondson (1996) describe concern as a culture which builds psychological safety by 
emphasizing their social capital. The sincerity of caring, empathy, and tolerance allows for an 
organization which treats mistakes as learning opportunities rather than as reason for 
punishment. Shockley-Zalabak et al. (2000) particularly emphasize the role of the sincerity in 
the above feelings for building organizational trust among employees.   
 The final significant construct defining the meaning of trust is perhaps the most 
important because without communication and openness, none of the other constructs would 
carry the same weight. The construct of communication and openness includes actions such 
as the timely sharing of accurate and relevant information, explanations of decisions under 
consideration or already made, and an open, non-defensive, and sincere delivery of the 
information to all relevant parties (Cufaude, 1999; Levin, 1999; Mishra, 1996; Shockley-
Zalabak et al., 2000; Whitener et al., 1998). Mishra (1996) suggests openness plays an 
especially key role in trust between managers and subordinates, but also cautions that 
extreme openness may actually decrease trust rather than increase trust levels.  
 The constructs listed above do not provide the full scope of all published definitions. 
Universal agreement on a definition of trust is still in development, but most researchers 
agree on some general properties of trust.  Several researchers (Currall & Epstein, 2003; 
Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2004; Slovic, 1993; Willemyns et al., 2003) have theorized that trust is 
difficult to gain, but easy to lose.  The general philosophy of trust is that it is built up based 
on a series of positive acts over a long period of time but may vanish instantly with one 
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negative incident. This imbalance of emotion has been termed the asymmetry principle by 
Slovic (1993) and others.  
 The asymmetry principle is thought to have a major impact on how people perceive 
information. Difficulty in building trust is illustrated by what Siegrist and Cvetkovich (2001) 
label a “negativity bias”, which helps explain why people find negative information to be 
more convincing than positive information. White et al. (2003) suggested that negative 
information is often clear and unambiguous while positive information may be fuzzy and 
more indirect, which can lower trust levels rather than increasing them.  Kramer (1999) also 
found a person’s position within an organization played a role in how information was 
received. People in lower status positions tended to be more aware of the trust dynamic 
between the worker and supervisor, in part because of their greater vulnerability and 
dependence on the decisions made by those in higher status positions (Kramer, 1999).  
 These theories are supported by Mayer et al. (1995), which also include the trustor’s 
propensity to trust as a major component of their model.  This propensity is thought to be 
determined at least in part by prior beliefs and attitudes (Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2004). 
Although the role of the trustee’s prior beliefs and attitudes is not fully known, researchers 
have established that these emotions do play a part in trust perception.  
 
TRUST IN THE WORKPLACE 
 In the workplace, trust has several important implications for both workers and 
management (Willemyns et al., 2003). Davis and Landa (1999) found that 43% of workers 
believe their managers cheat or lie to them, and 68% do not trust their managers, but they did 
not investigate how this impacted workplace safety or quality. Conchie and Donald (2008) 
found that trust-related properties played a substantial role in the development of a safe 
workplace. Other safety researchers have found that trust effects safety related outcomes both 
directly and indirectly (Burns, Mearns & McGeorge, 2006; Conchie & Burns, 2008; Cox et 
al., 2006). 
 In 1993, the Human Factors Working Group of the Advisory Committee on Safety in 
Nuclear Installations (ACSNI) highlighted the importance of communications based on 
reciprocal trust, shared viewpoints on the role of safety, and by high assurance in the 
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effectiveness of preventive measures (Cox et al., 2006). Several human-engineered facets 
have also been identified as having a positive impact on safety. These include: senior 
management commitment to safety, concern over the impact of hazards upon workers, 
reasonable and flexible rules and policies concerning hazards, and opportunities for 
continuous improvement in safety (Cox et al., 2006).  
 The connections between trust-related factors and organizational safety climate have 
not been studied extensively. Baas (2002) found correlations between both safety climate and 
trust measures with accident rates. Although this provides a link between organizational trust 
and employee behavior, the behavior metric is a lagging indicator rather than a leading 
indicator. Little research has explored the relationship between trust, safety climate and a 
leading behavioral indicator. Lagging indicators remain the norm for using organizational 
climate to predict safety behavior (Hudson, 2009; Johnson, 2007; Keren et al., 2009; Pousette 
et al., 2008; Zohar & Luria, 2005). Indeed, this remains a challenge for safety researchers – 
finding a leading indicator accepted by management that has a predictive relationship with 
employee behavior. Safety climate has the potential to serve as a leading indicator, but a lack 
of conclusive predictive power and acceptance from industry has limited efforts to use this 
metric (Keren et al., 2009). This detail has not prevented safety researchers from attempting 
to model safety climate against a variety of factors, including trust. The next section will 
discuss some of the research completed to measure the relationship between trust and safety 
climate.  
SAFETY CLIMATE AND TRUST 
 Safety climate is a measurement tool used to provide organizations with a snapshot of 
employee perceptions on the priority of organizational safety compared to other 
organizational outcomes such as productivity or quality (Zohar, 2000). The important direct 
effect of safety climate on employee behavior has been demonstrated (Johnson, 2007; Keren 
et al., 2009; Neal, Griffin & Hart, 2000; Zohar, 2002), but this finding has not been universal 
(Cooper & Phillips, 2004; Garavan & O’Brien, 2001; Vredenburgh, 2002). Replication and 
validation of the effect of safety climate on employee behavior has been limited in many 
cases because few safety climate instruments have been used multiple times or in multiple 
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work environments (Seo et al., 2004). After over 30 years of research on the topic (Zohar, 
1980), the 2002 study by Zohar was one of the first to confirm that worker perceptions of 
safety were significantly linked to accident and injury rates. This linkage has important 
implications for supervisory and management teams who wish to reduce safety incidents in 
their organizations.  
 Several factors affect the level and strength of safety climate. Flin et al. (2000) found 
five themes which commonly describe the organizational safety climate. These include: 
management and supervision, safety systems, risk, work pressure, and competence. Other 
researchers point to the importance of open communication in building safety climate 
(Conchie & Burns, 2008; Cox et al., 2006). Additional important components affecting safety 
climate include: management and supervisory practices, management values, and employee 
involvement (Neal et al., 2000). Although many items may affect safety climate, the links 
between management practices and communication and safety are grounded in the trust 
levels workers have in both supervisors and management and this will be the focus of this 
research (Conchie & Burns, 2008).   
 The role of the supervisor and top management on safety climate has been discussed 
by many researchers (Arboleda et al., 2003; Keren et al., 2009; Petersen, 2000; White & 
Eiser, 2006; Whitener et al., 1998; Zohar, 2000,2002; Zohar & Luria, 2005;), but few have 
specifically studied trust (McClain & Jarrell, 2007). Trust has been implied as a contributing 
factor in discussion and analysis section of previous studies (Clark, 1999; Conchie & Burns, 
2008; Mullen, 2004; Seo et al., 2004) but little research has measured the strength of the 
relationship at multiple levels (Zohar & Luria, 2005).  
 Furthermore, few studies have tested the impact of trust on safety climate, yet low 
trust levels have been linked to many negative safety and organizational outcomes. Several 
factors may contribute to these outcomes. First, a lack of trust in administrators may divert 
the employees’ attention from their assigned tasks (Mayer & Gavin, 2005). Moreover, 
employees’ who are concerned or worried about the behavior of their boss may not be 
focusing on improving their own work or concentrating on their personal safety.  Additional 
outcomes of low trust work environments may include increased attempts to break 
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management rules or setting inappropriate goals contradicting to the organizational 
objectives (Davis et al., 2000). Although Davis et al., (2000) did not test safety specifically, 
setting inappropriate safety goals or attempting to “get away” with not following safety rules 
could prove extremely dangerous and possibly deadly.  
 Zohar and Luria (2005) present a multilevel model of safety climate based on a 
theoretical framework outlined by Zohar (2000, 2003). The model attributes some variation 
in safety climate to the dynamics of the work group. This model assumes that employees are 
continually presented with a large number of inconsistent and conflicting demands from both 
management (termed organizational climate) and supervisors (work group climate). A second 
assumption is that although the management may create and develop policies and 
regulations, the daily implementation of the resulting actions and tasks are left to the 
supervisor. Supervisors are often left to interpret management mandates with a great deal of 
flexibility, resulting in variation between supervisory groups. Based on these assumptions, 
the implications from Zohar and Luria’s (2005) work are clear – when employees and 
supervisors are faced with competing demands, they will choose the behavior that is 
perceived to be the higher priority. If the priority behavior is safety, the choice will be safe 
behaviors. If the productivity has the higher priority, tasks will be completed with speed in 
mind rather than safety.  
 In addition to the multiple attempts to define the constructs of safety climate, an 
additional challenge for safety researchers has been validating a relationship between safety 
climate and safety behaviors. Zohar (2000) and Zohar and Luria (2005) have set the stage for 
work in this area as well. Additionally, Johnson (2007) was able to confirm the predictive 
validity of Zohar and Luria’s (2005) safety climate survey. Using the Zohar and Luria 
Organizational-Level and Group-Level Safety Climate instruments, Johnson (2007) 
corroborated a link between safety climate and injury rates with safe behaviors as a 
mediating effect. The same safety climate instrument (Zohar & Luria, 2005) also directly 
predicted safe behavior and injury severity (as measured by lost work days) (Johnson, 2007).  
 The level of safety climate describes the employee perception of the weight of safety 
issues in work performance and the strength of the safety climate measures the level of 
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agreement concerning the safety climate level (Zohar, 1980). Although the two 
measurements may be positively related, this is not always the case. Of the two measurement 
indicators, Zohar and Luria (2005) determined the level of safety climate has a more 
significant effect on organizational safety than does safety climate strength.  
 Implications from research on safety climate and safe behaviors suggest managers 
and supervisors should focus on developing a proactive environment which promotes safe 
behaviors rather than a punishing environment which reacts to injuries and incidents 
(Johnson, 2007; Zohar, 2000; Zohar & Luria, 2005). This finding was echoed by 
Vredenburgh (2002). Her study of management practices identified two major predictors of 
employee injury rates in a hospital environment. These included: hiring individuals based on 
a good safety record and proactively addressing near-miss incidents and correcting the 
underlying cause before a recordable incident occurs. The study concluded that although 
safety training should be used, it is not adequate when used alone. Vredenburgh (2002) also 
suggested that hospitals who proactively protect their employees’ safety may gain a financial 
benefit resulting from reduced lost “down” time and worker compensation expenditures. 
 Although Vredenburgh (2002) found safety training to be less effective when used 
without corresponding safety messages, other researchers have found safety training to be 
important predictors of safety climate (Mullen, 2004; Neal et al., 2000; Wu et al., 2007). Wu 
et al. (2007) concluded that additional safety training would lessen employee risk exposures 
and improve employee safety behavior, resulting in fewer incidents. This study also 
suggested safety training would improve the employees’ emergency responses to safety 
incidents. In an agriculture setting, Murphy (2003) notes that although educational 
approaches have been used in the past, long term effectiveness and behavior change as a 
result of the educational intervention is questionable. Given this, he does not advise the 
abandonment of educational approaches.  
 Neal et al. (2000) found organizational climate was a significant influence on safety 
climate and safety climate was linked to self-reported safety compliance. Although mediating 
effects of safety climate links safety performance to organizational climate, no direct 
relationship was found between organizational climate and safety performance. When 
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considering the results of this study, it is important to remember that organizational climate 
encompasses a broad range of workplace perceptions and safety is only one of many 
evaluations made. However, the influence of organizational climate has been found to 
influence several organizational outcomes (Neal et al., 2000) and a key component of 
organizational climate is employee perception of organizational leadership (James & 
McIntyre, 1996).  
 Management and supervisor safety attitudes have been shown to effect safety climate, 
but the magnitude of this effect has differed (Clark, 1999; Cooper & Phillips, 2004; Flin et 
al., 2000; Seo et al., 2004). Cooper and Phillips (2004) characterize the relationship as 
complex, with changes in perceptions not always resulting in safety performance and vice 
versa. They cite the use of self-reported safety performance outcomes as a key limitation in 
measuring the relationship between safety climate and safety performance. Flin et al. (2000) 
suggest safety climate components and themes vary greatly according to differences in 
industry, company, and work practices.  
 Clark (1999) found organizational perceptions of workers, supervisors, and managers 
to be positive, but noted a lack of understanding and incorrect perceptions among groups. 
Negative or incorrect perceptions may incorrectly influence group beliefs. Because 
perceptions are not necessarily based on fact, but rather the employees’ interpretation of 
facts, correct information about group safety perceptions is important for managers to 
remember when making judgments about workers in different hierarchy levels (Clark & 
Payne, 1997). In addition, prior beliefs, employee attitudes, and individual differences have 
also been shown to affect perceptions (Henning et al., 2009; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2004) and 
these differences must be considered when communicating with employees.  
 Furthermore, Das et al. (2008) note that safety climate has a significant perceptual 
component. This means employees may recognize and construe information or episodes quite 
differently and the management and supervisors may have little control over these 
perceptions. Keren et al. (2009) reiterate this, stating that employees do not respond directly 
to workplace incidents, but perceive and interpret events which occur in their work 
environment before taking action. 
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 Because perceptions are not necessarily based on fact, but rather the employees’ 
interpretation of facts, correct information about group safety perceptions is important 
information for managers and supervisors (Clark & Payne, 1997). Prior beliefs, employee 
attitudes, and individual differences have also been shown to affect employee perceptions 
(Henning et al., 2009; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2004). Even after over 30 years of research 
attempting to predict workers’ safety behavior, researchers still have no conclusive model to 
predict accidents before they occur. They are limited to analyzing the accident after the fact, 
which is subject to a great deal of bias.   
 Although post-accident analysis provides valuable information, understanding factors 
which predict or characterize unsafe employee behaviors before they occur would be an even 
better tool for managers and supervisors. Although no past model has been able to explain or 
predict safe behaviors before they happen, this has not kept researchers from attempting to 
understand why workers behave in an unsafe way. The next section summarizes research in 
this area.  
WORKER SAFETY BEHAVIOR 
 Two main angles of research on the safety behavior of workers will be overviewed in 
this review. First, one set of researchers have attempted to explain the ways employees 
violate safety rules and the factors which may contribute to unsafe behavior. A second group 
tries to predict employee behavior by identifying factors and creating predictive models. 
Neither provides a complete answer, but they do help to partially explain why workers 
routinely violate the long-held assumption of self-preservation in the workplace.  
 Hofmann et al. (1995) and Simard and Marchand (1995) report that safety behavior is 
related to organizational and group level influences. Hofmann et al. (1995) point to two 
broad factors: a lack of respect for technology driving workplace safety and employee 
attitudes. Concerning the lack of respect for technologies, the phrase “familiarity breeds 
contempt” seems the best descriptor. This thought is forwarded by Zohar and Erev (2007), 
who also site a flawed weighting of hazards by the employee and the delayed and uncertain 
occurrence of negative outcomes resulting from not following safety procedures as major 
contributors towards irresponsible behavior. Worker attitudes are generally defined as a 
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failure to wear protective gear, failure to follow procedures, and insufficient training 
(Hofmann et al., 1995; Kouabenan, 2009; Reason et al., 1998) 
 Simard and Marchand (1995) point to factors at several levels, including micro and 
macro organizational levels. They report that micro level factors such as work processes, 
hazards, and work group cohesiveness contribute to workers’ willingness to take safety 
initiatives. In their work, they found that many micro level factors are influenced by macro-
level factors such as managerial support and commitment. Numerous researchers have found 
supervisory and management commitment to be an important part of organizational and 
group safety outcomes (Clarke & Ward, 2006; Thompson et al., 1998; Zohar, 2000). 
However, after an accident, several researchers have noted the difference in perceptions 
between managers and first-line supervisors and coworkers of the victim. While the former 
generally attribute accidents to attitudes, knowledge, and behaviors of workers, the later 
blame the work environment, systemic weaknesses in safety or simple bad luck (Kouabenan, 
2009; Prussia et al., 2003; Walker, 2010). Conflicts between these two groups can negatively 
impact intervention programs aimed at improving workplace safety outcomes so resolving 
differences in perceptions between the groups should be a priority for managers and 
supervisors who are serious about improving safety. Prussia et al. (2003) suggest the way to 
do this is the improvement of organizational safety climate. Zohar (2000) adds that the 
improvement of group safety climate also promotes safer behavior by employees.  
 According to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 85% of workplace 
accidents result from unsafe behaviors (Anonymous, 2010), so understanding factors which 
predict workplace accidents is a high priority for researchers. Mullen’s (2004) qualitative 
work identified several individual factors which helped explain unsafe behaviors. Some of 
these include: role overload, performance versus safety, peer pressure, and avoidance of 
negative consequences. The first two factors address a common theme in the safety literature 
– the continual conflict between safety and productivity (Kouabenan, 2009; McClain & 
Jarrell, 2007). Additionally, although peer pressure can be position or negative, it is the 
negative pressure from peers that is typically highlighted in the literature (Keren et al., 2009; 
Mullen, 2004). Avoidance of negative consequences can be traced back to the commitment 
and support management and supervisors give to safety (Brown et al., 2000; Choudhry & 
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Fang, 2008; Seo, 2005; Zohar & Luria, 2005). Mullen (2004) uses the loss of a good job as 
an example of a potential negative consequence. From an employee perspective, all of the 
above factors would negatively impact their commitment to safety.  
 Mullen also mentions a factor that is especially prevalent in high reliability industries 
– defined as industries where safety is of utmost importance - and this is the worker’s 
“image”. Several interviewees reported taking unsafe risks to impress either supervisors or 
co-workers for the purpose of securing a job promotion or gain status within the organization 
or work group (Choudhry & Fang, 2008; Mullen, 2004). Zohar and Erev (2007) suggest that 
these types of behaviors can be either encouraged or discouraged by supervisors and 
management but that they must actively provide feedback and observation. Rewarding good 
behavior on a consistent basis is also suggested to alleviate risk-taking behaviors among 
employees.  
 Dekker (2002) takes a different approach, focusing on behavior after the accident 
occurs.  Because many accidents are the result of human error, it is important to understand 
why people acted the way they did rather than attempting to judge them with the luxury of 
hindsight. Dekker (2002) points out that hindsight adds bias and, along with the pressure to 
find a “fall guy” after a fatal accident or serious injury, works against the process of learning 
the mindset of the victim during his or her ordeal. Rather, he suggests that investigators focus 
less on the mistake and more on learning from the mistake. Instead of asking why the 
employee made the fatal error, he advises investigators to understand why the employee felt 
his or her actions were positive in that context.  
 Edmondson (1996) also focuses on accident analysis but in situations which are 
typically not fatal to employees. She terms the ability to openly discuss mistakes and errors 
without retribution from supervisors or management as “psychological safety”. Her work 
within the hospital environment made the surprising discovery that the most functional work 
teams were those with the highest reports of medical errors rather than those groups with low 
error rates. What she found was that reporting of errors was linked to the perceived openness 
and acceptance of group leaders to errors committed by the team. Ironically, she concluded 
that work teams with the greatest need for improvement are the most unlikely to report errors 
which could improve their performance.  
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 Edmondson (1996) suggested that these findings also had implications for the 
management of quality performance and improvements. The importance of work teams and 
their ability to find and correct errors may be disabled by group tensions or ineffective 
communications. These connections and other quality management research within the 
agricultural production and handling industry will be discussed in the next section.  
 
QUALITY MANAGEMENT IN AGRICULTURE 
 Process controls and verification of standards inherent to quality management 
systems are not new to many industries, but these ideas are very new to bulk commodity 
handling and processing firms (Hurburgh & Lawrence, 2003). Preliminary research on the 
use of quality management systems within a bulk commodity handling and processing 
facility demonstrated several benefits including increased operating efficiency, a better 
ability to meet customer specifications, and tighter food security controls (Laux, 2007; Laux 
& Hurburgh, 2010).  
 The global framework for quality management is the ISO 22000 and 9001 series of 
standards. The adoption of ISO quality standards forces a greater control of processes, an 
increased discipline and reproducibility, and continuous improvement within an organization. 
Quality is an important operational goal for many firms. As quality processes improve, 
benefits such as reduced waste, lower costs, and increased firm performance are often noted 
(Sroufe & Curkovic, 2008).  
 Although some companies pursue quality management systems at the request of their 
customers (Davis, 2004; Willem, 2004), a lack of internal motivation could limit the 
realization of organizational benefits. For this reason, an internal champion is an important 
part of the success of quality management programs (Chrusciel, 2004). Programs pushed 
from the top down are especially vulnerable to failure (Sroufe & Curkovic, 2008). Even 
when a quality management system creates operating efficiencies and increases profits – 
giving clear benefits to the firm- implementation of such a system in bulk commodity 
handling presents several challenges. 
 Among the most significant challenges is the business environment (Hurburgh & 
Hansen, 2002; Voigt, 2005). A commodity-based business focuses on large volumes, with 
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low profit margins, for the lowest cost. Although adoption of quality management has the 
potential to create opportunities for increased efficiency and profits (Laux, 2007), recognition 
of these advantages remains a major priority for employee training and education. 
 A second obstacle for the commercial grain handling industry is that the management 
of quality in agricultural commodities is changing (Hurburgh & Lawrence, 2003). Production 
agriculture is becoming more focused on product isolation, source verification, traceability 
and other differentiation processes that add value to bulk commodity crops and respond to 
consumer, regulatory, and industry needs (Miranowski et al., 2004).  Even outside specialty 
markets, the quality of grain is a key consideration in its storability, marketability, and end 
uses (Reed, 2006). In both existing and emerging agricultural markets, efficiencies in bulk 
grain handling can be facilitated through a quality management system (Laux, 2007; Thakur 
et al., 2009).  
 These systems have been used in manufacturing to improve efficiency and maintain 
high levels of quality (Bowersox, Closs, & Cooper, 2007; Das et al., 2008; Deming, 2000), 
but have had limited use in bulk commodity agricultural handling (Hurburgh & Lawrence, 
2003). However, the need and receptivity in bulk commodity handling is shown by the 
growth in quality management system certification in this sector (ISO, 2005). 
 Historically, the United States competed strongly with other grain-producing nations, 
but as other nations improve processes, increase production capability, and escalate their use 
of technology, commodity crops grown in the United States have lost much of the 
competitiveness they once had in terms of both price and quality (Laux, 2007). The 
commodity-based system that has been in use for nearly 100 years has several inadequacies 
that are not managed well by the current system of grain handling and management. These 
include (Adam & Hong, 2001):  
 Because the system has a limited ability to separate high grade grain from low grade 
grain, all grain is assumed to meet only the minimum standard grade; 
 No way exists to quickly differentiate high value traits at the grain elevator, so 
producers have no motivation to produce high value traits; 
 Grain elevators have little incentive to encourage high quality grain because they 
profit from discounts charged to the producer;   
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 Blending low quality grain with higher quality grain to form a consistent level of 
grain quality is another form of profit for grain elevators; 
 Elevators are hesitant to pay quality-adjusted prices because they risk losing a 
customer if they do not offer a competitive commodity-based price; and 
 Producers tend to be fairly risk adverse – they prefer a known market (certain price 
with well-defined discount rates) rather than a more speculative market price (Adam 
& Hong, 2001) 
 Quality management systems by way of ISO certification are offered by Caswell et 
al., (1998) as one option to increase agricultural competitiveness and efficiency in the global 
marketplace. Capmany et al. (2000) note that commodity agricultural products could realize 
more benefits of quality management systems, particularly in the areas of firm image, waste 
reduction, and costs of inventory management, but acknowledge the uncertainty regarding 
the costs and benefits of such systems. Initial studies on quality management systems within 
the agricultural handling industry have shown both benefits (Holleran et al., 1999; Laux, 
2007; Laux & Hurburgh, 2010; Mumma et al., 2002) and additional costs (Capmany et al., 
2000; Holleran et al., 1999). 
 Most studies of ISO 9001 and ISO 22000 use in agriculture have aligned with general 
research on the subject in that the firms who embrace the change in management practices 
and use the certification process to improve quality processes benefit the most of the use of 
quality management systems (Sroufe & Curkovic, 2008). Laux (2007) identified several of 
the core processes needed for the development of a quality management system in a grain 
handling environment. These include: receipt of the product, storage of product, and shipping 
the product to the next user. The limited storage life of grain products is a significant 
consideration in managing the quality of such products (Fleurat-Lessard, 2002; Reed, 2006). 
Therefore, a key component of such a system is the appropriate handling and storage of 
incoming raw materials (Luning & Marcelis, 2007). These duties fall to employees and their 
decisions on how to handle and store grain products can have a large impact on the success 
of such systems. Luning and Marcelis (2007) acknowledge that although technical actions 
typically dominate quality management models, considering only the technical actions is an 
overly simplistic approach. They list several “human dynamics” which clearly impact the 
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quality management model, including tasks such as handling out of tolerance products, 
corrective actions, critical decisions, and appropriate action points.  
 The gap between the technical conditions and human dynamics can be partially 
addressed by quality decision-making research. The decisions made by employees have a 
clear role in any given quality management system. Understanding this role has the potential 
to improve the quality system processes, which in turn may improve quality performance at 
both the organizational and group level. 
 
  DECISION-MAKING THEORY  
 To address the gap between the perceptions of employees and the safety-related 
behavior of employees, Keren et al. (2009) established a framework for an examination of 
the relationship between safety climate and safety decision-making, where the decision 
making process reflects proximate behavior. The concept is defined by processes which are 
thought to play a role in the safety-related decisions employees make on the job. This work 
also introduces the concept of quality decision-making and the processes which are 
hypothesized to play a role in decisions concerning workplace quality systems. The next 
section of the literature review will provide an overview of the topic of decision making as it 
relates to occupational safety and management of quality.   
 The safety decision scenario in this work explores personal risk while the quality 
decision scenario involves business risk. Amendola (2001) summarizes decision making 
under risk as a three step process: establish probability and degree of the hazard, assess the 
benefits and costs, and establish priorities so that the greatest benefits can be realized at the 
lowest cost. Although Amendola’s decision making paradigm does not specifically address 
safety, many of its features are applicable in a safety environment. When making risky 
decisions (often the case with safety-related decisions and in some quality decisions), Slovic 
(1993) asserts that the decision making process may not follow a rational pattern, and 
therefore, may not conform to any standard decision making theories.  
 Several other psychological theories on decision-making help explain a worker’s 
decision-making process under risky conditions. Traditionally, a fundamental basis for risky 
decision-making has been the Expected Utility Theory (EUT) which posits that when people 
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make risky decisions, they weigh several options and the likelihood of each occurring 
(Newell, Lagnado & Shanks, 2007; Zohar & Erev, 2007). The option with the highest 
“utility” to the decision-maker is the final decision choice. However, the process is not 
always so straightforward. When comparing benefits between safe behaviors and unsafe 
behaviors under the framework of the EUT, unsafe behaviors are clearly favorable to the 
employee in terms of effort and time expended (Zohar & Erev, 2007), even though the 
decision choices are obviously unsafe and therefore, have a lower utility to the decision-
maker. The choice of an unsafe option also refutes the long held assumption that self-
preservation outweighs other employee motivations (Maslow, 1970).   
 Several violations to the EUT have been noted by researchers over the years, with 
three noted by Newell et al. (2007). Researchers have doubted the ability of humans to act 
rationally when making decisions, due in part to limitations in cognitive processing and 
availability of information. Notably, Herbert Simon (1955, 1956) redefined the human 
decision-making process as one which took advantage of the restricted information and 
cognitive resources to make a decision that were “good enough” rather than ideal in terms of 
utility.  
 A second criticism of EUT in decision-making was offered by Edwards (1968) and 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974). They proposed that decision-making behavior used 
mathematical principles such as probability and probabilistic judgment, expanding the 
possibilities of information acquired and how it was used before a decision was made 
(Newell et al., 2007). The research served as a basis for the use of Bayes’ theorem and the 
bias and heuristic approach in decision-making research. 
 The final violation noted by Newell et al (2007) concerning the EUT refines the role 
of choice. Best represented by the Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), the theory 
posits that although humans attempt to make decisions maximizing their utility, both decision 
utility and probability are subject to cognitive distortions in the decision-making process. 
Although researchers have discovered many violations and weaknesses to the EUT, it still 
plays a large role in theoretically describing the decision-making process under risky 
conditions.  
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 A second theory which explains risky decision-making is the Prospect Theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). The Prospect Theory (PT) challenges the fundamental 
postulation of the EUT by suggesting that people are more apt to give more attention to low-
probability situations than to higher-probability occurrences – an example of the 
“distortions” introduced under the framework of the EUT (Tversky & Wakker, 1995). This 
theory also states that when a person stands to gain, risk adverse behavior is more common 
while those who perceive that they have nothing to lose exhibit more risk-seeking behavior. 
Newell et al. (2007) state that actual probabilities are often ignored by decision makers who 
underestimate common outcomes and overestimate rare outcomes. Additionally, Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979) demonstrated that decision-makers are more affected by decision 
outcomes that have a high probability of actually occurring rather than those that have a 
lower chance of happening. Both theories imply that people are more sensitive to risk than 
uncertainty.   
 Another factor which affects the utility of a decision and adds distortion to the 
decision process is the presence of or lack of pertinent information. Sharps and Martin (2002) 
propose that information retrieved to support positive decisions must be immediately 
accessible for it to be used. Even if applicable information is available in long term memory, 
books, manuals, or hard drives, information that is not seen at the time of the decision may 
have very little effect on the decision choice. In a safety environment, the practicality and 
possibility of having immediately accessible information for all potential unsafe actions is 
questionable if not impossible. Sharps and Martin’s (2002) calls into question the 
fundamental assumption of educational intervention and training. 
 Murphy (2003) applies a model similar to Amendola’s in an agricultural safety 
setting. The model involves four steps: assessing the problem, identification of risks 
(hazards), evaluating what works in addressing the problem, and a final implementation step. 
He links the approach to traditional models developed in the public health sector, where the 
overriding goal is behavior change. This approach goes beyond a one-time decision, and this 
is true for lasting occupational safety and quality as well. Murphy (2003) notes two 
behavioral models which could be applied in both a safety and quality scenario. These 
models are the Theory of Reasoned Action and the Theory of Planned Behavior. Both posit 
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that behavioral intentions immediately precede behavior. In both theories, the person will 
follow their intended action if the said behavior will lead to a desirable outcome, if others 
value the behavior, and if necessary resources and opportunities are available to support the 
behavior (Murphy, 2003).  
However, Murphy (2003) also notes that although behavioral theories have wide 
acceptance, limitations of the theories do exist. Two are especially relevant to the safety and 
quality decision-making process.  The first limitation is the issue of variance explained. Most 
models and theories of human behavior explain only a small amount of variance, meaning 
that human behavior can never be fully explained by these theories. Second, many intended 
behaviors are never actually carried out. This is the case, not only in cases of public health 
and safety, but also in workplace safety and quality intentions. Most models do not account 
for those who fail to convert intentions into actions (Murphy, 2003).   
 Another position on the Theory of Planned Behavior is offered by Fogarty and Shaw 
(2010) and this examines human error. Psychologists differentiate simple errors (defined as 
unintentional) from violations, in which employees willfully disregard safety procedures. 
Fogarty and Shaw (2010) argue that safety violations are explained by the psychological 
Theory of Planned Behavior. In a safety context, the Theory of Planned Behavior is based on 
the idea that a person’s behavior is a direct result of both their intentions and their perceived 
behavioral control. In turn, intentions are shaped by attitudes, subjective norms, and 
perceived behavioral control. In a work environment, subjective norms are perceived by 
employees based on behaviors and expectations of managers, supervisors, and co-workers 
while a person’s prominent beliefs form the basis for many of their attitudes. Perceived 
behavioral control is rooted in behavior intentions, based on the individual’s perception of 
the ease or difficulty of performing a specific behavior. The model constructed by Fogarty 
and Shaw (2010) included variables of management attitude, self-attitude, group norms, 
workplace pressures, the intention of the employee to violate the safety procedure, and the 
actual violations and all variables were found to be significant, accounting for a large 
proportion of variance in both intent to violate and violations.  
 Although little empirical evidence exists to link trust with quality climate and 
employee decision-making, the relationship can be explained theoretically by using the 
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theory of cognitive dissonance (Das et al., 2008). The theory was developed by Festinger 
(1957) and aims to explain the relationship among contradicting cognitions or “pieces of 
knowledge”. Operationally, the theory posits that when people are confronted with 
conflicting cognitions (i.e., quality or speed), they will attempt to resolve these conflicts to 
reduce the uncomfortable state of the mind. According to Das et al. (2008), employees will 
address the conflicts in one of three ways: first, ignore their own judgment and follow advice 
of the supervisor or manager; second, ignore the opinion of management and the supervisor 
and follow their own judgment; and third, delay action and do nothing until they are forced to 
make a decision. Of course, the third option does not solve the problem; rather, it just 
postpones the inevitable decision path until a later time. An assumption not acknowledged by 
the theory relates to another decision choice – that where the employee sees no contradiction 
with his or her “pieces of knowledge”. The model assumes that the decision in question 
presents a conflict of cognitions. 
 The trust literature provides another theoretical possibility. Davis et al. (2000) suggest 
that trusting relationships reduces the need for formal contracts, lessens devious behaviors, 
and lowers the need for hierarchical controls. Additionally, trust between two individuals is a 
relationship that cannot be recreated, which classifies it as a competitive advantage in terms 
of firm performance (Barney, 1986). Alternatively, in low trust environments, employees 
may have limited power to protest their frustrations so they resort to other mechanisms to 
fight back. These include: attempts to break management rules, setting inappropriate goals, 
and in a worst case scenario, sabotage (Davis et al., 2000). This differs from employee 
performance related behaviors in high trust environments, including empowerment of 
leaders, positive citizenship behaviors, and enhanced individual performance.  
 In this project, decision scenarios were presented to participants using Decision 
Mind™, a software platform using the decision process tracing method. Decision process 
tracing is an approach used to capture direct cognitive processes by directly evaluating the 
information an individual uses to form a judgment and the sequence with which the 
information was examined (Ford et al., 1989). Other key processes recorded include: the 
number of alternatives viewed, the time needed to make a choice, and the final decision. A 
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key advantage of process tracing is that it addresses the intervening steps between 
information acquisition and decision choice. 
 To gather this information, two methods are used: the decision board or the verbal 
protocol. Decision boards display possible alternatives for the decision maker to view 
privately while verbal protocols require the decision maker to describe to researchers what 
they are thinking or doing as they move through the decision process (Ford et al., 1989). 
Electronic decision boards provide a way to measure the decision process of an employee 
rather than just measuring the final decision choice.  
 Decision process tracing has several key advantages over self-reported 
questionnaires, which depend on recall ability and researcher observation of work behavior, 
which is cross-sectional at best and may have serious bias related to the Hawthorne and other 
effects. Decision process tracing also has benefits not realized with structural modeling.  The 
former focuses on the processes humans use to analyze and gather information in preparation 
to make a decision choice while the later emphasizes the outcome of the decision choice 
(Ford et al., 1989). Mintz (2004) adds another strength of the process tracing methodology – 
the ability to isolate decision rules and models used in the decision-making process as well as 
test the association of situational and personal factors with the decision process and the final 
decision choice. The latter is the use of the methodology in this study.  
 The objectives and aims of this research were framed and grounded by the research 
reviewed here. The knowledge from the research reviewed in Chapter 2 was important in the 
experimental design, analysis of the data, and interpretation of the results.  
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ABSTRACT 
Introduction: The safety priority perceptions of employees may be affected by several things, 
including their level of trust in their work group supervisor and organizational management. 
The level of safety climate is thought to be an important predictor of safe behavior at both 
organizational and work group tiers. Employee safety behaviors are the result of safety-
orientated decision-making. This study builds on the concept of safety decision-making and 
examines the relationship between perceptions of trust, safety climate and employee 
decision-making. Method: 178 employees of three commercial grain handling facilities 
completed questionnaires on perceptions of trust and safety climate and participated in a 
computerized safety decision-making simulation. Descriptive statistics, correlation, and 
hierarchical regression analysis were used to calculate the relationships between the 
variables. Results: Organizational and group level trust significantly predicted safety climate 
and the choice of a safer decision. Organizational and group safety climate levels 
significantly predicted a safer decision choice. Organizational trust showed a significant 
positive relationship with peer pressure, but no other decision dimension variables exhibited 
a significant relationship with trust or safety climate.  Impact on Industry: This study 
suggests that trust plays a role in safety climate perceptions of employees and further 
supports previous research proposing a two-level safety climate. Understanding the roles of 
other influencing factors is important for managers and supervisors who wish to promote safe 
work behavior for their employees. 
PROBLEM 
 Human factors play an important, but often overlooked, role in the management of 
safety in the work environment. Workplace safety is one of several competing organizational 
demands. The relative priority of these demands is formed by perception, based in part on 
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employee experiences and practices (Das et al., 2008; Zohar & Luria, 2005). One human 
factor which is believed to influence employees’ perception of safety is trust. Although 
linkages between trust and safety outcomes (Conchie & Donald, 2008; Edmondson, 1996; 
Vredenburgh, 2002; Whitener et al., 1998) and between safety climate and safety behavior 
have been explored in past research (Cooper & Phillips, 2004; Johnson, 2007; Thompson, 
Hilton, & Witt, 1998; Zohar, 2002), little attention has been paid to the linkages of employee 
trust or safety climate to employee decision-making, an important precursor to employee 
behavior. Because safe workplaces depend heavily on the decisions employees make on the 
job (Keren, Mills, Freeman & Shelley, 2009; Zohar & Erev, 2007) an increased 
understanding of factors influencing employee decision-making processes provides 
information helpful to the development of specific safety counter measures, best practices for 
management, or targeted educational intervention.   
TRUST AND SAFETY 
 Trust has been shown by previous safety researchers to clearly play a role in safety 
related outcomes in the workplace (Burns, Mearns & McGeorge, 2006; Conchie & Burns, 
2008; Cox, Jones, & Collinson, 2006). Several positive organizational outcomes have been 
linked with positive employee trust perceptions, including high quality communication, 
performance levels, constructive citizenship behaviors, increased problem solving, and 
employee cooperation (Whitener et al., 1998). Furthermore, the effect of supervisors and 
management on the safety perceptions of employees has been discussed by many researchers 
and practitioners (Arboleda et al., 2003; Keren et al., 2009; Petersen, 2000; White & Eiser, 
2006; Whitener et al., 1998; Zohar, 2000, 2002; Zohar & Luria, 2005), but none have 
specifically studied the relationship between trust and safety climate. Although trust has been 
suggested as a contributing factor in previous studies (Clark, 1999; Conchie & Donald, 2008; 
Mullen, 2004; Seo, Torabi, Blair, & Ellis, 2004), little research has measured the strength of 
the relationship between organizational and group-level trust and safety climate.  
 Although few studies have tested the impact of trust on safety climate, low trust 
levels have been linked to several negative safety and organizational outcomes. First, a lack 
of trust in administrators may divert the employees’ attention from their assigned tasks 
(Mayer & Gavin, 2005). Moreover, employees who are concerned or worried about the 
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behavior of their boss may not be focusing on improving their own work or concentrating on 
their personal safety.  Additional outcomes of low trust work environments may include 
increased attempts to break management rules or setting inappropriate goals which contradict 
organizational objectives (Davis et al., 2000). Kath, Magley & Marmet (2010) and Prussia, 
Brown and Willis (2003)  have suggested that settings where positive relationships between 
managers and employees are evident, a stronger agreement on safety concerns is present and 
is more likely to predict positive organizational safety outcomes. 
 Trust has been shown to be particularly important in high reliability organizations. 
High reliability organizations have been defined as those where safety is a critical component 
of operations (Cox et al., 2006). This is in part due to the intrinsic hazards of these 
organizations. Failure in safety systems at this level could lead to high level damage, injury, 
or loss of life (Cox et al., 2006). Examples from the literature include: aviation, 
biotechnology, offshore drilling, nuclear, and rail operations.  
 Even in organizations which do not present the potential for catastrophic hazards, 
McLain and Jarrell (2007) note that high production and technology demands often can result 
in mental and physical environments which could threaten organizational safety. Multiple 
demands on a worker’s time, together with a lack of control over work tasks, can blur 
behavior expectations for workers. Although management requires workers to be both safe 
and productive, sometimes these two priorities are incompatible, given the work environment 
(McLain & Jarrell, 2007).  
AGRICULTURAL SAFETY 
 Agriculture is not included on the list of high reliability organizations (Cox et al., 
2006) even though work environments within the commercial agricultural handling industry 
have no shortage of safety hazards. Production agriculture has long been considered a 
hazardous profession based on the number of safety incidents recorded annually (Chapman & 
Husberg, 2008; National Safety Council, 2007; U.S. Department of Labor, 2008). 
Management and supervisory personnel at commercial grain handling facilities deal with a 
wide variety of safety hazards including confined space concerns, chemical, biological, 
petroleum and electrical dangers and excessive noise (Lehtola, Brown, & Becker, 2008; 
OSHA, 1988, 2004; Rains, 2004; Roberts & Field, 2010). Other challenges of agricultural 
 
 
50 
 
 
 
worksites include the combination of large numbers of seasonal and temporary laborers and 
the intense pressure for high productivity during the busy spring and fall seasons (Brandon, 
2009; Chapman & Husberg, 2008; Lehtola et al., 2008).  
 On any given day, multiple hazards are presented to workers in the agricultural 
handling industry. Dangers are well known by workers (Walker, 2010) yet incidents still 
occur and injuries and fatality rates in the industry are perennially higher than those in other 
industries (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010).  
 
SAFETY CLIMATE 
 One measurement which is hypothesized to influence organizational climate and 
serve as a frame of reference for employee behavior is safety climate (Flin, Mearns, 
O’Connor, & Bryden, 2000; Williamson et al., 1997). Safety climate was introduced by 
Zohar (1980) as a measurement of shared employee perceptions concerning the relative 
importance of safety as compared with other organizational goals. To measure and describe 
the parameters of safety climate, researchers use the terms level and strength. The level of 
safety climate refers to the perception scores given by workers while the strength reflects the 
agreement on the level of safety climate. The two do not necessarily exhibit a positive 
relationship (Keren et al., 2009).  Others have defined and discussed factors which predict 
safety climate (Cooper & Phillips, 2004; Griffin & Neal, 2000; Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 2000; 
Zohar, 2002), but disagreement on the constructs and dimensions which predict or describe 
an organization’s safety climate remains.  
 Despite differences among researchers, dominant themes have emerged. One theme 
which has been revealed repeatedly is the commitment management and supervisors have 
towards safety (Cavazza & Serpe, 2009; Conchie & Donald, 2008; Neal et al., 2000). While 
researchers have established the important role management and supervisors play in 
predicting the strength and level of safety climate (Clarke, 1999; Cooper & Phillips, 2004; 
Flin et al., 2000; Mullen, 2004; Zohar, 2000, 2002), they have not come to an agreement on 
specific aspects management and supervisory teams should concentrate on to increase 
organizational and group level safety. 
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 Cooper and Phillips (2004) characterize the relationship between management and 
supervisory commitment and safety climate as complex, with changes in climate level and 
strength not always resulting in more positive safety performance. They cite the use of self-
reported safety performance outcomes as a key limitation in measuring the relationship 
between safety climate and safety performance. Flin et al. (2000) suggest safety climate 
components and themes vary greatly according to differences in industry, company, and 
work practices.  
 A second theme emphasized by safety researchers is the importance of work group 
attitudes towards safety (Pousette, Larsson & Torner, 2008; Zohar & Luria, 2005). Seo et al. 
(2004) suggested that management commitment to safety was an influencing factor on 
supervisor commitment to safety, suggesting a relationship between safety attitudes from the 
organizational level and the group level.  
 Zohar and Luria (2005) present a multilevel model of safety climate based on a 
theoretical framework outlined by Zohar (2000, 2003). The model assumes that employees 
are continually presented with a large number of inconsistent and conflicting demands from 
both management and supervisors. A second assumption is that although the management 
may create policies and regulations, the daily implementation of the resulting actions and 
tasks on the work floor is left to the supervisors (Zohar, 2000, 2003). Supervisors are often 
left to interpret management mandates with a great deal of flexibility, resulting in variation 
between work groups.  
  In testing their multi-level model of safety climate, Zohar and Luria (2005) found 
that organizational (management) climate predicts group (supervisory) climate, which in turn 
predicts worker behavior. The routine of work practices played a role as well, with stronger 
relationships noted between organizational and group climate when work routines were more 
structured and formalized. One reason for this observation could be that the greater the 
routine, the less flexibility supervisors have to interpret the implementation of daily practices 
and procedures (Zohar & Luria, 2005).  
 An additional challenge for safety researchers has been validating a predictive 
relationship between safety climate and safety behaviors. Zohar (2000) and Zohar and Luria 
(2005) have led work in this area. Johnson (2007) confirmed the predictive validity of Zohar 
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and Luria’s (2005) safety climate survey. Through this survey, both researchers (Johnson, 
2007; Zohar & Luria, 2005) were able to confirm a link between safety climate and injury 
rates with safe behaviors as a mediating effect.  
 
SAFETY BEHAVIOR 
 Even with these initial relationships confirmed, the predictive power between safety 
climate and lagging indicators such as self-reported employee behavior, injury rates, accident 
records, and other indicators has not been shown conclusively (Cooper & Phillips, 2004;  
Keren et al., 2009). Part of this is because of the inherent limitations of lagging indicators, 
which only emerge after an incident has occurred. In contrast, leading indicators such as 
safety climate present themselves prior to a safety event, giving management and supervisors 
the chance to address negative behaviors or potential risks before they become a problem. 
Hudson (2009) notes that although leading indicators are often available to managers, many 
choose to ignore them in favor of higher priority production and financial concerns. Adding 
to this are data which show that although many unsafe behaviors occur in a day, very few of 
these result in accidents or injuries (Reason, 1997; Vredenburgh, 2002; Zohar & Erev, 2007). 
Additionally, most accidents do not have a straightforward cause and effect relationship but 
are the result of a series of events and interacting factors (Brown, 2000; Choudhry & Fang, 
2008; Prussia, Brown & Willis, 2003). All of these factors make prediction of employee 
safety behavior difficult and limit the predictive power of safety climate when used alone.  
 Furthermore, Das et al. (2008) note that safety climate has a significant perceptual 
component. This means employees may recognize and construe information or episodes quite 
differently and the management and supervisors may have little control over these 
perceptions. Keren et al. (2009) reiterates this, stating that employees do not respond directly 
to workplace incidents, but perceive and interpret events which occur in their work 
environment before taking action. 
 Clark (1999) found organizational perceptions of workers, supervisors, and managers 
to be positive overall, but noted a lack of understanding and incorrect perceptions among 
groups. Negative or incorrect perceptions may incorrectly influence group beliefs about other 
work expectations. Because perceptions are not necessarily based on fact, but rather the 
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employees’ interpretation of facts, correct information about group safety perceptions is 
important information for managers and supervisors (Clark & Payne, 1997). Prior beliefs, 
employee attitudes, and individual differences have also been shown to affect employee 
perceptions (Henning et al., 2009; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2004). 
 
SAFETY DECISION-MAKING 
 Keren et al. (2009) established a framework for studying the relationship between 
safety climate and safety decision-making, with the decision choice representing proximate 
behavior. The concept is defined by factors which are thought to play a role in the safety-
related decisions employees make on the job, termed dimensions. The safety decision-
making task explored in the present research addresses a scenario of personal risk. 
 Amendola (2001) summarizes decision making under risk as a three step process: 
establish probability and degree of the hazard, assess the benefits and costs, and establish 
priorities so that the greatest benefits can be realized at the lowest cost. Amendola’s decision 
making paradigm does not specifically address safety, but many of its features are applicable 
in a safety environment. When making risky decisions (often the case with safety-related 
decisions), Slovic (1993) asserts that the decision making process may not follow a rational 
pattern, and therefore, may not conform to any standard decision making theories.  
 Even so, several psychological theories have been offered to explain a worker’s 
decision-making process under risky conditions. Murphy (2003) applies a model similar to 
Amendola’s in an agricultural safety setting. The model involves four steps: assessing the 
problem, identification of risks (hazards), evaluating what works in addressing the problem, 
and a final implementation step. He links the approach to traditional models developed in the 
public health sector, where the overriding goal is behavior change. The approach goes 
beyond a one-time decision, and this philosophy must be true for enduring occupational 
safety. Murphy (2003) notes the Theory of Planned Behavior is one of many behavioral 
models that can be applied to safety. The Theory of Planned Behavior posits that behavioral 
intentions immediately precede behavior. People will follow their intended action if the said 
behavior will lead to a desirable outcome, if others value the behavior, and if necessary 
resources and opportunities are available to support the behavior (Murphy, 2003). 
 
 
54 
 
 
 
 Another position on the Theory of Planned Behavior is offered by Fogarty and Shaw 
(2010) and this examines human error. Psychologists differentiate simple errors (defined as 
unintentional) from violations, where employees willfully disregard safety procedures. 
Fogarty and Shaw (2010) argue that safety violations are explained by the psychological 
Theory of Planned Behavior. In a safety context, the Theory of Planned Behavior is based on 
the idea that a person’s behavior is a direct result of both their intentions and their perceived 
behavioral control. In turn, intentions are shaped by attitudes, subjective norms, and 
perceived behavioral control. In a work environment, subjective norms are perceived by 
employees based on behaviors and expectations of managers, supervisors, and co-workers 
while a person’s prominent beliefs form the basis for many of their attitudes. Perceived 
behavioral control is rooted in behavior intentions, based on the individual’s perception of 
the ease or difficulty of performing a specific behavior. The model constructed by Fogarty 
and Shaw (2010) included variables of management attitude, self-attitude, group norms, 
workplace pressures, the intention of the employee to violate the safety procedure, and the 
actual violations and all variables were found to be significant, accounting for a large 
proportion of variance in both intent to violate and violations.  
 Traditionally, a fundamental basis for risky decision-making has been the Expected 
Utility Theory (EUT) which posits that when people make risky decisions, they weigh 
several options and the likelihood of each occurring (Newell, Lagnado & Shanks, 2007; 
Zohar & Erev, 2007). The option with the highest “utility” to the decision-maker is selected 
as the final decision choice. However, the process is not always so straightforward. When 
comparing benefits between safe behaviors and unsafe behaviors under the framework of the 
EUT, unsafe behaviors are clearly favorable to the employee in terms of effort and time 
expended (Zohar & Erev, 2007), even though the decision choices are obviously unsafe and 
therefore, have a lower utility to the decision-maker. The choice of an unsafe alternative also 
refutes the long held assumption that self-preservation outweighs other employee motivations 
(Maslow, 1970).   
 A variety of violations to the EUT have been noted by researchers over the years, 
with three noted by Newell et al. (2007). Researchers have doubted the ability of humans to 
act rationally when making decisions, due in part to limitations in cognitive processing and 
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availability of information. Notably, Herbert Simon (1955, 1956) redefined the human 
decision-making process as one which took advantage of the restricted information and 
cognitive resources to make a decision that was “good enough” rather than ideal in terms of 
utility.  
 A second criticism of EUT in decision-making was offered by Edwards (1968) and 
Tversky & Kahneman (1974). They proposed that decision-making behavior used 
mathematical principles such as probability and probabilistic judgment, expanding the 
possibilities of information acquired and how it was used before a decision was made 
(Newell et al., 2007). The research served as a basis for the use of Bayes’ theorem and the 
bias and heuristic approach in decision-making research. 
 The final violation noted by Newell et al (2007) concerning the EUT refines the role 
of choice. Best represented by the Prospect Theory (PT) (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), the 
theory posits that although humans attempt to make decisions maximizing their utility, both 
decision utility and probability are subject to cognitive distortions in the decision-making 
process. Although researchers have documented many violations and weaknesses to the 
EUT, the theory still plays a large role in theoretically describing the decision-making 
process under risky conditions.  
 PT challenges the fundamental postulation of the EUT by suggesting that people tend 
to overweight low-probabilities and underweight higher-probabilities – an example of the 
“distortions” introduced under the framework of the EUT (Tversky & Wakker, 1995). This 
theory also states that when a person stands to gain, risk adverse behavior is more common 
while those who perceive that they have nothing to lose exhibit more risk-seeking behavior. 
Newell et al. (2007) state that actual probabilities are often ignored by decision makers who 
underestimate common outcomes and overestimate rare outcomes. Additionally, Kahneman 
and Tversky, (1979) demonstrated that decision-makers can be more affected by decision 
outcomes that have a lower probability of actually occurring but more impact rather than 
those that have a stronger chance of happening but with a lower or uncertain impact. Both the 
EUT and Prospect Theory imply that people are more sensitive to risk than uncertainty.   
 Zohar and Erev (2007) offer three behavioral propensities that may explain an 
employee’s willingness to behave in an unsafe manner. First as shown by Kahneman and 
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Tversky (1979), people tend to underweight future outcomes of unsafe behavior, especially if 
the outcome does not become evident immediately, such as when using personal protective 
equipment or exposure to extreme noise. A second behavioral inclination is to overlook the 
potential injury hazard of unsafe behaviors – in part because few of these unsafe behaviors 
actually result in injuries or fatalities. Reason (1997) and Heinrich (1931) estimated an injury 
or fatality rate of less than 1% for each safety violation (Zohar & Erev, 2007).  
 Finally, an employee’s decision can be classified by one of two types of outcomes. 
Internal outcomes are those which affect only the decision maker. Externalities are outcomes 
which affect other people. Zohar and Erev (2007) theorize that in the case of unsafe behavior, 
the externalities of the decision are typically underweighted by the decision maker in favor of 
positive internal outcomes such as savings in time and effort and an increase in productivity. 
In all these situations, the expected utility of unsafe decisions is clearly favorable to the 
utility of safe decisions (Keren et al, 2009). However, the hypothesis of researchers is that 
organizational factors have the potential to sway the balance of the utility for safe and unsafe 
decisions (Brown et al., 2000; Edmondson, 1996; Johnson, 2007; Neal et al., 2000; Seo, 
2005; Zohar & Luria, 2005). It is this hypothesis which is explored in the present research.  
 Another factor which affects the utility of a decision and adds distortion to the 
decision process is the presence of or lack of pertinent information. Sharps and Martin (2002) 
propose that information retrieved to support positive decisions must be immediately 
accessible for it to be used. Even if applicable information is available in long term memory, 
books, manuals, or hard drives, information that is not seen at the time of the decision may 
have very little effect on the decision choice. In a safety environment, the practicality and 
possibility of having immediately accessible information for all potential unsafe actions is 
questionable if not impossible. Sharps and Martin’s (2002) calls into question the 
fundamental assumption of educational intervention and training. 
MEASURING EMPLOYEE DECISION-MAKING 
  In this project, decision scenarios were presented to participants using Decision 
Mind™, a software platform using the decision process tracing method. Decision process 
tracing is an approach used to capture direct cognitive processes by evaluating the 
information an individual uses to form a judgment and the sequence with which the 
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information was examined (Ford et al., 1989). Other key processes recorded include: the 
number of alternatives viewed, the time needed to make a choice, and the final decision. A 
key advantage of process tracing is that it addresses the intervening steps between 
information acquisition and decision choice, considered a fundamental component of 
decision-making analysis (Mintz, 2004). 
 Decision process tracing has several key advantages over self-reported 
questionnaires, which depend on recall ability and researcher observation of work behavior, 
which is cross-sectional at best and may have serious bias related to the Hawthorne and other 
effects. Decision process tracing also has benefits not realized with structural modeling.  The 
process tracing focuses on the processes humans use to analyze and gather information in 
preparation to make a decision choice while the structural modeling emphasizes the final 
decision choice (Ford et al., 1989). Mintz (2004) adds another strength of the process tracing 
methodology – the ability to isolate decision rules and models used in the decision-making 
process as well as test the association of situational and personal factors with the decision 
process and the final decision choice. For these reasons, decision process tracing was utilized 
to study decision-making for the present study.  
 
METHODOLOGY AND MEASURES 
 This research seeks to better understand the relationship between employee 
perceptions of trust and safety at two levels of administration – organizational (management) 
and group (supervisory). A second goal of the research is to link these perceptions to 
employee safety decision-making choices and to the information employees use to make their 
final decision in an agricultural handling and storage facility.  
 Three instruments were used to measure the test variables: 1) a two-level 
questionnaire measuring behavioral workplace trust, 2) a two-level safety climate 
questionnaire, and 3) a computerized decision-making simulator. Perceptions of trust and 
safety climate were measured at two levels based on previous work by Zohar (2000, 2008). 
His research has suggested that although employees may informally communicate with their 
supervisor daily, communication with management is typically limited to more formal and 
less frequent exchanges. As a result of this, perceptions of the management and supervisors 
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by employees may be very different. Moreover, Zohar (2008) believes that while the 
management team may create and promote the organization’s policies and procedures, it is 
the supervisors that actually implement and interpret these policies. In this research, 
perceptions of management were classified as organizational level while supervisor 
perceptions were described as group level.  
 The Management Behavior Climate Assessment (Levin, 1999) was used to evaluate 
employee trust levels in their management and their supervisor as well as provide 
demographic data such as age, gender, and length of time with the organization. The 40 item 
instrument (20 items measuring perceptions of management and 20 items measuring 
perceptions of supervisors) was developed and validated by Levin (1999) as a behavioral 
measurement of trust in top level and executive level (supervisory) management. Variables 
were measured on a 5 point scale (1 = Almost or almost always; 2 = Usually; 3 = 
Occasionally; 4 = Seldom; and 5 = Rarely or never). Examples of items used included “top 
management tells the same story to each person they speak to” and “my supervisor does what 
he or she says they will do”.  Levin (1999) identified two factors to explain the concept of 
trust: consistency and credibility. Confirmatory factor analysis performed on data gathered 
for this project yielded similar results. Therefore, the aggregated means of employee 
responses regarding trust, consistency, and credibility are included in the model as the 
dependent variable. 
 To measure employee perceptions of safety climate, the Organization and Group 
Level Safety Climate instrument (Zohar & Luria, 2005) was used. The instrument consisted 
of 32 items and surveyed employees on two levels: organizational (management) and group 
(supervisory). Items were scored on a 5 point scale (1 = Strongly agree; 2 = Agree; 3 = 
Neutral; 4 = Disagree; 5 = Strongly disagree).Examples of items used include “top 
management react quickly to solve problems when told about safety hazards” and “my 
supervisor emphasizes safety procedures when we are working under pressure”. Factor 
analysis yielded one universal safety climate factor for management (organizational) and one 
for supervisors (group), therefore, aggregated scores for employee perceptions of 
organizational and group safety climate are used in analysis. Although the scale originally 
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used a three factor climate structure, the one factor climate structure has been suggested by 
others as adequate (Johnson, 2007; Zohar & Luria, 2005).  
 The second portion of the study measured employee decision making patterns. The 
safety decision scenario was created based on a fundamental safety concern in all work 
environments – the failure to follow standard operating procedures (SOPs) (Keren et al., 
2009; Zohar & Erev, 2007). The scenario was selected to reflect the response of an employee 
when he or she was presented a potential shortcut opportunity. The dilemma presented occurs 
commonly in the grain handling industry – the bridging of out of condition grain as it is 
unloaded from a grain storage container to a transportation vehicle (Brandon, 2009; Freeman, 
Kelley, Maier, and Field, 1998; Kingman & Field, 2005). The bridge blocks the flow of the 
grain and slows or stops the grain from moving.  
 Following SOPs will resolve the issue, but require additional time, slowing 
productivity and delaying shipments to clients. Fixing the problem quickly presents a major 
engulfment hazard to the employee. The dilemma presented to the employee asks him or her 
to decide whether to follow safety procedures and take additional time or fix the problem 
quickly but with an increased risk of injury or death.  
 The decision-making scenario facilitated use of the process-tracing method. This 
technique traces the information gathering process by recording data on the information 
viewed by the employee during a decision task. Data collected can then be used to infer 
information on the decision-making process used by employees as they make a choice (Ford 
et al., 1989; Keren et al., 2009; Payne et al., 1993). 
 The software platform used was Decision Mind™, a computerized decision-making 
simulation (Mintz, 2004). The decision structure is presented in a matrix format as shown in 
Table 1 with a set of alternatives and a set of dimensions. Alternatives define the choices 
available to the participant (C) and information is gathered by viewing the dimensions (D). 
Each square of the matrix (V) provides an evaluation of a given choice on a given dimension. 
The participant is asked to choose one alternative based on information acquired on the 
dimensions. Each square on the matrix is also assigned a numeric utility value on a scale 
from -10 to +10, with -10 indicating a negative evaluation and +10 a positive evaluation. The 
utility values represent the impact of the alternative within that specific dimension.  
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Table 1. Decision Mind
TM
 Decision Simulation Matrix 
 C1 C2 C3 C 4 
D1 V11 V21 V31 V41 
D2 V12 V22 V32 V42 
D3 V13 V23 V33 V43 
D4 V14 V24 V34 V44 
 
 The decision-making scenario was developed and critiqued by a panel of experts in 
grain elevator operations using a modified Delphi method (Linstone & Turoff, 2002). 
Weighted scores were assigned by the same panel of experts. Using the information 
contained within the matrix squares, employees viewed the information and then selected a 
decision choice. Scenarios were pilot tested on a small group with a moderate knowledge of 
grain elevator operations. Slight modifications were made to improve the clarity of survey 
instruments and the decision scenarios as a result of the pilot tests. The text of the scenario 
presented and the alternatives and dimensions are shown below. The matrix with outcomes 
and utility values is shown in the appendix. The text of the decision simulation was presented 
as follows: 
You and a co-worker are emptying a bin and working to fill a waiting truck. Your 
supervisor walks by to check on your progress and notices the flow of grain to the 
truck has slowed. Your supervisor suggests keeping the auger running while someone 
gets inside the bin to release the blockage and keep the grain flowing. You are 
surprised because your organization normally follows the grain safety handling 
standard administered by OSHA, which require lock out / tag out of the bin before 
entry. You need to decide what to do next. You have the following four options.  
 
 1. Enter the bin 
 2. Follow entrance procedure 
 3. Confront supervisor, follow procedure 
 4. Follow procedure and report supervisor 
 
These four factors could impact your decision: 
  
1. Safety 
2. Productivity 
3. Supervisor’s opinion of you 
4. Peer pressure 
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When you are ready, follow the steps below in order to initiate and complete the 
simulation 
CALCULATIONS AND VARIABLES 
 The dependent variables included the two measures of organizational and group trust 
and the two measures of organizational and group safety climate. The dependent variables 
are the aggregated mean of the individual participant scores for the level of trust variables 
(including trust, consistency, and credibility) in management and supervisory personnel and 
the aggregated mean of the individual participant scores for the level of safety climate for 
management and supervisory personnel.  
 The independent variables are the final choice made by each participant and the 
search index, as presented below. To provide a way to quantitatively present the information 
gathering process completed by participants, Keren, Freeman, and Schwab (2006) introduced 
the search index metric. The measurement calculates the ratio between the number of times 
information squares of one dimension have been reviewed as compared with the other 
dimensions. In this study, four dimensions were measured: Safety, Productivity, Supervisor 
Opinion, and Peer Pressure. Accordingly, the search indices are the Safety Search Index 
(S_SI), Productivity Search Index (P_SI), Supervisor Opinion Search Index (SO_SI), and 
Peer Pressure Search Index (PP_SI). Calculations are shown below.  
 
                 
       
 
 
∑   
 
            
         (1 
 
Where Nsafety denotes the number of times safety squares were viewed, and n denotes 
the number of times squares other than safety were viewed.  
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        (2 
 
Where Nproductivity denotes the number of times productivity squares were viewed, and 
n denotes the number of times squares other than safety were viewed.  
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       (3 
Where NSO denotes the number of times supervisor’s opinion squares were viewed, 
and n denotes the number of times squares other than supervisor opinion were 
viewed. 
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Where Npp denotes the number of times peer pressure squares were viewed, and n 
denotes the number of times squares other than peer pressure were viewed. 
 
 Index values which equal one indicate the dimension has equal importance to others 
in the decision-making process. Values less than or greater than one represent a dimension of 
less importance as compared with others or greater importance in relation to others, 
respectively. Values of one denote the dimension plays no more importance than any of the 
other dimensions; therefore, it is designated as the “ultimate mean”.  In this study, four 
dimensions were used: safety, productivity, supervisor’s opinion, and peer pressure. The 
orientation most affiliated with safety in this decision-making scenario is the safety index. 
Employees who viewed safety dimensions at a higher frequency were assumed to be 
considering safety as a prioritized source of information in their decision process. 
Consequently, they were of greater interest to researchers.  
HYPOTHESES 
 The hypotheses of this work focused on the relationship between employee 
perceptions of trust and safety and less on the constructs and factors making up these 
perceptions. For this reason, the hypotheses emphasize the association between the final 
decision choice and decision process and the climate variables. The study aimed to test the 
following null hypotheses: 
 
H1. The level of organizational trust does not predict the level of organizational safety 
climate.  
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H2. The level of organizational trust does not predict the choice of a safer decision in a safety 
decision-making task. 
H3.  The level of organizational trust does not predict a higher orientation to safety 
information in a safety decision-making task. 
H4. The level of organizational safety climate does not predict the choice of a safer decision 
in a safety decision-making task. 
H5. The level of organizational safety climate does not predict a higher orientation to safety 
information in a decision-making task.  
H6. The level of group trust does not predict the level of group safety climate. 
H7. The level of group trust does not predict the choice of a safer decision in a safety 
decision-making task.  
H8. The level of group trust does not predict a higher orientation to safety information in a 
safety decision-making task.  
H9. The level of group safety climate does not predict the choice of a safer decision in a 
safety decision-making task.  
H10. The level of group safety climate does not predict a higher orientation to safety 
information in a safety decision-making task.  
H11. The safety search index value does not differ significantly from the ultimate mean of 1.  
The perception instruments and decision simulations were both presented to 
employees in a web-based format. The decision simulations were offered on the Decision 
Mind™ platform and the trust and safety perception instruments were administered using 
Survey Monkey. The data collection process began with a letter of consent, followed by the 
trust and safety questionnaires. Questionnaires were presented in random order and 
questionnaire items were also randomized. The decision simulation was presented once 
perception questionnaires were completed. Employees were able to complete the steps of the 
process at different times as their schedule allowed. To connect data from instrument to 
instrument, employees were given a set of three identification numbers. No personal 
identifiers were linked with the identification numbers to eliminate the possibility of tracking 
participants’ responses.  
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 Participants were employees of three Midwestern grain handling facilities. Employees 
who would be subject to safety-related decisions in their daily jobs (i.e. those who worked 
clerical and administration were excluded) were offered the opportunity to participate in the 
project. Of the 410 invitations, 197 responded. Of these 197, 178 provided usable data, for a 
response rate of 43 percent. Employees were drawn from grain handling organizations which 
volunteered for the study. Although only three companies made up the sample, the service 
area of these three covered nearly one-third of the state’s area. Additionally, because a 
required condition of participation in this study was a two-level administrative system, the 
grain handling capacities for all three were large, varying between 18 million bushels and 
217 million bushels per year. According to capacity data provided by the each grain elevator 
and from the state Department of Agriculture, the aggregated handling capability of the three 
(approximately 58.3 million bushels of grain handled per year) makes up roughly 20% of the 
state’s grain handling capacity in an average year.  Data were collected from March until 
May of 2010. Mean responses from all organizations were measured to rule out significant 
effects from one company in the sample. No significant differences were found between 
companies in any of the variables so data from all three were aggregated for analysis. 
  Results were calculated using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS 18.0). 
Demographic information on the sample and a correlation matrix of bivariate correlations for 
organization and group level variables are presented first. The distributions of decision 
choices and mean comparison of search indices are presented next. To determine which 
factors were significant predictors of the dependent variables, hierarchical regression analysis 
was used (Cramer, 2003). The process of hierarchical regression is used to determine the 
variance explained by certain variables when other influencing factors are controlled. The 
order by which variables are entered is controlled by the researcher.  
 For this analysis, the independent variables were entered one at a time, and other 
independent variables were controlled as each new variable was entered. In this study, the 
variance in the dependent variables (trust, consistency, and credibility) due to safety climate, 
safety decision choice, and safety decision dimensions of safety, productivity, supervisor’s 
opinion, and peer pressure are of interest. The explained variance in safety climate due to 
safety decision choice and the decision dimensions of safety, productivity, productivity, 
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supervisor’s opinion, and peer pressure are also of interest in this study. Both sets of models 
were calculated at two tiers of administration: organizational (management) and group 
(supervisory).   
RESULTS 
 Demographic information on the sample and bivariate correlations for organizational 
and group variables are presented first. Next, the distribution of decision choices and search 
indices are presented. To determine which factors were significant predictors of the 
dependent variables, hierarchical regression analysis was used.  
 The sample contained 142 males and 35 females for a total sample size of 177. The 
age of participants ranged from below 21 to over 61, with the most common response being 
41-50 years of age. Two groups of employees made up the largest portion of the sample – 
those with less than three years on the job, (38.5%) and those who had been with the 
organization more than 10 years (34%). Nearly all (98%) had completed high school, with 
some (62%) completing at least some college.   
 To observe relationships between variables and guide regression analysis, bivariate 
two-tailed correlations were calculated for each of the organizational level variables. The 
correlation matrix is shown in Table 2. Values in parentheses represent scale reliabilities as 
calculated by Alpha’s Cronbach where relevant. Significant relationships between search 
indices are expected because a single search index is not independent of the others (Keren et 
al., 2006). When one index is emphasized, the others would be expected to have less 
emphasis, leading to the appearance of a negative significant correlation.  
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Table 2. Organizational Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations
a
 
Variable
a
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Trust 1 (0.96)       
Safety Climate .488** 1(0.95)      
Safety Decision -.205** -.219** 1     
Safety Index -.103 -.037 .155 1    
Productivity 
Index 
.144 .121 -.075 .011 1   
Supervisor 
Opinion Index 
-.039 -.082 .005 -.292** -.253** 1  
Peer Pressure 
Index 
.149* .031 -.119 -.301** -.182* -.137 1 
a
n = 178; **p< 0.01; *p< 0.05 
 Two-tailed bivariate correlations were also calculated for group variables. Table 3 
presents the correlation matrix for these variables. Scale reliabilities were calculated with 
Alpha’s Cronbach and these values are shown in parentheses, where relevant. Again, search 
indices are showing a negative significant relationship, but this is due to a lack of 
independence between search indices rather than because of a suggested relationship.  
Table 3. Group Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations 
Variable
a
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Trust 1(0.97)       
Safety Climate .456** 1(0.97)      
Safety Decision -.327** -.185* 1     
Safety Index -.102 .012 .155 1    
Productivity 
Index 
.070 .118 -.075 -.245** 1   
Supervisor 
Opinion Index 
.008 -.138 .005 -.292** -.253** 1  
Peer Pressure 
Index 
.0070 .080 -.119 -.301** -.182* -.137 1 
a
n = 178; **p< 0.01; *p< 0.05 
 The second component of data collection was the decision-making scenario. 
Information from the safety decision-making simulation contains two important data points: 
the final decision choice and information about the decision-making process. The decision-
making process is represented by the search index values, which reflect the information 
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acquired by respondents in each dimension as compared with the other three dimensions. A 
value of 1 for a particular dimension indicates that no emphasis was given to that dimension 
above the others and therefore, represents the ultimate mean or benchmark. A paired sample 
t-test was performed on each search index to compare its value with 1. T-test values for each 
index are presented in Table 4.  
Table 4. T-test values for information emphasis within a safety decision-making task
a
 
Search Index Mean S.D. t score P-level 
Safety 1.34 1.40 3.29 0.001 
Productivity 0.967 0.866 -0.526 0.600 
Supervisor’s Opinion 1.13 1.32 1.28 0.201 
Peer Pressure 0.978 0.911 -0.318 0.751 
a
n=177 
 Two dimensions were higher than 1, but only one of these, safety, was significantly 
higher than 1. The dimension of supervisor’s opinion was higher than one but not in a 
statistically significant way. The dimensions of productivity and peer pressure were given 
less than average emphasis by respondents, but the difference was not significant. The 
second data point contained within the decision-making simulation was the distribution of 
decision choices. These results are displayed in Figure 1.Numbers on top of each decision 
choice represent the utility value of that specific decision choice in the safety search 
dimension.  
Figure 1. Distribution of frequency of decision choices in a safety decision-making task
a 
 
a
n=160 
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 To measure how well the independent variables of safety climate level, safety 
decision choice, and the search indices of safety, productivity, supervisor’s opinion, and peer 
pressure explain the variance in the dependent variables, four regression models were 
estimated at each administrative tier. Three models used the trust factors as the dependent 
variable (i.e. trust, consistency, and credibility) and independent variables of safety climate 
level, decision choice, and the four decision indices. Variables were added individually to the 
model. The fourth model used the level of safety climate as the dependent variable and safety 
decision choice and the search indices.  
 Linear hierarchical regression techniques were used on all models to determine which 
variables could explain a significant amount of variance in the dependent variable. To 
calculate the proportion of variance explained by the independent variables of the model, 
standardized regression coefficients (r) and the coefficient of determination (r
2
) were 
calculated. The F test was used to determine if a statistically significant proportion of 
variance could be explained as each independent variable was entered into the model. Safety 
decision choices were reverse coded, with positive decisions having higher values, so 
negative relationships between decision choice and the trust and climate variables are 
desirable. The summary of the models from the organizational tier are shown in Table 5.  
Table 5. Summary of organizational hierarchical regression models
a,b
 
Independent 
variables
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Organizational 
trust
b
 
Organizational 
consistency
b
 
Organizational 
credibility
b
 
Organizational 
safety climate
b
 
Organizational 
safety climate 
c
0.436** 0.377** 0.375** ------ 
Safety decision 
choice 
-0.084 -0.075 -0.099 -0.203* 
Safety index 0.028 0.041 0.046 -0.019 
Productivity 
index 
0.110 0.075 0.124 0.084 
Supervisor 
opinion index 
0.052 0.020 0.044 -0.052 
Peer pressure 
index 
0.181* 0.198* 0.200* 0.055 
r
2
 0.264 0.210 0.224 0.062 
Adjusted r
2
 0.236 0.179 0.193 0.032 
F 9.164** 6.789** 7.344** 2.048 
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a
n=178;
b
dependent variables;
 c
values = standardized regression coefficients; **= p<0.01; 
*=p<0.05 
 Group models were created in the same way as those at the organizational level, with 
group trust, consistency, and credibility as the dependent variables and group safety climate 
level, quality decision choice, and the search indices as independent variables in the first 
three models. The final model used group safety climate level as the dependent variable and 
decision choice and the search indices as independent variables. As with the organizational 
models, standardized regression coefficients (r), the coefficient of determination (r
2
) and the 
F-test were used to test whether the incremental variance explained by each variable added to 
the model was statistically significant. Group models are summarized in Table 6.  
Table 6. Summary of group hierarchical regression models
a
 
Independent 
variables 
Group trust
b 
Group 
consistency
b 
Group 
credibility
b 
Group safety 
climate
b 
Group safety 
climate 
c
0.387** 0.362** 0.395** ---- 
Safety decision 
choice 
-0.244** -0.240** -0.211** -0.175* 
Safety index -0.069 -0.072 -0.063 0.061 
Productivity index -0.010 -0.023 -0.026 0.087 
Supervisor opinion 
index 
0.031 0.031 0.022 -0.065 
Peer pressure index 0.012 0.016 0.047 0.108 
r
2 
0.255 0.232 0.247 0.058 
Adjusted r
2 
0.226 0.207 0.217 0.027 
F 8.719** 7.70** 8.345** 1.894 
 
a
n=178;
b
dependent variables; 
c
values = standardized regression coefficients; **= p<0.01; 
*=p<0.05 
DISCUSSION 
 Several significant findings emerged from this study. Discussion of data will be 
presented in terms of the hypothesis tested. A major portion of this work measured the final 
decision choice of employees and these data will be discussed first. Four decision alternatives 
were offered to employees. With the exception of the small number (n=6) who chose to enter 
the bin, the frequency distribution of the other three options were nearly equal. Clearly, 
choice one (enter bin) is not a safe choice, and therefore, a negative choice from a safety 
perspective. Yet, both dimensions could be evaluated more positively in terms of the 
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productivity and supervisor opinion. In the decision-making scenario, peer pressure was 
framed to be a positive influence on safety rather than a negative effect. As expected, few 
employees chose the most unsafe option – to enter the bin. However, the fact that any of the 
respondents made this choice further supports the continuing importance of studying 
employee’s safety behavior (Brown, 2000; Hudson, 2009) – even when hazards are presented 
very clearly, employees still make unsafe decisions (Walker, 2010).   
 The other three alternatives presented in the decision-making scenario, while safer 
than the first decision, are not equal in terms of group and organizational safety. Choosing to 
follow the correct procedure does not target the issue of the supervisor asking the worker to 
break the SOP; therefore, it does not actually address the root cause of the problem. 
Confronting the supervisor, while a safe individual decision alternative, could have negative 
implications for future safety outcomes, especially considering that organizational and group 
safety often depend on teamwork and psychological safety – the freedom of workers to 
correct mistakes or incorrect orders (Das et al., 2008; Edmondson, 1996; Kath et al., 2010). 
Upsetting the supervisor or threatening the power structure of the work group has potentially 
negative implications. Additionally, this choice could negatively impact the trust between the 
supervisor and the employee, leading to future unsafe behaviors performed in retaliation by 
the employee (Davis et al., 2000). 
 The fourth choice has the best potential to improve safety outcomes in both the group 
and the organizational level. If supervisors are routinely advising workers to take safety 
shortcuts, this is a fact management should be aware of. The strong relationships noted 
between organizational trust and organizational safety climate, suggest the management 
would be supportive of employees reporting habitual safety offenders. Of course, if 
management took no action on the employee complaint, the decision to report the supervisor 
would likely not occur again, in part because of the lack of action by management to address 
the problem (Zohar, 2000; Zohar & Luria, 2005).  
  To determine the information employees used to make their decision choice, the 
search index was utilized as introduced by Keren et al. (2006). Search indices for four search 
dimensions – safety, productivity, supervisor opinion, and peer pressure – were compared 
with the mean of 1. A search index equaling 1 would indicate that no higher emphasis was 
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placed on a given dimension. Of the four search dimensions, only the dimension of safety 
was viewed by employees significantly more often than the mean. Therefore, hypothesis 11, 
which posited that no difference existed between the safety search index and 1, was rejected.  
 Although employees emphasized safety in their information processing, this does not 
necessarily mean that safety played a significant role in decision choice, especially when 
other variables such as trust and safety perceptions were entered into the regression model. 
None of the other search dimensions showed a significant difference from 1, therefore, a 
conclusion can be made that the dimensions of productivity, supervisor’s opinion, and peer 
pressure, were not prioritized at higher or lower amounts than other dimensions included in 
the decision-making scenario. 
 Organizational data revealed several patterns, some expected and some unexpected. 
The strong relationships between the organizational trust variables and safety climate at the 
organizational tier are noteworthy, indicating that more positive perceptions of organizational 
trust, consistency, and credibility predicted a more positive opinion concerning 
organizational safety climate. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 was rejected.  
 The finding provides empirical basis for a relationship that many researchers (Clark, 
1999; Mayer & Gavin, 2005; McLain & Jarrell, 2007) have implied and supports similar 
findings by Kath et al. (2010).  Based on these data, the perception of consistent and credible 
behaviors by management predicts a high level of organizational safety climate, but the 
composite score of trust perceptions explains a higher degree of variance in the model. This 
finding is not unexpected, as other researchers have theorized that trust is a fundamental 
component to dedicated and fulfilled employees (Kath et al., 2010). This highly engaged 
workforce could hypothetically lead to positive behavioral actions, including cooperation, 
teamwork, and high quality communication (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002; Kramer, 2006).  
 Hypothesis 2 asked if trust, consistency, and credibility could significantly predict the 
choice of a safer decision. Hypothesis 3 tested whether trust, consistency, and credibility 
could predict an increased orientation to safety during the decision-making process. 
Organizational trust, consistency, and credibility were not found to significantly predict the 
choice of a safer decision in the regression model, failing to reject Hypothesis 2. 
Furthermore, the organizational trust variables could not significantly predict an increased 
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emphasis on safety as employees completed the decision-making process, failing to reject 
Hypothesis 3. Peer pressure was the sole dimension in the hierarchical model to demonstrate 
significance (p-value = 0.027).  The relationship was positive, indicating that higher levels of 
trust, consistency, and credibility increase the emphasis on peer pressure. It is important to 
note that in the decision-making scenario, peer pressure was framed as a positive influence 
on safety. Although peer pressure can have a positive or negative effect on safety, it is 
typically the negative pressure from peers highlighted in published research (Keren et al., 
2009; Mullen, 2004).  
 The employees making up this sample seem to defy Mullen’s (2004) conclusion that 
peer pressure can serve as an indirect discouragement to safety by way of the employee’s 
“image”. It seems reasonable that positive peer pressure would prevent employees from 
taking unsafe risks to impress supervisors or co-workers as reported by Choudhry and Fang 
(2008). Zohar and Erev (2007) suggest that behaviors such as these can be encouraged or 
discouraged depending on the behavior of management. Although the conclusion from data 
collected for this project implies that positive management perceptions may lead to positive 
peer pressure, a significant relationship with a safer decision choice was not noted. With a 
positive perception of trust and trust constructs and a positive framing of peer pressure, the 
relationship is not unreasonable.  However, employees were unaware of the frame of the 
peer pressure dimension when they began the decision-making scenario.  Hypothetically, if 
employees felt positively about organizational trust levels, they may have trusted the 
management to back them up against peer pressure which is negatively aligned with 
organizational safety, potentially accounting for employees’ initial selection of information 
on peer pressure.  
 Peer pressure was also a dimension of interest for Keren et al. (2009) but peer 
pressure was framed as a threat to safety in the decision-making scenario rather than as a 
positive effect. An additional unexpected point is that the observed relationship between trust 
variables and peer pressure showed significance only at the organizational level. Theory 
posits that organizational climates have much less bearing on peer pressure than group 
climate (Zohar & Luria, 2005; Zohar, 2003). The fact that peer pressure is even a significant 
dimension in employee decision-making is also an unexpected finding, given the 
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individualistic nature of the United States (Keren et al., 2009). The influence of 
organizational trust perception on the dimension of peer pressure in employee behavior and 
decision-making clearly warrants additional examination by safety researchers.   
 Hypotheses 4 and 5 concerned the relationship of organizational safety climate with 
the choice of safer decision and an increased orientation toward safety in the decision-
making process. Organizational safety climate did show a significant positive relationship 
with the choice of a safer decision, rejecting Hypothesis 4. Although the relationship between 
the two variables was significant, the incremental variance was not enough to significantly 
impact the model as demonstrated by the non-significant F value in Table 5. Results from the 
search indices failed to reject Hypotheses 5, meaning that the level of safety climate did not 
predict a higher orientation toward safety in the decision-process. Unlike the organizational 
trust model, none of the other search indices were identified as significant.  
 These findings make theoretical and logical sense. Employee’s sense of the relative 
importance of safety would theoretically impact their choice of decision. This could be 
explained partially by their interpretations of the value of safety within the organization. As 
Zohar and Luria (2005) imply, when employees are faced with competing demands, they will 
choose the behavior that is perceived to be the highest priority. If safety climate can be 
interpreted as reflective of an organization’s commitment to safety, a high level of safety 
climate would likely predict more positive safety decision-making by employees. Although 
past work has found positive associations between safety climate and safety-related events 
(Evans, Michael, Wiedenbeck, & Ray, 2005; Michael, Evans, Jansen, & Haight, 2005) and 
safe job-related behaviors (Kath et al., 2010), this finding is one of the few to link levels of 
organizational safety climate with the choice of safer decisions by employees (Keren et al., 
2009).  
 Hypotheses 6 through 8 evaluated the influence of group tier trust, consistency, and 
credibility on group safety climate, safer decision choices, and a higher degree of safety 
orientation in the decision-making process. Group trust significantly predicted more positive 
perceptions of group safety climate and the selection of a safer decision choice. Thus, 
Hypotheses 6 and 7 were rejected. Hypothesis 8, testing the relationship of group trust and a 
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higher orientation to safety during decision-making, did not show a significant relationship, 
therefore, the conclusion was a failure to reject this null hypothesis.  
 Hypotheses 9 and 10 tested in the effect of group safety climate on employee safety 
decision choices and whether they were more likely to use safety-related information to make 
their decision choice. Group safety climate showed a significant prediction with safety 
decision choice, indicating that more positive perceptions concerning safety climate 
predicted the selection of a safer decision choice. Thus, hypothesis 9 was rejected. Because 
no search indices were identified as having a significant relationship with group safety 
climate, the data failed to reject the null hypothesis in this case.  
 The outcome of these findings align with the Zohar and Luria’s (2005) two-level 
climate theory, which found that group climate has a stronger effect on employee actions and 
behavior than does organizational climate. Conclusions also support earlier findings of a 
significant relationship between safety climate and safety decision choice by Keren et al. 
(2009). Given the daily interaction between supervisors and employees, it is not unexpected 
to find that perceptions of group trust, consistency, credibility and safety would impact the 
decision choice. However, the variance explained by group safety climate is still only about 
5% for the trust variables of trust, consistency, and credibility and about 3% for group safety 
climate. That safety climate explains only a small amount of variance in decision choice is 
not a surprise, given that safety climate’s unpredictable relationship with safety behavior has 
frustrated researchers for decades. While perceptions of trust and safety explain significant 
amount of variance in the regression model, identifying other factors which influence 
employee decisions concerning safety is a continuing challenge for safety researchers.   
   
IMPLICATIONS FOR INDUSTRY 
 Workplace safety has many contributing factors. In a hazardous work environment, 
safe work practices are often the difference between going home at the end of the day and 
ending the day injured or even worse, killed. For better or worse, worker behavior is always 
precipitated by a decision-making process. A better understanding of the factors which affect 
the process of decision-making in safety decision tasks has potential benefits for managers, 
supervisors, and workers.  The results of this study suggest an important relationship between 
 
 
75 
 
 
 
employee perceptions of trust and safety climate at two tiers. At the group tier, perceptions of 
trust, consistency, and credibility play a significant role in workers’ choice to make a safe 
decision. Moreover, safety climate at both tiers significantly predicts a choice of a safer 
decision by employees. This work builds on previous work which proposes that worker 
perceptions play a role in safety climate (McLain & Jarrell, 2007; Zohar & Luria, 2005) and 
that trust plays a role in determining those perceptions (Kath et al.,2010). Additionally, data 
from this project strengthens the argument that workers who feel more positively about 
safety at both organizational and group tiers will make safer decision choices, which will 
lead to safer behavior (Keren et al., 2009; Zohar & Luria, 2005) 
 Although this research was the first of its kind in this work environment and used the 
relatively new measure of safety decision-making (Mills, 2007; Keren et al., 2009), several 
important implications emerged. First, organizational trust levels have a substantial impact 
on employee perceptions of safety climate for both the organizational and within work 
groups, confirming previous research which clearly links perceptions of safety with 
employee behaviors and attitudes (Johnson, 2007; Mullen, 2004; Vredenburgh, 2002; Zohar, 
2002). Although the relationship between organizational safety climate and decision choice 
was not significant, group attitudes did demonstrate a significant prediction with safer 
decision-making choices, an expected finding. The daily interactions most employees have 
with their work groups would lead one to expect a larger impact than that which could be 
linked to a management team employees rarely see and interact with (Zohar & Luria, 2005). 
Finally, the findings of this study suggest that peer pressure may play an important role in the 
employee decision-making process in a positive as well as a negative way. Safety 
intervention targeting peer pressure from both a positive and negative perspective could be 
relevant to employees who struggle with peers who do not prioritize safety.   
 The findings of this study suggest that the role of management and supervisors in 
employee safety outcomes should not be discounted. However, perceptions of trust and 
safety may vary at different tiers of administration and perceptions at different tiers may 
influence employee actions differently. Low trust in management may have different effects 
than low trust levels in supervisors. The prevention of safety incidents has many factors. The 
perceptions of employees may be one of the more difficult factors to manage and control 
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because of the strong perceptual component (Das et al., 2008), but this research suggests that 
consistent and credible behavior by managers and supervisors could positively influence 
workplace safety outcomes.  
 
LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
 Several limitations concerning this research should be noted. First, a small sample 
size limits the ability to generalize these data to a larger population. In addition, the data 
collection process included many steps and was unfamiliar to participants, leading to possible 
measurement error. Both of these biases may have affected the final results of the study. 
Additionally, data were collected from one industry, using cross-sectional data collection 
techniques, in one region of the United States. A larger, more heterogeneous sample would 
strengthen the conclusions of this study substantially. Related to this, the research subjects 
were drawn from a group of organizations which volunteered for the study. This introduces 
potential for selection bias. Another limitation involves the decision scenario – the scenario 
tested was one situation framed from one angle (i.e. with a positive peer pressure dimension). 
Therefore, responses from employees may be different for other decision scenarios, limiting 
the applicability of results for other safety scenarios even within the same work environment.  
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that employee responses were hypothetical. While the 
employees stated that this was the decision choice they would make under these conditions, 
the difference between what employees say would do and what they might actually do is well 
documented by behavioral theory (Murphy, 2003). These are limitations and the researchers 
acknowledge the potential error they bring to the conclusions of the study.  
 This research was the first to examine safety decision-making in the grain handling 
environment. Conclusions have raised many questions that could be addressed with 
additional empirical evidence. To better understand the differences between perceptions at 
the organizational and group tiers, more cross-tier research should be completed. To better 
study the wide variety of safety scenarios faced by grain elevator employees, alternate 
decision scenarios should be developed and tested. Additionally, the emphasis of peer 
pressure in the decision process also warrants additional investigation and perhaps 
comparison of negative peer pressure versus positive peer pressure. Additional work 
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concerning the search dimensions of interest (i.e. safety, productivity, supervisor’s opinion, 
and peer pressure) would also be of interest. Some of these have theoretical linkages to safety 
outcomes, especially that of productivity (McLain & Jarrell, 2007). Finally, a duplicate 
design with a wider population and more diversity in terms of gender, occupation, and 
workplace hazards would add to the existing body of knowledge.  
 Even with the limitations and additional questions noted, it is clear that organizational 
and group trust levels do impact the perceptions employees have for safety climate and that 
these perceptions influence the decision-making process at the organizational tier and 
decision choice at the group tier. Trust and safety climate perceptions are two of many 
factors influencing the decision-making of employees on the job. For managers and 
supervisors, understanding, acknowledging, and addressing these factors in a meaningful 
way is an essential part of managing occupational safety. 
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management of high moisture grain 
 
A manuscript to be submitted to Applied Engineering in Agriculture 
Gretchen A. Mosher
a
, Nir Keren
a
 and, Charles R. Hurburgh, Jr.
a
 
a
Department of Agricultural and Biosystems Engineering, Iowa State University, Ames, IA 
ABSTRACT 
 Quality management systems have been shown to improve inventory management, 
increase internal efficiencies, and enhance the ability of businesses to meet customer 
specifications but little work has explored the role of employees in the success of such 
systems. Several factors are thought to influence employee perceptions of quality climate and 
their quality-related decisions. One of these factors is employee trust in their management 
(organizational) and supervisory (group) personnel. This study develops the concept of 
quality climate in the grain handling environment and examines the relationship between 
perceptions of trust, quality climate, and employee decision-making. Employees from three 
commercial grain handling facilities completed questionnaires on perceptions of trust and 
quality climate and participated in a computerized quality decision-making simulation. 
Descriptive statistics, correlation, and hierarchal regression analysis were used to calculate 
the relationship between the variables.  A positive significant relationship was noted between 
organizational trust and organizational quality climate. Organizational trust failed to 
significantly predict decision choice in a quality decision task, but group level consistency 
was a significant predictor of decision choice more orientated toward quality. Organizational 
quality climate significantly predicted decision choice, but not the decision-making process 
while group quality climate did not significantly predict decision choice but significantly 
predicted the decision-making process.  Data from the project suggest that perceptions of 
trust and quality climate play a role in quality decision-making of employees. Data also show 
that employees do not perceive a connection between supervisors and quality climate. This 
research is the first in this area of study and several items need further exploration including 
the concept of quality climate in a grain handling environment and the measure of quality 
decision-making in the grain handling environment.  
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MOISTURE MANAGEMENT OF CORN 
Prudent post-harvest management of commodity grains such as corn helps prevent spoilage, 
preserve quality attributes, and establish marketability (Bern and Brumm 2003; Hellevang 
1995; Reed 2006). Bern, Quick, and Herum (2003) and Reed (2006) argue that of all quality 
attributes to be managed during storage, moisture is the most important. Moisture plays a 
critical role in the development of mold in corn and is also important in controlling insects 
and other foreign material in storage. Moisture levels must also be considered during 
aeration, fumigation, blending, and in the calculation of shrink (Hellevang 1995; Reed 2006). 
However, perhaps the most important effect of moisture on corn is economic. The moisture 
levels in corn directly influence the market price (Bern and Brumm 2003; Hellevang 1995).  
 Moisture levels determine storage and management strategies for corn. High moisture 
corn cannot be marketed through normal channels without extensive drying and may limit 
handling, storage, and feeding options (Bern et al. 2003). Although high moisture corn can be 
dried, drying wet corn to the conventional long term storage moisture level of approximately 
14%-15% (Bern, Hurburgh, and Brumm 2008) uses more energy, takes more time, and 
reduces the capacity of grain handling systems (Roberts and Stroshine 2009). Storage time 
for higher moisture corn is also greatly reduced (Hurburgh and Elmore 2009). 
 In most growing years, corn moisture levels at harvest are between 18-22%. The 2008 
and 2009 growing years were challenging for both producers and grain handlers (Hurburgh 
and Elmore 2009). Delayed planting, cool wet summers, and cold wet falls kept producers 
from harvesting corn and stressed the storage and drying capacities of many commercial 
grain elevators in the United States. Although it is typical for corn and other grains to be 
stored in outside piles temporarily while storage and rail car capacities catch up with the 
abundant harvest each fall (Bern et al. 2003), in 2008 and 2009, temporary storage turned 
into permanent storage for many grain elevators.  Considering that the recommendation for 
storing grain in an outdoor pile is to start with dry corn, it was no surprise that by the spring 
of 2010, many grain elevators were dealing with unprecedented spoilage levels (Hurburgh 
2010). Management practices that had always been adequate for handling damaged corn 
were no longer acceptable.  
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QUALITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS IN AGRICULTURE 
 Recent food safety issues involving commodity grain have added to the concern 
already building concerning the safety of food and feed. As food systems increase in 
complexity and consumer expectations for safe foods increase (Thakur and Hurburgh 2009), 
grain handling organizations are forced to reconsider and reformulate existing grain handling 
procedures (Voigt 2005).  
 The bulk commodity handling industry has not traditionally focused on food safety 
(Laux and Hurburgh 2010; Thakur and Hurburgh 2009), but recent food safety concerns have 
focused attention on this matter. Several food safety incidents have involved the adulteration 
of bulk agricultural commodity products (FDA 2010; Harris 2009; Lin et al. 2002; Martin 
and Moss 2009; Moss 2009). Without a standard methodology for implementing quality 
systems, the ability of processors, regulators, and consumers to identify, isolate, and contain 
unsafe products within the food and foodstuffs supply chain is limited (Harris 2009; Thakur 
and Hurburgh 2009).  
 In response to the needs of supply chain stakeholders, grain handlers have begun to 
recognize the potential of quality management systems (Laux and Hurburgh 2010). The 
practices of quality applied to the food production and processing have the potential solution 
to address food safety as well as other important components of handling and processing 
organizations, including inventory management, security, and legislative compliance (Laux 
2007; Laux and Hurburgh 2010; Thakur et al. 2009). These systems have been used in 
manufacturing to improve efficiency and maintain high levels of quality (Bowersox, Closs, 
and Cooper 2007; Das, Pagell, Behm, and Veltri 2008; Deming 2000), but have had limited 
use in bulk commodity agricultural handling (Hurburgh and Lawrence 2003).  
 Traditionally, quality management systems have focused on improving a firm’s 
strategic position and operating efficiency by focusing on customer needs and quality 
objectives (Foster 2008; Laux and Hurburgh 2010). The systems approach of these programs 
emphasize the interacting aspects of organizational components such as processes and 
procedures, machines and equipment, facilities, inputs, and personnel. The use of such 
systems in agriculture has been offered as one way to address several long-standing quality 
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issues in the United States commodity grain market (Lawrence and Hurburgh 2003; Thakur 
and Hurburgh 2009; Thakur et al. 2009). 
 Laux (2007) demonstrated benefits for grain handling organizations in the areas of 
enhanced inventory management, increased compliance, and a better ability to add value to 
existing product. However, refinement and definition of procedures and processes as well as 
hardware improvements are only one component of the quality management system. One of 
the most difficult elements of the quality management system to both manage and control are 
personnel actions (Azanza and Zamora-Luna 2005; Henson and Heasman 1998; Luning and 
Marcelis 2007). Team-oriented employees who can assess situations, follow procedures, and 
perform required tasks consistently are a valuable component of any quality management 
system (Das et al. 2008; Luning and Marcelis 2007). Related to this, Baskerville and 
Dulipovici (2006) suggest that employee knowledge should be managed as an organizational 
resource with the intended result being daily routines and processes that facilitate appropriate 
actions. 
 Employees, their perceptions, and the management of their accumulated knowledge 
which result from these perceptions have also been shown to be an important component of 
significant changes in the workplace (Chrusciel 2004; Chrusciel and Field 2003; Liebowitz 
1999). In the grain handling industry, quality management systems which go beyond the 
conventional commodity-based grades can be defined as significant change (Hurburgh and 
Lawrence 2003; Laux and Hurburgh 2010).  
 Employee decisions constitute a major portion of appropriate action in both positive 
and negative ways.  Consequently, the decision making patterns of employees have the 
potential to work for or against organizational quality management processes (Luning and 
Marcelis 2007). Quality processes in food and agriculture systems assume that employees are 
following procedures and behaving in predictable ways and if this does not occur, the success 
of such a system can be severely threatened (Luning and Marcelis 2007). Although quality 
management has the potential to uncover operational efficiencies, improve inventory 
management, and increase legal compliance, none of these improvements can be realized if 
employees do not make positive quality-oriented decisions on the job.  
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TRUST AND QUALITY 
 Several factors are believed to affect the employee’s ability to make positive quality-
related decisions. Two of these factors will be explored in this research. The first factor is the 
level of trust employees have for their management and supervisor. Little research has 
explored this relationship (Evans, Michael, Wiedenbeck, and Ray 2005).  Quality 
management expert Deming (2000) placed much of the responsibility for quality on the 
management, viewing quality as a system controlled by management. Peterson (1998) and 
Saraph, Benson, and Schroeder (1989) suggest that trust and management commitment to 
quality is central to building a system that promotes quality processes continuously.  
 The second factor to be examined in this research is the concept of quality climate. 
This factor is based on the safety climate measurement, which measures the shared 
perceptions employees have of safety policies, procedures, and practices (Zohar 2008). 
Safety climate has been explored extensively in the safety literature, particularly with regard 
to its relationship to employee performance (Cooper and Phillips 2004; Johnson 2007; Zohar 
2002). Quality climate and its impact on employee behavior has been largely ignored even 
though employee participation and training is considered a substantial predictor of improved 
organizational quality (Chrusciel 2004; Saraph et al. 1989). 
 Although little empirical evidence exists to link trust with quality climate and 
employee decision-making, the relationship can be partially explained by the theory of 
cognitive dissonance (Das et al. 2008). The theory was developed by Festinger (1957) and 
aims to explain the relationship among contradicting cognitions or “pieces of knowledge”. 
Operationally, the theory posits that when people are confronted with conflicting cognitions 
(i.e. quality or speed), they will attempt to resolve these conflicts to reduce their 
uncomfortable state of the mind. According to Das et al. (2008), employees will address the 
conflicts in one of three ways: first, ignore their own judgment and follow advice of the 
supervisor or manager; second, ignore the opinion of management and the supervisor and 
follow their own judgment; and third, delay action and do nothing until they are forced to 
make a decision. Of course, the third option does not solve the problem; rather, it just 
postpones the inevitable decision path until a later time. Additionally, the theory does not 
acknowledge a fourth scenario – that of no conflict between an employee’s cognitions.  
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 This work examines the association between employee trust in his or her management 
and supervisor and the independent variables of quality climate, quality decision choice, and 
dimensions influencing the decision-making process. The primary interest of researchers in 
this work was the amount of variance accounted for by the independent variables after 
controlling for other independent variables. To this end, the following research questions 
were explored: 
1. Does the level of organizational or group trust predict the organizational or group 
quality climate within a grain handling work environment? 
2. Does the level of organizational or group trust predict the decision choice by 
employees in a quality decision task?  
3. Does the level of organizational or group trust predict a quality orientation to the 
decision-making process of employees in a quality decision task?  
4. Does the level of organizational or group quality climate predict the decision choice 
by employee in a quality decision task? 
5. Does the level of organizational or group quality climate predict a quality orientation 
to the decision-making process of employees in a quality decision task? 
 
METHODOLOGY AND MEASURES 
 Participants in the study were employees of three Midwestern grain handling 
facilities. Employees who would be subject to quality-related decisions in their daily jobs 
(i.e. those who worked in clerical and administration were excluded) were offered the 
opportunity to participate in the project. Of the 410 invitations, 197 responded. Of these 197, 
177 provided usable data, for a response rate of 43 percent. Data was collected from March 
2010 until May of 2010. In discussion of data and results, organizational level factors refer to 
trust and quality climate for the management and group level factors refer to the same 
climate for supervisors.  
 Climate data were collected using existing questionnaires. The trust instrument was 
developed and validated by Levin (1999) to measure behavioral trust. The 40 item 
questionnaire asked employees to rate the frequency of behavioral actions by their 
management and supervisors on a 5 point scale (1 = always or almost always; 3 = 
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occasionally; 5 = rarely or never). Examples of items used included “top management tells 
the same story to each person they speak to” and “my supervisor does what he or she says 
they will do”. Levin (1999) used factor analysis to reduce the number of factors describing 
behavioral trust to two: consistency and credibility. Factor analysis performed on data 
gathered for this project yielded similar results; therefore, employee perceptions of trust, 
consistency, and credibility are included in the model as the dependent variable.  
 The quality instrument was adapted from Zohar and Luria’s (2005) organizational 
and group level safety climate questionnaire and used 16 items for management and 15 items 
for supervisors. Employees were asked to rate their agreement with statements concerning 
their view of quality climate at their company. Examples of items used include “top 
management provide all means necessary to perform jobs in a high-quality manner” and “my 
supervisor is strict about quality at the end of the day when we want to go home”. Factor 
analysis yielded one universal quality climate factor for management and one for supervisors, 
therefore, aggregated scores for employee perceptions of organizational and group quality 
climate are used in analysis. The one-factor climate structure has also been suggested by 
others using the scale to measure safety climate (Johnson 2007; Zohar and Luria 2005).  
 All data-gathering instruments were presented to employees in a web-based format. 
The decision simulations were offered on the Decision Mind™ platform and the trust and 
quality climate instruments were administered using Survey Monkey. Questionnaires were 
presented in random order and questionnaire items were also randomized. The decision 
simulation was presented after trust and quality questionnaires were completed. Employees 
were able to complete the steps of the process at different times as their schedule allowed. To 
connect data from instrument to instrument, employees were given a set of three 
identification numbers. No personal identifiers were linked with the identification numbers to 
eliminate the possibility of tracking participants’ responses and to encourage candid 
responses.  
 The decision-making task investigated in this work was employee decisions 
concerning the management and storage of wet corn. The scenario asks employees to make 
choice – do they follow direct orders from management and dump the wet corn onto an 
unmanaged pile on the ground or do they take action to better preserve the quality of the 
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product? Although this action is fairly straightforward, it illustrates implications for a larger 
question that can potentially be applied to other industries – does the employee follow the 
instructions from the supervisor and management, even if these do not promote high quality 
processes, or do they make a decision to disregard the management and supervisor in favor of 
a more quality-oriented decision? 
 Decision-making data was collected using the process-tracing method of measuring 
decisions. Process tracing utilizes a linear model and measures the intervening steps between 
information acquisition and decision choice, considered a fundamental principle in decision-
making research. Additionally, process tracing addresses a major weakness of using 
structural modeling approaches by studying the steps a person uses to make a decision choice 
rather than the outcome of the decision choice (Ford et al. 1989).  Data collected can then be 
used to infer information on the decision-making process used by employees as they make a 
choice on handling the hypothetical scenario presented to them (Ford et al. 1989; Keren, 
Mills, Freeman, and Shelley 2009; Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993).  
 The software platform Decision Mind™, a computerized decision-making simulation, 
was used to enable the process-tracing methodology (Mintz 2004). The simulation employs 
decision process-tracing by recording several key attributes of the decision making process, 
including: 1) sequence of information gathered, 2) the number of items viewed 3) the amount 
of time needed to complete the decision-making task, and 4) the choice.   
 Decision choices were presented in a matrix format as shown in Table 1 with four 
dimensions that were hypothesized to play a role in making the decision choice. With each 
decision simulation, employees read the hypothetical situation and then were presented four 
decision choices. Each square of the matrix (V) represents the evaluation of a given choice 
(C) on a given dimension (D) and a weighted numerical score (contained within V).  
Table 1. Decision Mind
TM
 Decision Simulation Matrix 
 C1 C2 C3 C 4 
D1 V11 V21 V31 V41 
D2 V12 V22 V32 V42 
D3 V13 V23 V33 V43 
D4 V14 V24 V34 V44 
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 The scenario was developed and critiqued by a panel of experts in grain elevator 
operations using a modified Delphi method (Linstone and Turoff 2002). Weighted scores for 
matrix squares (the Vs) were assigned by the same panel of experts on a scale from -10 to 
+10. Scores less than zero denote a negative evaluation and scores greater than zero 
designate a positive evaluation on that particular dimension.  
 Using the information contained within the matrix squares, employees viewed the 
information and then selected a decision choice. Scenarios were pilot tested on a small group 
with a moderate knowledge of grain elevator operations. Slight modifications were made to 
improve the clarity of survey instruments and the decision scenarios as a result of the pilot 
tests. The text of the scenario presented to participants and the dimensions are shown below. 
The matrix with outcomes and weighted values is shown in the appendix.  
Long term storage of wet corn has been a continuing problem at the grain 
cooperative where you work. The policy of the cooperative is that no member of the 
cooperative should be turned away from delivering corn – all loads are received and 
stored somewhere. 
A member of the cooperative pulls in with a load of very wet corn. You are directed to 
dump the load directly on a large uncovered pile of corn on the ground near the 
storage bins. You do not know the moisture levels of the corn in the pile. 
You must decide on the next step. The following four items are your options. 
1. Dump the corn 
2. Do not accept corn 
3. Dry corn first 
4. Check moisture levels in pile 
These four dimensions could impact your decision. 
1. Storage risk 
2. Customer service 
3. Costs to company 
4. Company policy 
 When you are ready, follow the steps below in order to initiate and complete the 
 simulation.  
 
 To provide a way to quantitatively present the information gathering process 
completed by participants, Keren, Freeman, and Schwab (2006) introduced the search index 
metric. The measurement calculates the ratio between the number of times information 
squares of one dimension have been reviewed as compared with the other dimensions.  
 Index values which equal one indicate the dimension has equal importance to others 
in the decision process. Values less than or greater than one represent a dimension of less 
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importance as compared with others or greater importance in relation to others, respectively. 
In this study, four dimensions were used: storage risk, customer service, costs to company, 
and company policy. The orientation most affiliated with quality in this decision scenario is 
the storage risk index. Employees who viewed storage risk dimensions were assumed to be 
considering quality management as a primary source of information in their decision process. 
The search indices are shown below with the appropriate equation. They include: Storage 
Risk Search Index (SR_SI), Customer Service Search Index (CS_SI), Cost to Company 
Search Index (CC_SI), and Company Policy Search Index (CP_SI). Calculations are shown 
below.  
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    Where Nstorage denotes the number of times storage risk squares were viewed and Ni denote 
the number of times squares other than storage were viewed.    
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Where Ncustomer denotes the number of times customer service squares were viewed, and Ni, 
denote the number of times squares other than customer service were viewed.  
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Where Ncost   denotes the number of times cost to company squares were viewed, and Ni, 
denote the number of times squares other than cost to company were viewed.  
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         (4 
Where Npolicy denotes the number of times company policy squares were viewed, and Ni, 
denote the number of times squares company policy were viewed.  
 Results were calculated using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS 18.0). 
Demographic information on the sample and a correlation matrix of bivariate correlations for 
organization and group level variables are presented first. The distributions of decision 
choices and search indices are presented next. To determine which factors were significant 
predictors of the dependent variables, hierarchical regression analysis was used (Cramer 
2003). The process of hierarchical regression is used to determine the variance explained by 
certain variables when other influencing factors are controlled. The order by which variables 
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are entered is controlled by the researcher. In this study, the variance in the dependent 
variables (trust, consistency, and credibility) due to quality climate, quality decision choice, 
and quality decision dimensions is of interest. A second model has quality climate as the 
dependent variable, with quality decision choice and the quality decision-making dimensions 
as independent variables. Both the trust models and the quality climate model were estimated 
at two levels: organizational (management) and group (supervisory).  
 
RESULTS  
 The sample consisted of 142 males and 35 females for a total number of 177. The age 
of participants ranged from below 21 to over 61, with the most common response (nearly 
58%) being 31-50 years of age. Most participants belonged to one of two groups: those with 
less than three years on the job, (38.2%) and those who had been with the organization more 
than 10 years (34%). Nearly all (98%) had completed high school, with the majority (62%) 
completing at least some college. 
 Bivariate two-tailed correlations were calculated to illustrate the relationship between 
organization level variables. A correlation matrix reporting all values is shown in Table 2. 
Values in parentheses represent scale reliabilities as calculated by Alpha’s Cronbach where 
relevant. 
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Table 2. Organizational Descriptive Data and Bivariate Correlations
a
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Org. Trust 1(0.97)        
Org. Consistency .842** 1       
Org. Credibility .862** .903** 1      
Org. Quality 
Climate 
.655** .618** .634** 1(0.96)     
Quality Decision -.167* -.159* -.160* -.217** 1     
Storage Risk 
Index 
-.030 -.009 -.019 .105 -.129 1   
Customer Service 
Index 
.008 -.039 .031 -.106 -.013 -.168* 1  
Company Policy 
Index 
.174* .138 .187* .106 -.034 -0.256** -.288** 1 
Cost to Company 
Index 
-.043 -.011 -.069 -.118 -.061 -.360** -0.170* -.233** 
a
n = 177;**p<0.01; * p< 0.05 
  Group level variables were calculated in the same way as organizational 
variables. These data are shown in Table 3. Because of the strong inter-correlations between 
trust, consistency, and credibility (>0.700) and the similarity in the correlations with other 
variables (< 0.054 difference among correlation coefficients), only group trust is presented in 
Table 3.  
Table 3. Group Bivariate Correlations
a
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Group Trust 1(0.97)      
Group Quality Climate .130 1(0.97)     
Quality Decision -.159* -.003 1    
Storage Index .032 .102 -.129 1   
Customer Service 
Index 
-.032 -.030 -.013 -.168* 1  
Company Policy Index 0.122 .067 -.034 -.256** -.288** 1 
Cost to Company 
Index 
-.084 .041 .061 -.360** -.170** -.233** 
a
n = 177; **p < 0.01; *p< 0.05 
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 The second part of data collection was the decision-making scenario. Data derived 
from the quality decision simulation is classified in two ways: decision choice and decision-
making process. The decision-making process is reflected by the search index values, which 
represent the information acquired by respondents in one dimension as compared with others. 
A value of 1 for a particular dimension indicates that no emphasis was given to that 
dimension above the others and therefore, represents the benchmark. A paired sample t-test 
was performed on each index to compare its value with 1. Values for the search indices and 
their respective paired sample t-tests are shown in Table 3.  
Table 3. Information acquisition within a quality decision task
a 
Search Index Mean S.D. t P-value 
Storage Risk 1.19 1.08 2.36 0.019 
Customer Service 1.01 0.912 0.245 0.807 
Company Policy 1.21 1.43 1.98 0.049 
Cost to Company 0.927 0.631 -1.55 0.123 
a
n=177 
 Two search dimensions were significantly higher than the average. Storage risk and 
company policy were both given significantly more emphasis by decision-makers than 
dimensions in the areas of customer service and cost to company. The second piece of 
information contained within the decision-making simulation was the distribution of decision 
choice. These results are shown in Figure 2.  
Figure 2. Distribution of frequency of decision choices in a quality decision task 
 
a
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 To measure how well the independent variables of quality climate, quality decision 
choice and the search dimensions explain the dependent variables, four regression models 
were estimated at each level. Three used the trust factors as the dependent variable (i.e. trust, 
consistency, and credibility) and one with quality climate as the dependent variable. 
Independent variables are added one at a time. The first model used organizational trust as 
the dependent variable, and the variables of interest were organizational quality climate, 
quality decision choice, storage index, customer service index, company policy index, and 
cost to company index. The second model defined perceptions of consistent behavior in 
management as the dependent variable and identical independent variables as for the first 
model. The third model included the same independent variables, but used employee 
perceptions of credibility in management as the dependent variable. The dependent variable 
used in the final model was organizational quality climate with decision choice, storage 
index, customer service index, company policy index, and cost to company index entered as 
the independent variables of interest.  
 Linear regression was used on all models to determine which variables could explain 
a significant amount of variance in the dependent variable. To calculate the proportion of 
variance explained by the independent variables of the model, the coefficient of 
determination (r
2
) was calculated. The F test was used to determine if a statistically 
significant proportion of variance could be explained as each independent variable was 
entered into the model. Positive relationships represent more positive perceptions predict a 
higher perception or orientation toward the variable in question. Quality decision choices 
were reverse coded, with positive decisions having higher values, so negative relationships 
between decision choice and the trust and climate variables are desirable. The summary of 
the models are shown in Table 4.  
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Table 4. Summary of Organizational Hierarchical Regression Models
a, c
 
Independent 
variables 
Model 1   Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Organizational 
trust
b
 
Organizational 
consistency
b
 
Organizational
 
 
credibility
b
 
Organizational 
quality 
climate
b
 
Organizational 
quality climate 
0.673** 0.649** 0.646** ----- 
Quality decision 
choice 
-0.031 -0.025 -0.023 -0.201* 
Storage index -0.011 -0.010 -0.006 0.028 
Customer service 
index 
0.202** 0.138 0.232** -0.108 
Company policy 
index 
0.198** 0.148 0.223** 0.085 
Cost to company 
index 
0.133 0.144 0.120 -0.103 
r
2 
0.498 0.443 0.474 0.084 
Adjusted r
2 
0.477 0.411 0.446 0.052 
F 23.80** 19.13** 21.62** 2.64* 
a
values represent standardized regression coefficients; 
b
dependent variable;
c
n=177 
**= p<0.01; *=p<0.05 
 Group models were created in the same way as those at the organizational level, with 
group trust, consistency, and credibility as the dependent variables and group quality climate, 
quality decision choice, and the search indices as independent variables in the first three 
models. The final model used group quality climate as the dependent variable and decision 
choice and the search indices as independent variables. As with the organizational models, 
the coefficient of determination (r
2
) and the F-test were used to test whether the incremental 
variance explained by each variable added to the model was statistically significant. Group 
models are summarized in Table 5.  
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Table 5. Summary of Group Hierarchical Regression Models
a,c
 
Independent 
variables 
Model 1   Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Group Trust
b
 Group 
consistency
b
 
Group
 
 
credibility
b
 
Group quality 
climate
b
 
Group quality 
climate 
0.111 0.118 0.104 ----- 
Quality decision 
choice 
-0.157 -0.166* -0.133 0.016 
Storage index 0.007 0.032 0.015 0.210* 
Customer service 
index 
-0.017 -0.010 -0.005 0.118 
Company policy 
index 
0.091 0.124 0.094 0.220* 
Cost to company 
index 
-0.077 -0.070 -0.101 0.215* 
r
2 
0.060 
 
0.075 0.058 0.047 
Adjusted r
2 
0.021 
 
0.037 0.019 0.015 
F 1.54 1.95 1.48 1.45 
a
values represent standardized regression coefficients; 
b
dependent variable;
c
n=177  
**= p<0.01; *=p<0.05 
DISCUSSION 
Several significant findings emerged from this study. Each research question in the study will 
be reviewed along with the data findings which best answer the question posed. The first 
research question asked whether levels of organizational and group trust (trust in this case 
includes concepts of trust, consistency, and credibility) can predict organizational and group 
quality climate. In addition to the expected correlations between organizational trust 
variables (i.e. trust, consistency, and credibility), organizational variables for quality show 
several significant results. The major conclusions are listed below: 
 The significant positive correlation found between organizational trust and 
organizational quality climate is notable in its strength, with quality climate responses 
explaining over 45 percent of the variance in trust responses 
 Organizational consistency and credibility also were found to have a strongly 
significant positive correlation with organizational quality climate, where quality 
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climate explained approximately 42 percent and 41 percent of the variance in 
consistency and credibility, respectively  
 In all trust variables, a higher degree of organizational trust, consistency, and 
credibility significantly predicted a more positive organizational quality climate. This 
observation aligns with Deming’s (2000) view that quality systems are controlled and 
administered by management. The influence of organizational quality climate on the trust 
variables was responsible for the high F values and the highly significant predictions on the 
first three organizational regression models. The same results were not noted at the group 
level. Group results are summarized below: 
 Group trust, consistency, and credibility did not significantly predict group quality 
climate, explaining approximately 1 percent of the variance in group trust variables 
 Group trust variables - trust, consistency, and credibility - did not explain a 
significant increment of variance in the regression model 
 Unlike the finding at the organizational level, more positive perceptions of group 
trust, consistency, and credibility were not found to significantly predict a more positive 
group quality climate. This finding was unexpected, contradicting the previous work on 
safety and other organizational climates (Evans et al., 2005; Patterson et al., 2005; Zohar, 
2008). Although these data suggest an interpretation that quality climate is influenced by 
different factors than safety climate, it may also be that in the grain handling environment, 
employees do not link their supervisors or their work group with a climate of quality. Instead, 
they associate quality climate and quality processes with management, following the line of 
thought offered by Deming (2000).  
 The second research question asked whether organizational and group trust predicted 
the decision choice of employees. Figure 2, which illustrates the distribution of decision 
choices and Tables 4 and 5, provide the data needed to answer the research question. Results 
are shown below: 
 Organizational trust variables – trust, consistency, and credibility – did not 
significantly predict the decision choice of employees 
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 One group trust variable – consistency – had a weak (p-value = .045) negative 
significant relationship with employee decision choice 
 Generally, employees did not choose the quality-oriented alternatives. Instead, most 
chose to either follow orders or to pass the actual decision on to someone else 
 At both organizational and group tiers, higher levels of trust and credibility did not 
significantly predict the choice of a more quality-oriented decision. Higher group perceptions 
of consistency predicted a higher likelihood of making a decision which encouraged quality, 
but the relationship was weak. No relationship between consistency and decision choice was 
noted at the organizational tier.  
 In the decision scenario, the most quality-oriented choice was to not accept the corn. 
However, very few respondents chose this alternative. Rather, many chose to follow orders 
by dumping the corn. Because dumping corn on an unmanaged pile is fairly typical practice 
(Bern et al., 2003), it was not a surprise that many employees chose this option. While 
dumping the corn was not unexpected decision alternative, a surprising number chose to 
choose an option which was in effect a “non-choice”. The decision alternatives of checking 
the moisture in the dump pile and drying the corn first are considered “non-choices” because 
they do not require an employee to make a decision about what to do with the wet corn. 
Instead, these decision choices allow the employees to pass the decision onto someone else 
by sending the customer elsewhere to resolve the problem of unloading the wet corn. Neither 
the decision choice to dump corn or the “non-choices” of checking the moisture or drying the 
corn first are decisions classified as positive from a quality management perspective. This 
phenomenon is known as the “free ride” in the decision-making literature. Free ride is when 
employees fail to correct an obvious safety issue because they figure someone else will take 
care of it. The tendency of workers to behave in the “free ride” manner was noted with 
respect to safety by Zohar and Erev (2007), and is worthy of further investigation in the 
quality domain.   
 Another unexpected finding was the weak relationship between group consistency 
and decision choice. It was surprising for two reasons. First, supervisors have much more 
interaction with employees, yet the relationship observed between group trust variables and 
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the decision choice of employees explains a very small increment of variance in the model, 
suggesting that employees perceive a small role for supervisors in quality improvement 
within the work environment. Furthermore, employees perceive quality as a management 
issue and not an issue they need to address. Second, the role of consistency in employees’ 
decision choices seems to suggest that in terms of quality, employees value unchanging work 
expectations (i.e. consistency) over believability (i.e. trust or credibility) from their 
supervisors. Implications for the grain elevator based on these data are not positive in terms 
of quality. To realize success with quality management systems in the grain handling 
environment a stronger role must be created for supervisors in the development and 
implementation of quality programs as well as educational intervention to increase the 
willingness of employees to be more outspoken in their support of actions which could 
improve quality.  
 The third research question concerned whether organizational and group level trust 
predicted a quality orientation in the decision-making process. Major findings are listed 
below: 
 No significant relationship was noted between organizational trust and the search 
index storage risk 
 Organizational trust and credibility have a significant positive relationship with 
company policy and customer service 
 Group trust variables have no significant relationship with search indices 
 In this case, a higher degree of organizational trust, consistency, and credibility does 
not significantly predict a stronger emphasis on storage risk during the decision-making 
process. However, more positive perceptions of organizational trust and credibility were 
found to significantly predict a higher orientation toward company policy and customer 
service. One reason for this could be that employees who have higher organizational trust 
and credibility levels may feel more responsibility to follow company policy and toward 
strong customer service. A stronger emphasis on company policy and customer service might 
also partially explain the large number of final decision choices to dump the corn. Dumping 
the customer’s corn without delay is clearly advantageous to the customer and directly 
follows the policy specified by the management and the supervisor.  
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 The significant correlations between search index dimensions in the organizational 
and group bivariate correlation tables are expected, as they are dependent on the other 
dimensions when measured with the search index metric. Therefore, when one dimension is 
selected more often another will be selected less often, leading to the negative correlations.   
 When the mean values of search indices were calculated (see Table 3) to determine 
which index was given the strongest emphasis in the decision-making process, company 
policy had the highest mean, followed closely by storage risk. Customer service was very 
close to the mean of one, indicating its role in the decision process was no more or no less 
important as compared with other indices. The only index below one was the cost to 
company. This was not an unexpected finding, considering many employees’ general 
indifference to their company’s financial bottom line.  
 The storage risk dimension represents a higher emphasis toward quality in this 
decision scenario; therefore, the higher mean value suggests that employees are thinking 
about quality while making their decision choice. However, the mean for company policy is 
also significantly greater than one, providing evidence that employees are also thinking about 
the expectations of their managers and supervisors. The cognitive conflict between the two 
pieces of knowledge playing out in the employee’s mind during this decision-making process 
is well illustrated by the search indices.  
The final two research questions concerned the role of the organizational and group tier 
quality climate in final decision choice and in an increased emphasis on quality in a quality 
decision-making task. The findings for both research questions are listed below: 
 Organizational quality climate significantly predicts the choice of a decision 
promoting quality, but does not predict an increased emphasis on any of the search 
indices 
 Group quality climate does not significantly predict the choice of a more positive 
quality decision, but did predict a higher orientation toward storage risk, company 
policy, and cost to company 
 A more positive view of organizational quality climate was found to significantly 
predict a positive quality decision choice. Although the relationship was not particularly 
strong (explaining less than 5 percent of the variance in the model), it was strong enough to 
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provide significant incremental value to the model, even given the lack of a significant 
relationship with the search index variables. This finding is unexpected from a theoretical 
basis. Management and organizational climate have been shown to play less of a role in 
employee actions in some cases than group climate, although they have been found to play a 
mediating role in other cases (Thompson et al, 1998; Zohar, 2008). However, once again, the 
finding aligns with hypotheses forwarded by Deming (2000) and others (Evans et al. 2005; 
Peterson 1998; Saraph et al. 1989) which assign the largest role of developing and creating 
quality processes within an organization to management. 
Different conclusions were observed with group quality climate. Although more 
positive perceptions of group quality climate did not significantly predict a more positive 
quality decision choice, group quality climate did predict a higher emphasis toward the 
indices of storage risk, company policy, and cost to company. These results were unexpected 
in two ways. First, the lack of a significant relationship between group climate and decision 
choices refutes previous research that has suggested the supervisor plays a larger role in 
employee actions than management does within the organizational tier (Zohar 2008; Zohar 
and Luria 2005; Thompson et al. 1998).  
Second, the search indices identified as significant components of the model would 
seem to provide conflicting information to the decision-maker. Therefore, the observation 
that storage risk, company policy, and cost to company were given emphasis by decision 
makers who also provided more positive assessments of group climate suggests the conflict 
inherent to this decision choice. Moreover, the significant negative correlations between the 
three search indices (indicating higher values of one predict lower values of the other(s)) 
further illustrate the conflict of this decision choice. Further study of these decision indices, 
along with additional research on the role of group quality climate on decision-making, 
would help to answer several unresolved questions.   
LIMITATIONS & FUTURE RESEARCH 
 Several limitations to the study are acknowledged. The small sample size was cross-
sectional and from a limited number of grain handling organizations, limiting the 
generalization of the findings to other industries and other organizations within the grain 
handling industry. In addition, the data collection procedures were relatively new to the 
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participants, introducing potential measurement error. Respondents volunteered for the study, 
so the possibility of a selection bias cannot be discounted. Furthermore, quality climate is a 
new and undefined construct. Although the quality climate questionnaire was found to be 
both reliable and valid, a questionnaire more specific to the agricultural environment might 
measure the construct of quality climate differently. Finally, although the decision search 
indices were developed and critiqued by experts in grain elevator management, there may be 
other indices that could better characterize the thought process of quality decision-making. 
 This was the first attempt at a study of this kind. The investigation raised several 
questions which could be addressed by future research. High priority needs for future 
research include: 
 Further refinement and development of the quality climate measure and the quality 
decision scenario 
 Development and testing of a second quality decision scenario for a grain handling 
environment 
 Creation and testing of a quality climate measure suited specifically for the grain 
handling environment 
 Strong linkages observed between the trust variables and organizational quality 
climate warrant further examination  
 The lack of the connection between group trust variables and group quality climate 
must be addressed to implement quality management systems in a grain elevator 
environment 
 Workplace quality outcomes depend heavily on the decisions made by employees. 
Within the grain elevators surveyed, quality considerations play a reduced role in the 
decision process when compared with customer service and company policy. A quality 
program cannot be successful if employees are not making positive quality-oriented 
decisions. Additionally, a better understanding of the factors which influence the decision 
choices and decision-making process of employees plays an important role in workplace 
quality initiatives and may provide guidance on employee training needs. As the importance 
of quality management increases in the commodity grain handling industry, continued 
research on quality decision-making processes of employees is essential. Increased 
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knowledge of employee decision-making patterns will improve not only existing quality 
management programs, but increase the likelihood of successful implementation of new 
quality management systems within the grain handling environment.  
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ABSTRACT 
Human factors play an important role in the management of safety and quality in the work 
environment. Although employee actions and decisions have been identified as a key 
component of successful occupational safety programs and quality management programs, 
little attention has been given to the employees’ role in these types of programs. This 
research explored two relationships which have theoretical connections, but little previous 
research: the relationship between safety and quality climate and the relationship between 
climates at the organizational and group level. Survey data were collected at three bulk 
commodity grain elevators from 178 employees. Employees also participated in safety and 
quality decision-making simulations. Significant predictions were noted for safety and 
quality climate. Decision-making predictions are also discussed. This research suggests that 
organizational safety is an important predictor of group safety. In addition, recognizing the 
larger role supervisors play in group workplace behavior, more should be done to increase 
employee perceptions of group level involvement in quality climate to promote more quality-
oriented decision-making by employees. 
   
INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH 
 Human factors play an important, but often overlooked, role in the management of 
safety and quality in the work environment. Both occupational safety and quality 
management programs depend on team-oriented employees who can assess situations, follow 
procedures, and perform required tasks consistently (Das et al. 2008; Luning and Marcelis 
2007). Employee perceptions are hypothesized to play a substantial role in employee 
behavior. Furthermore, employee decisions are an important precursor to behavior (Newell, 
Lagnado, and Shanks 2007).  Theoretical perspectives addressing both motivation and 
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employee decision-making processes suggest that employee perceptions in safety are related 
to their perceptions of quality and together, may influence the quality related decision-
making process of an employee (Das et al. 2008; Deming 2000; Evans et al. 2005; Maslow 
1970; Murphy 2003). 
 Another strong influence on employee decisions is the environment in which decision 
choices are made (Patterson et al. 2005; Simard and Marchand 1995; Thompson et al. 1998; 
Zohar 2008). Both managers and supervisors affect employee actions in a workplace 
environment, but they do so in different ways. Previous research has examined the 
relationship between perceptions of organizational climate, that which is related to the 
employee’s relationship with the management team, and perceptions of group climate, the 
underlying expectations and understandings concerning the employee’s relationship with his 
or her supervisor (Hofmann et al. 1995; Thompson et al. 1998; Zohar 2008).  
  This research will explore two relationships which have received relatively little 
attention in previous research. The first objective is to explore the relationship between 
perceptions of safety and perceptions of quality of workers in the commercial grain elevator 
work environment and how these perceptions affect the decision choices of employees in 
safety and quality-related decision tasks. The second objective of the research is to explore 
the relationship between perceptions at the organizational level and perceptions at the group 
level. Both safety and quality have well known benefits for organizations. Safe workplaces 
benefit both workers and the organization (Goetsch 2008). Quality management systems 
have the potential to increase revenue, improve inventory management, and improve the 
performance of organizations (Naveh and Marcus 2007; Psomas et al. 2010; Rao et al. 1997). 
Employees and the decisions they make play major roles in the success of both types of 
programs (Cooper and Phillips 2004; Howard and Foster 1999; Neal et al. 2000). Additional 
knowledge of factors impacting employee decisions are helpful to researchers and managers 
in the development of more responsive educational intervention as well as provide guidance 
for spending limited employee training dollars. 
SAFETY AND QUALITY IN THE GRAIN HANDLING INDUSTRY 
 The setting of this research is a commercial grain handling facility. Safety has 
historically played an important role in operations management at such facilities, but the 
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measurement of quality indicators and quality performance is a more recent facet of interest 
(Capmany et al. 2000; Hurburgh and Lawrence 2003). Work environments within the 
commercial agricultural handling industry have no shortage of safety hazards and production 
agriculture has long been considered a hazardous profession based on the number of safety 
incidents recorded annually (Chapman and Husberg 2008;  National Safety Council 2007; 
U.S. Department of Labor 2008).  
 On any given day, management and supervisors at grain handling facilities may deal 
with a wide variety of safety hazards including confined spaces, petroleum and electrical 
dangers, and lock out/tag out procedures. Other challenges of these types of facilities include 
extreme pressure for high productivity in the planting and harvest seasons and large numbers 
of temporary and seasonal employees (Chapman and Husberg 2008; Lehtola et al. 2008; 
Roberts and Field 2010). Although employees are well aware of the hazards they face 
(Walker 2010), incidents still occur and fatality and injury rates for the agricultural industry 
are nearly always higher than those in other industries (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2010).  
 Quality beyond generic commodity grades has not typically been a primary 
operational consideration for grain handling organizations (Thakur and Hurburgh 2009), but 
this situation is rapidly changing. Production agriculture is becoming more focused on 
product isolation, source verification, traceability and other differentiation processes to add 
value to bulk commodity crops (Miranowski et al. 2004), but even without specialized 
markets, the quality of grain is a key consideration in its storability, marketability, and end 
uses (Reed 2006). Judicious post-harvest management of commodity grains helps prevent 
spoilage, preserve quality attributes, and establish marketability (Bern and Brumm 2003; 
Hellevang 1995; Reed 2006). Grain quality researchers (Bern et al. 2003; Reed 2006) assert 
that of all attributes to be managed during grain storage, moisture is the most important. 
Moisture plays a critical role in the development of mold in granular grains such as corn and 
wheat and is also an important component of controlling insects and other foreign material in 
storage. 
 The lack of quality controls and quality management procedures for bulk commodity 
grains has received greater attention recently. Several food safety incidents have involved the 
adulteration of bulk agricultural commodity products (FDA 2010; Harris 2009; Martin and 
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Moss 2009; Moss 2009). Without a standard methodology for implementing quality systems, 
the ability of processors, regulators, and consumers to identify, isolate, and contain unsafe 
products within the food and foodstuffs supply chain is limited (Harris, 2009; Thakur and 
Hurburgh, 2009). In both existing and emerging agricultural markets, management of and 
increased efficiencies in bulk grain handling can be facilitated through a quality management 
system (Laux 2007; Laux and Hurburgh 2010; Thakur et al. 2009).  
 Research by Laux (2007) and Thakur (2010) detailed the operationalization of quality 
management systems in a grain handling organization. Both identified several benefits, 
including tighter management of inventory, improvement of grading functions, optimization 
of blending procedures, better legislative compliance, and the addition of value to low quality 
grain products. While the research illustrated several key benefits of tighter management of 
grain quality factors in a grain elevator environment, one area which remains unexamined by 
researchers is how employee actions impact a quality management system in a grain handling 
environment. These employee actions are especially important in situations where the 
employee decision determines how the quality process will be interpreted and carried out. 
For example, management procedures for an out-of-condition grain product such as high 
moisture corn could be identified as part of a quality management system, providing 
guidance to employees. However, if the employees, supervisors, or management choose not 
to follow the guidelines provided by quality management systems, how will this action affect 
the success of the system? 
 
THEORETICAL CONNECTIONS BETWEEN SAFETY AND QUALITY 
 Out-of-condition grain has been identified as a safety hazard by several researchers.  
In the review of grain engulfments at commercial grain elevators by Freeman et al. (1998), 
out-of-condition grain played a significant role in 81% of incidents. Kingman and Field 
(2005) identified moldy grain as an important contributor toward farm-level grain 
engulfments and suffocations. In their summary of 2009 grain engulfments in the United 
States, Roberts and Field (2010) noted a positive relationship between out-of-condition grain 
and the probability of engulfment. All of these data summaries are based on a database of 
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U.S. grain engulfments recorded by Purdue University and include all recorded incidents 
since 1978. 
 The link between out-of-condition grain and employee safety is only one theoretical 
connection between safety and quality. Quality researchers have noted that many processes 
developed for quality management programs can be applied toward improvements in safety, 
including process documentation, root cause analysis, and data-based decision-making 
(Brown 1996). The role management plays in safety (Conchie and Burns 2008; Flin et al. 
2000) and quality systems is well documented.  
 Indeed, quality expert Deming (2000) assigns managers the largest role in developing 
and overseeing quality, viewing quality as a system which management controls. Salazar 
(1989) examines Deming’s philosophy in greater detail from a safety perspective, viewing 
safety as a system which can be improved continuously. Salazar (1989) also notes that, with 
both systems, the goal is less about counting the number of defects or injuries, but to 
understand the system which allowed the injury to occur. Dekker (2002) adds to this thought 
by pointing out that using hindsight to judge the injury is subject to bias and works against 
the process of learning from the mistake. Deming (2000), Dekker (2002), and Salazar (1989) 
agree: the goal of evaluating safety and quality systems is to measure the effectiveness of the 
system, not the nature of the results.  
 Murphy (2003) also believes that safety and quality goals align very well. The 
following actions were identified by Murphy as having a place in both safety and quality: 
 A definition of core processes which are essential for excellence 
 Measurement of targeted factors 
 Using data to understand the variation in the targeted factors 
 Learning from feedback 
 Use of data to quantify and measure relationship between system variables 
 Solving problems as a method for continuous improvement 
 Management plays a significant role in commencing and sustaining process 
improvements 
 Active employee integration of methods in their daily tasks 
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 In the literature, theoretical behavioral connections between safety and quality have 
been identified. Murphy’s (2003) thoughts on the association between an employee’s safety 
behavior and quality performance are explained partially by the Theory of Planned Behavior 
(Fogarty and Shaw 2010). The theory seeks to explain the immediate antecedents to behavior 
and aims to predict and explain human behavior in a specific environment. The theory 
assumes that a person’s behavior is based on several things: available alternatives, 
motivational factors, and attitude and perceptions. Both safety and quality decisions could be 
explained using the components of the Theory of Planned Behavior as both decision choices 
depend on alternatives, motivations, and perceptions of employees. However, Murphy (2003) 
criticizes the theory for its low reliability across scenarios and its lack of consideration for 
past behavior.  
 Das et al. (2008) forwards a more basic behavioral theory to explain the relationship 
between safety and quality. The group refers to Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs, which 
assumes that the needs at a lower stage (safety) must be satisfied before employees can 
concentrate on needs at higher levels (quality) (Glickman et al. 2001). However, Das et al. 
(2008) also note that motivational theory can partially explain why employees who do not 
feel safe will fail to pursue quality goals. Employees tend to evaluate choices offered to them 
on the basis of outcomes (Steel and Konig 2006). Outcomes of lowered safety are more 
likely to benefit the employer (Kaminiski 2001) by saving money on equipment, training and 
engineered design. Therefore, working in an unsafe setting (saving the company money at 
the worker’s expense) will limit the employee’s motivation for pursuing quality-related 
goals. This is especially true when one considers that in many cases, employees will see little 
benefit from quality improvement – quality goals will largely add value only to the 
organization (Das et al. 2008).  
 Zohar and Erev (2007) also offer a theoretical basis for employee decision-making. 
Although Zohar and Erev (2007) are speaking from a safety viewpoint, many of their ideas 
are also true from a quality perspective. The theory discussed is the Expected Utility Theory 
(EUT), which has been used to explain decision-making under risk and uncertainty for 
several decades. The fundamental assumption of the EUT is that when people make decisions 
under risk or uncertainty, they weigh several options and the likelihood of each occurring 
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(Newell, Lagnado and Shanks 2007). However, the basis of EUT has been challenged by the 
Prospect Theory (Tversky and Wakker 1995). Prospect Theory hypothesizes that decision 
makers have a tendency to give more credence to low-probability but high impact events than 
to high-probability, low impact events. In other words, humans are more sensitive to risk 
than they are to uncertainty in a decision (Newell, Lagnado, and Shanks 2007). 
 Zohar and Erev (2007) also discuss safety decision choices from a social realm. These 
consequences can be classified in two ways: internal outcomes and external outcomes. 
Internal outcomes affect only the person who is making the decision, while external 
outcomes will affect others. Zohar and Erev (2007) theorize that in the case of unsafe 
behavior, the externalities of the decision are typically underweighted by the decision maker 
in favor of positive internal outcomes such as savings in time and effort and an increase in 
productivity. This may also be true in cases of quality decisions. In both these situations, the 
expected outcome of negative safety and quality decisions is clearly favorable over that of 
more positive safety decisions (Keren et al. 2009; Zohar and Erev 2007).  
  A final theory which can be used to explain the relationships between safety 
and quality is the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957; Harmon-Jones and 
Harmon-Jones 2008). The theory falls under the family of motivational theories and aims to 
understand the relationship between contradicting cognitions or “pieces of knowledge”. 
Operationally, the theory asserts that when people are confronted with the uncomfortable 
state of having to decide between two conflicting conditions in the workplace (i.e. safety and 
productivity; quality and cost), the person will attempt to address the conflict in one of three 
ways (Das et al. 2008): first, ignore their own judgment and follow advice of the supervisor 
or manager; second, ignore the opinion of management and the supervisor and follow their 
own judgment; and third, delay action and do nothing until they are forced to make a 
decision. Of course, the third option does not solve the problem; rather, it just postpones the 
inevitable decision path until a later time. A fourth option, not addressed by the model, is that 
where the person has no conflict with their existing knowledge and consequently follow 
orders from management without any internal conflict.  
 Given all the factors which have been found to play a role in the decision choices of 
employees, the hypothesis of many researchers is that organizational factors have the 
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potential to sway the balance of the dilemma between safe and unsafe decision choices and 
ultimately, behavior (Brown et al. 2000; Edmondson 1996; Johnson 2007; Neal et al. 2000; 
Seo 2005; Zohar and Luria 2005). The conflict which forms the basis of this dilemma is 
tested in the present research.  
SAFETY AND QUALITY FROM TWO LEVELS 
 A second line of research has examined the differences in safety and quality climate 
between administrative levels. Zohar and Luria (2005) present a multilevel model of safety 
climate based on a theoretical framework outlined by Zohar (2000, 2003). The model 
attributes some variation in safety climate to the dynamics of the work group. This model 
assumes that employees are continually presented with a large number of inconsistent and 
conflicting demands from both management and supervisors. A second assumption is that 
although the management may create and develop policies and regulations, the daily 
implementation of the resulting actions and tasks are left to the supervisor. Supervisors are 
often left to interpret management mandates with a great deal of flexibility, resulting in 
variation between supervisory groups.  
 Thompson et al., (1998) note that managers and supervisors both play roles in 
promoting workplace safety, albeit in different ways. Managers determine the degree of 
politics in the organization’s work climate. Politics can be defined as actions such as falling 
for subordinate flattery, hidden agendas, or avoiding unpleasant or controversial matters. 
From a supervisory level, negative political behavior might include not forwarding 
unpleasant information to managers or avoiding confrontation with problem employees. In 
many cases, political behavior is usually classified as a negative attribute because it suggests 
the needs of the manager are being placed above the needs of the organization (Thompson et 
al. 1998). In terms of safety, manager actions such as establishing priorities, setting 
production schedules, and controlling incentives may be influenced by negative workplace 
politics. 
 Alternatively, the supervisor’s role in safety involves the degree of fairness the 
supervisors’ use in resolving violations of compliance to safety rules. Thompson et al. (1998) 
refer to the perceived justice given by supervisors to subordinates when employees bring an 
issue forward to a supervisor. Employees expect supervisors to represent them fairly in the 
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presence of management. If this does not occur, perceptions of justice will be negatively 
impacted.  Thompson et al. (1998) also describe tasks which supervisors manage that 
promote safety. These include: monitoring compliance, providing feedback and providing 
input to management on employee compliance or failure to comply with organizational 
policies and procedures. Supervisors also serve as a liaison between employees and 
management. Conflicts between these two groups can negatively impact interaction programs 
aimed at improving workplace safety outcomes. Thus, resolving differences in perceptions 
between the groups should be a priority for managers and supervisors who are serious about 
improving safety. 
 Zohar (2008) adds additional details on the relationship between organizational and 
group level safety climate. He differentiates between formal policies, typically created by 
management, and enforced policy, implemented mainly by supervisors. He notes that while 
managers create policies and procedures for implementing policies, it is supervisors who 
execute the policies. He sees differences between the safety climates of the two groups as an 
inherent part of a multi-level system. The reason for this is because procedures rarely cover 
every situation that could possibly occur, therefore, supervisors must make choices on how 
and which procedures can be practically implemented. Zohar (2008) believes supervisors 
confront systemic conflicts of organizational goals, which force them to use their own 
judgment in interpreting and implementing formal procedures, resulting in differences 
between organizational level (management) climate and group level (supervisor) climate.  
 Simard and Marchand (1995) point to factors at several levels, including micro and 
macro organizational levels. They report that micro level factors such as work processes, 
hazards, and work group cohesiveness contribute to workers’ willingness to take safety 
initiatives. In their work, they found that many micro level factors are influenced by macro-
level factors such as managerial support and commitment. However, after an accident, 
several researchers have noted the difference in perceptions between managers and first-line 
supervisors and co-workers of the victim. While management personnel generally attribute 
accidents to attitudes, knowledge, and behaviors of workers, supervisors and colleagues of 
the victim are more likely to blame the work environment, systemic weaknesses in safety or 
simple bad luck (Kouabenan 2009; Prussia et al. 2003; Walker 2010). Addressing the 
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“disconnect” between the management, supervisors, and workers is important not only for 
the success of workplace safety programs, but also for quality programs (Brown et al. 2000; 
Das et al. 2008; Prussia et al. 2003).  
 Psomas et al. (2010) found a link between effective implementation of an ISO based 
quality system and commitment and support of senior management, internal motivation of 
the company, and attributes of the company. All of these factors are indicators of 
organizational climate (Patterson et al. 2005). Howard and Foster (1999) found that human 
resource management practices which increased employee empowerment increased the 
perceptions of leadership commitment to quality. Evans et al., (2005) found a significant 
positive relationship between safety climate and quality climate in a wood-processing 
environment, but a negative relationship between safety climate and productivity climate and 
safety-related events. The lack of research related to quality climates limits the amount of 
research performed at different levels of administration. However, the little research that has 
been completed in this area has demonstrated that perceptions concerning management’s 
commitment to quality are an important factor in the success of quality management 
programs in the workplace (Das et al. 2008; Evans et al. 2005; Howard and Foster 1999; 
Psomas et al. 2010).  
 This research seeks to build upon the work of Das et al. (2008) and add to the limited 
research on the relationship between safety and quality climates as interpreted at two levels 
of administration. In addition, decision choices made by employees in safety and quality 
scenarios were measured to determine if employee safety decision choices predict employee 
quality decision choices. A graphical model of the relationships measured is shown in Figure 
1.The following research questions guided the collection and analysis of data in this work.  
1. Does safety climate predict quality climate at organizational and group levels?  
2. Does the level of organizational safety climate predict the level of group safety 
climate? 
3. Does the level of organizational quality climate predict the level of group quality 
climate?  
4. Does organizational and group safety climate predict the employee’s decision choice 
in a quality related decision task? 
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5. Does organizational and group quality climate predict the employee’s decision choice 
in a safety related decision task? 
6. Does an employee’s choice of a safe decision predict the choice of a decision which 
promotes quality? 
 
Figure 1. Model of relationship between safety and quality  
 
 
MEASUREMENT OF DATA 
 Data was gathered in three parts. First, two survey instruments were used to measure 
the safety and quality climates of three agricultural grain handling organizations. To measure 
employee perceptions of safety climate, the Organization and Group Level Safety Climate 
instrument (Zohar and Luria 2005) was used. The instrument was developed and validated by 
Zohar and Luria (2005) to measure two-level safety climate. The instrument consisted of 16 
items measuring the perceptions of employees concerning the relative priority management 
gives to safety and 16 items which measured the employees’ perceptions of the relative 
priority given to safety by the supervisors. Items were scored on a 5 point scale (1 = Strongly 
agree; 2 = Agree; 3 = Neutral; 4 = Disagree; 5 = Strongly disagree). For analysis, the items 
were split into two groups: management and supervisory. The quality climate instrument was 
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constructed based on the validated safety instrument. Items were modified slightly to reflect a 
quality environment and were scored on the same scale. 
 Scale items were highly correlated in both safety and quality climate measures, so 
factor analysis was performed to identify orthogonal variables in each instrument. For 
reasons of brevity, these data were not included in the manuscript. They are available from 
the first author by request. Both the organizational and group safety climate variables loaded 
on one factor. High loadings on each item resulted in the decision to use the aggregated 
means of individual organizational and group level safety climate responses to represent one 
universal safety climate factor. Scale reliability was evaluated using Cronbach’s Alpha 
coefficient and both met generally acceptable standards for reliability with a coefficient of 
0.95 for the organizational level and 0.97 for the group level (Bryman and Cramer 2009).  
 Similar results were noted for quality climate measures. As with the safety climate 
scales, the instrument was divided into two components for analysis: 16 items were used to 
measure organizational quality climate and 15 items for group quality climate. Both sets of 
items loaded on one factor. Factor loadings on each were high (above 0.67 for organizational 
and above 0.71 for group level) and these values led to the decision to aggregate individual 
means for the variables into one universal factor to represent organizational quality climate 
and one universal factor representing group quality climate. Scale reliability was evaluated 
using Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient and both scales were found to meet generally accepted 
standards for scale reliability with a value of 0.96 for the organizational scale and 0.97 for the 
supervisory scale. 
 The second portion of the study measured employee decision making patterns in a 
safety decision task and a quality decision task.  The safety decision scenario was created 
based on a fundamental safety concern in all work environments – the failure to follow 
standard operating procedures (SOPs) (Keren et al. 2009; Zohar and Erev 2007). The 
scenario was selected to reflect the response of an employee when he or she is presented with 
a potential shortcut opportunity. The dilemma presented occurs commonly in the grain 
handling industry – the bridging of out of condition grain as it is unloaded from a grain 
storage container to a transportation vehicle (Brandon 2009; Freeman et al. 1998; Kingman 
and Field 2005; Roberts and Field 2010).  
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 Following SOPs will resolve the issue, but require additional time, slowing 
productivity and delaying shipments to clients. Fixing the problem by taking the shortcut 
presents a major engulfment hazard to the employee. The dilemma presented to the employee 
asks him or her to decide whether to follow safety procedures and take additional time or fix 
the problem quickly but with an increased risk of injury or death.  
 The quality decision-making task investigated in this work was employee decisions 
concerning the management and storage of wet corn. The scenario asks employees to make 
choice – do they follow directives from management and dump the wet corn onto an 
unmanaged pile on the ground or do they take action to better preserve the quality of the 
product? Although this action is fairly straightforward, it illustrates implications for a larger 
question that can be applied across all industries – does the employee follow the instructions 
from the supervisor and management, even if these do not promote high quality processes, or 
do they make a decision to disregard the management and supervisor in favor of a more 
quality-oriented decision? 
 Decision-making data was collected using the process-tracing method of measuring 
decisions. This technique traces the information gathering process by recording data on the 
information viewed by the employee during a decision task. Mintz (2004) reviews this 
process in more depth.  
 The software platform used was Decision Mind™, a computerized decision-making 
simulation. The simulation employs decision process-tracing by recording several key 
attributes of the decision making process, including: 1) sequence of information gathered, 2) 
the number of items viewed 3) the amount of time needed to complete the decision-making 
task, and 4) the choice.  The decision structure is presented in a matrix format with a set of 
alternatives and a set of dimensions. Dimensions represent factors which may influence the 
decision choice. Both safety and quality decisions were drawn from published literature and 
current information available about both decision scenarios in the research and popular press 
(Bern and Brumm 2003; Brandon 2009; Reed 2006; Roberts and Field 2010). Dimensions in 
the safety decision scenario included: productivity, safety, supervisor’s opinion, and peer 
pressure. Dimensions for the quality decision scenario included: storage risk, customer 
service, company policy, and cost to company. Alternatives define the choices available to 
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the participant and information is gathered by viewing the dimensions. The participant is 
asked to choose one alternative based on information acquired from the dimensions (Mintz 
2004).  
 The safety and quality scenarios were developed and critiqued by a panel of experts 
in agricultural safety and grain elevator operations using a modified Delphi method (Linstone 
and Turoff 2002). Scenarios were pilot tested on a small group with a moderate knowledge of 
grain elevator operations. The text of the both scenarios presented to employees is shown in 
the appendix. The research discussed in this case focused on decision choices of employees. 
Keren, Freeman and Schwab (2006), Keren et al. (2009) and Mills (2007) provide more 
information on the use and analysis of decision dimensions.  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 Participants were employees of three Midwestern grain handling facilities. Employees 
who would be subject to safety and quality-related decisions in their daily jobs (i.e. those 
who worked clerical and administration were excluded) were offered the opportunity to 
participate in the project. Data was collected from March until May 2010. The sample 
consisted of 142 males and 35 females for a total sample size of 177. The age of participants 
ranged from below 21 to over 61, with the most common response being 41-50 years of age. 
Most participants had been on the job either less than three years (38.5%) or had been with 
the organization more than 10 years (35.2%). Nearly all (98%) had completed high school, 
with some (66%) completing at least some college. 
 Using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS 18.0) bivariate two-tailed 
correlations were calculated to illustrate the direction and strength of the relationship 
between variables and these data are presented in Table 1.   
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Table 1. Bivariate correlations between variables 
Variable
a
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Organizational safety climate 1      
Group safety climate .774** 1     
Organizational quality climate .654** .691** 1    
Group quality climate .185* .225** .242** 1   
Safety decision -.219** -.185* -.296** -.035 1  
Quality decision -.163* -.133 -.217** -.003 .141 1 
a
n = 185; **=p<0.01; *=p<0.05 
 To measure the amount of variance explained in the dependent variable by the 
independent variable, the coefficient of determination is used. The value is commonly 
referred to as r
2
. Values for each relationship studied are shown in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2. Safety and quality model with coefficient of determination (r
2
) values
a
 
  
a
values represent r
2
 values; **= p< 0.01; *= p<0.05 
  
 Data were able to answer the research questions conclusively. The first research 
question asked whether organizational and group safety climate could predict organizational 
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and group quality climate. In both pairs of variables relationships between safety climate and 
quality climate exhibited a positive and significant relationship, indicating that a positive 
safety climate is more likely to encourage a positive quality climate. The strength of 
relationships between organizational safety climate and organizational quality climate were 
surprising, given that few grain handling facilities think the two goals have anything in 
common. Another noteworthy finding was the relationship between safety and quality 
climates at the group level. Although it is a significant relationship, the strength of the two 
climates from a work group perspective is much less than the same relationship at the 
organizational tier.  The finding suggests that employees do not connect the administration of 
quality with their supervisors nearly as much as they do with their management team.   
 This finding aligns with Deming’s (2000) thoughts on the role of management the 
development of and implementation of quality processes within an organization.  Yet, 
although management does play a large role in setting quality protocols and pushing through 
organizational changes which result from quality management systems, on a daily basis it 
will be the supervisors who implement the routine tasks and procedures. Strengthening the 
employee perceptions of the connection between group quality climate and their supervisor 
should be a priority for leaders who wish to introduce quality management systems to their 
employees.  
 The second and third research questions concerned levels of safety and quality 
climate at two administrative levels. The significant positive relationships noted between 
organizational and group safety climates confirmed a similar relationship reported by 
Johnson (2007), Thompson et al. (1998), and Zohar and Luria (2005). The role of 
management in setting organizational safety priorities and influencing work group priorities 
for safety procedures makes both logical and theoretical sense.  
 The same relationship strength does not exist for quality climate at both tiers of 
administration. Although Howard and Foster (1999) observed that quality tends to flourish 
under strong management commitment to the cause, little additional empirical evidence has 
confirmed this. Although a significant positive relationship was found between 
organizational and group level quality climate in this research, from a practical standpoint, 
less than 6% of the variance in group level climate was explained by organizational quality 
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climate. This suggests that perceptions of management’s commitment to quality have less 
influence on how employees’ feel about their supervisor’s relative commitment to quality 
than was observed for safety climate.  
 The final two research questions concern the relationships of quality climate with 
safety decision choices and safety climate with quality decision choices. The data offer both 
expected and unexpected findings. As specified in Maslow’s theory of human needs (Maslow 
1970) and previous research (Das et al., 2008), a positive significant relationship was noted 
between organizational safety climate and positive quality decisions, indicating that 
employees make decision choices which encourage quality when they feel positively about 
safety. Again, this supports the quality theories offered by Deming (2000) and Howard and 
Foster (1999). However, the limited involvement that most management teams have in daily 
employee decisions, particularly those involving quality, makes this finding somewhat 
unexpected. 
 In addition, the strength of the organizational finding is even more unexpected in light 
of the lack of findings at the group tier. The relationship between group safety climate and 
quality decision choices was not significant, indicating little or no connection between how 
quality is perceived within the work group and the decision choice in a quality decision task. 
Given the frequent interaction between supervisors and employees, the lack of a significant 
relationship is unexpected.  
  Additionally, a significant relationship was noted between organizational quality 
climate and employee safety decisions, even though it lacked a theoretical basis. As with the 
safety climate and quality decision relationship, no significant group level relationship with 
safety decision choice was observed. In the workplace environment, this could be partially 
explained by the properties of many workplace quality management systems. An integral part 
of such systems are detailed descriptions on employee actions, tasks, and daily duties, 
including handling emergencies and out-of-specification products. Perhaps the discipline of 
the quality system also promotes discipline within the safety realm as well as is suggested by 
several researchers (Brown 1996; Das et al. 2008; Salazar 1989). The finding warrants 
further investigation to determine if this is an isolated finding or one which is true across 
many workplace facilities.  
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LIMITATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, and CONCLUSIONS 
 Like all research involving humans, this work is subject to several limitations. The 
small sample and the cross-sectional data collection may limit the extrapolation to other 
situations and work environments. In addition, a new tool was used to collect decision-
making data and because of its newness, it may add measurement error to the data collection 
process. Quality climate is a concept that has not been tested repeatedly, potentially adding 
unwanted and uncontrolled error to the results. This work was the first attempt at developing 
stronger theoretical connections between safety and quality in a grain handling environment. 
Therefore, does not begin to establish the kind of evidence needed for theory development 
and this is fully acknowledged by the researchers. Moreover, the work tested only one safety 
scenario and one quality scenario. Consequently, the results cannot be generalized to other 
work tasks although the broad decision concepts could be tested in other situations to address 
this weakness. Finally, decision simulations measure employee intentions and not employee 
behavior, so employees may behave in a different way than how they responded to the 
decision scenario. This is an inherent limitation to leading indicators of both safety and 
quality as well as with decision-making research.   
 Findings from this research suggest that the linkages between safety and quality 
climates are in place, although not in all levels. More work is needed to connect quality 
climate to the work group level, where many decisions regarding quality tasks and work 
procedures are made. Increasing the communication between departments of safety and 
quality may partially address this gap, but building the bridge between safety and quality is a 
long term proposition, especially in the field of agricultural handling, where the two concepts 
have not historically had a strong association. A systemic approach to managing safety and 
quality in a grain handling environment may improve performance in both areas. Managing 
the two from separate perspectives and departments does not appear to be a good 
methodology, given their apparent connectedness.  
 Future research should continue to investigate the linkages between workplace safety 
and quality, focusing on ways to align supervisors more closely with daily quality processes. 
In addition, the inter-connected relationship between quality management systems and safety 
decisions calls for further investigation, both from an operational perspective as well as a 
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theoretical viewpoint. Future research should also expand the decision-making scenarios, 
especially in the area of quality management systems. Human factors play a major role in the 
success of occupational safety programs and quality management systems (Chrusciel 2004; 
Goetsch 2008; Lunning and Marcelis 2007), but to better understand these human factors of 
failure and success in quality management systems, our understanding of this role must 
increase.  
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Chapter 6. General Conclusions and Recommendations for Future Work 
GENERAL REVIEW OF CONCLUSIONS 
The overriding goal of this research was to determine the association between perceptions of 
employee trust, safety, and quality and the decision choice and decision-making process of 
grain elevator employees at two levels of administration. Broadly, the research questions 
asked: 
1. Does employee trust predict safety and quality climates? 
2. Does employee trust predict employee decision choices in safety and quality 
decision-making tasks? 
3. Does employee trust predict the process employees use to make their decision choices 
in safety and quality decision-making? 
4. Does safety climate predict employee decision choices in safety and quality decision 
tasks? 
5. Does quality climate predict employee decision choices in quality and safety decision 
tasks? 
6. Do safety or quality climates predict the process employees use to make their 
decision choices? 
7. Do organizational safety and quality climates predict group level safety and quality 
climates? 
 All relationships were explored at the organizational level (with management) and at 
the group level (with supervisors). At the organizational level, the relationship of trust 
with safety climate was positive and significant, indicating that positive employee 
perceptions of trust predicted positive employee perceptions of safety commitment by 
management. This was not an unexpected finding, as previous literature has implied such 
a relationship. The relationship between group trust and group safety climate was also 
positive and significant, demonstrating that employee trust in their supervisors predicted 
a more positive viewpoint concerning the supervisors’ commitment to safety. This 
finding has been suggested in previous work, but never explicitly tested. Data suggest an 
important role for behavioral trust in establishing and maintaining high level 
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organizational and group safety climates. Although organizational and safety climates 
explained less than 25% of the variance in organizational and group trust, these values 
represent a noteworthy finding when attempting to predict human behavior. 
 Relationships between trust and quality climates showed positive and significant 
relationship at only one of the two levels. Organizational level quality climate and trust 
revealed a significant, positive relationship, with the employees’ perceptions of the 
management’s commitment to quality climate explaining almost 50% of the variance in 
employees’ trust in the management. However, no significant relationship was noted at 
the group level. This was an important finding, both because of the strong relationship at 
the organizational level and the lack of relationship at the group level. The data suggest 
that while trust in management plays a large role in the development of a positive quality 
climate, the role of trust at the supervisory level concerning the development of a positive 
quality climate is essentially zero.  
 Results testing the influence of trust on safer decision choices showed a clear pattern. 
Organizational trust could not significantly predict the selection of a safer decision 
choice, but a significant relationship was noted between trust and a safer decision choice 
at the group tier. The pattern revealed in this case is not unexpected as it would be logical 
to expect the supervisor to have a greater impact on employee decision choices than the 
management. This is in part because of the greater interaction between supervisors and 
employees than is typically noted between the management and employees.  
 Only one safety search dimension played a significant role in the relationship between 
decision-making process and trust and this was peer pressure. A positive and significant 
relationship was noted between positive peer pressure and organizational trust. A similar 
finding was noted in previous research (Keren et al., 2009), but in previous work peer 
pressure was framed negatively, while in this research, peer pressure was framed as a 
positive influence on safety. No significant relationships between safety search indices 
were noted at the group level.  
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 The quality data showed different patterns than did the safety data. A significant, 
positive relationship was noted between trust and quality climate, but only at the 
organizational level, indicating that a higher degree of trust in management predicted 
more positive perceptions of quality, but that no significant relationship existed between 
quality climate and trust of supervisors. Organizational trust did not significantly predict 
the choice of a quality-oriented decision. At the group tier, only consistency was able to 
predict a quality-oriented decision-making choice. Group trust and group credibility 
showed no significant relationship with quality decision choice. Quality climate could 
significantly predict a more positive quality decision choice at the organizational tier, but 
not at the group tier.  
 Organizational and group trust, consistency, and credibility perceptions did not 
predict a higher orientation toward quality in the decision-making process. Nor did a 
more positive organizational quality climate predict a stronger emphasis on quality 
during the quality decision-making task. However, group quality climate showed a 
significant and positive relationship with three of the four decision indices – storage risk, 
company policy, and cost to company. The increased emphasis on storage risk indicates 
that employees were considering quality factors while making the decision, but the 
emphasis on company policy and cost to company indicates that the decision choice was 
not without conflict. The importance of following company policy and saving the 
company money were also powerful factors in the decision-making choice.  
 The relationship between safety and quality in the grain elevator environment showed 
several significant patterns. Although safety climate significantly predicted quality 
climate at both organizational and group tiers, the relationship was much stronger at the 
organizational tier (explaining 42.8% of the variance at the organizational tier, but only 
5.1% at the group tier). Organizational climate was shown to predict group climate for 
safety and quality, indicating that management priorities for safety and quality carries 
down to the work group. The stronger effect (nearly 60% of variance explained) was 
noted for safety. Quality showed a significant, but weaker (5.8% of variance explained) 
relationship. Furthermore, safety climate significantly predicted a more positive quality 
 
 
139 
 
 
 
decision choice at the organizational tier, but not at the group tier. The same pattern was 
noted for the prediction of quality climate and a safer decision choice, with more positive 
perceptions of quality predicting the choice of a safer decision alternative.  
 General conclusions from this work emphasize several main points:  
 Trust plays a role in safety climate and quality climate 
 The role of trust differs by tier of administration and may have different effects 
on employee decision-making choices at each tier 
 Trust has a significant predictive relationship with decision choice for safety, but 
not with quality decisions 
 Safety climate significantly predicts safety decision choice at both organizational 
and group tiers 
 Organizational quality climate predicts a quality decision choice, but group 
quality climate does  
 Safety climate predicts quality climate but only at the organizational level 
 Organizational climates influence climates within the work group 
 Organizational safety climate predicts a more positive quality decision choice  
 Organizational quality climate predicts the choice of a safer decision alternative  
LIMITATIONS 
 Many of the limitations of this work have been discussed in the manuscripts, but 
another review of them will remind the reader of the constraints of the conclusions noted 
above. The participants for this research volunteered, in some cases after several other levels 
(i.e. supervisors, management, executive team) had approved the research. This limited the 
sample size and introduced significant selection bias. Although an attempt was made to 
collect data from grain handling organizations with a variety of organizational climates, 
encouraging participation was a continuous challenge throughout the project. 
 Another reason for the small sample size was the multi-step, complex, and unfamiliar 
data collection process. Participants read through one consent document, completed three 
questionnaires, and two decision simulations. Although specific written directions were 
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provided to each participant, some measurement error certainly exists. Missing and 
incomplete data points affected approximately 15% of the data collected. The data collection 
process may have prevented other employees from taking part, adding additional selection 
bias. 
 The researcher was not present while employees completed questionnaires and 
decision scenarios. Although it is assumed that employees completed all parts of the data 
instruments independently, this cannot be guaranteed. As with all human-completed research 
instruments, the assumption is that participants responded honestly and thoughtfully to both 
the questionnaires and the decision scenarios. In addition, the population in the sample is not 
known for their computer literacy. All research instruments were computerized and this may 
have affected their understanding of the data collection process.  
 The research measured specific actions from a hypothetical perspective. Participant 
responses represent intentions, not actual behavior. In addition, each decision scenario 
measured the participants’ response to one scenario and cannot be generalized to other 
situations in the workplace concerning safety and quality. Research instruments are subject to 
the normal limitations of using questionnaires and human response data collection. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
 This research was the first to measure safety and quality climate with decision-
making scenarios in the grain handling environment.  Although it has provided some initial 
findings, it has raised even more questions. Some of these can be addressed by further 
research. Several of these have been recommended in the manuscripts. Additional 
recommendations for future research include: 
 The safety scenario framed supervisor opinion negatively and peer pressure 
positively. Future research could reverse the frame of these dimensions and compare 
decision choices and decision-making processes. 
 The development of a quality climate questionnaire designed specifically for quality 
management in agricultural environments is needed. With this instrument, studying 
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the constraints of QMS adoption within the agricultural handling industry could be 
measured more directly. 
 The decision data and search index dimensions along with existing research literature 
can be used to begin to quantitatively estimate paths for an entire safety or quality 
system using tools such as Event Tree Analysis or Fault Tree Analysis.  
 Additional work on why employees continue to behave in unsafe ways in dangerous 
workplaces is needed. Both quantitative and qualitative research could prove valuable 
in understanding and preventing unsafe behaviors by employees. 
   The role of employees in the development and implementation of quality 
management systems is not well understood. Successful implementation of QMS in 
the agricultural handling industry will depend on knowledge in this area.  
 Agricultural safety and the management of quality are both perennial issues of grain 
handling facilities. Understanding the employees’ perceptions and how they influence 
workplace behavior and actions will be an important part of improving the management of 
both safety and quality. This research only begins to reveal what knowledge is needed, but 
data collected for this research has established the grounding for further work in this area.  
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Appendix A 
Management Behavior Climate Assessment 
 
Please indicate your thoughts on the behavior of the top management team in your 
organization by marking the most appropriate number. Mark your answers in the following 
ways: 1 = Always or almost always; 2 = Usually; 3 = Occasionally; 4 = Seldom; and 5 = 
Rarely or never.  
 
Please answer the following questions about the top management team in your 
organization.  
  
The top management team in this 
organization: 
1 = Always or almost always 
2 = Usually 
3 = Occasionally  
4 = Seldom 
5 = Rarely or never 
 
1. 
Are consistent in their dealings with various and 
different individuals. 
 
1       2         3         4          5 
2. 
 
Tell the same story to each person they speak to. 1       2         3         4          5 
3. “Stay the course” and persist, over time, in the 
actions they have decided upon.  
1       2         3         4          5 
4. Will have the same viewpoint tomorrow as they 
do today.   
1       2         3         4          5 
5. Share relevant information.   1       2         3         4          5 
6. Follow through with actions consistent with what 
they have said 
1       2         3         4          5 
7. Act in the same way, even in different 
environments.  
1       2         3         4          5 
8. Say the same thing from one time to the next.  1       2         3         4          5 
9. Make sure information they share is truthful.  1       2         3         4          5 
10. Act as they said they would in past statements.  1       2         3         4          5 
11. Act the same toward those they know personally 
as they do toward those they do not know.  
 
1       2         3         4          5 
12. Are open with relevant information.  1       2         3         4          5 
13.  Demonstrate respect for their commitments by 
their actions.  
1       2         3         4          5 
14.  Make sure that what they say will take place 
actually occurs.  
1       2         3         4          5 
15. Do what they say they will do.  1       2         3         4          5 
16. Deliver on their commitments.  1       2         3         4          5 
17. Provide correct information about past behavior.  1       2         3         4          5 
18.  Follow through on promises. 1       2         3         4          5 
19. Carry out actions they have said would be taken.  1       2         3         4          5 
20.  State future results or outcomes accurately.  1       2         3         4          5 
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Please indicate your thoughts on the behavior of your supervisor(s) by marking the most 
appropriate number. Mark your answers in the following ways: 1 = Always or almost 
always; 2 = Usually; 3 = Occasionally; 4 = Seldom; and 5 = Rarely or never.  
 
 
  
My supervisor(s): 
1 = Always or almost always 
2 = Usually 
3 = Occasionally  
4 = Seldom 
5 = Rarely or never 
 
21. 
Is consistent in his/her dealings with various and 
different individuals. 
 
1       2         3         4          5 
22. 
 
Tells the same story to each person he/she speaks 
to. 
1       2         3         4          5 
23. “Stays the course” and persists, over time, in the 
actions he/she has decided upon.  
1       2         3         4          5 
24. Will have the same viewpoint tomorrow as 
he/she does today.   
1       2         3         4          5 
25. Shares relevant information.   1       2         3         4          5 
26. Follows through with actions consistent with 
what he/she has said 
1       2         3         4          5 
27. Acts in the same way, even in different 
environments.  
1       2         3         4          5 
28. Says the same thing from one time to the next.  1       2         3         4          5 
29. Makes sure the information he/she shares is 
truthful.  
1       2         3         4          5 
30. Acts as he/she said they would in past 
statements.  
1       2         3         4          5 
31. Acts the same toward those he/she knows 
personally as he/she does toward those he/she 
does not know.  
 
1       2         3         4          5 
32. Is open with relevant information.  1       2         3         4          5 
33.  Demonstrates respect for his/her commitments 
by his/her actions.  
1       2         3         4          5 
34.  Makes sure that what he/she says will take place 
actually occur.  
1       2         3         4          5 
35. Does what he/she says they will do.  1       2         3         4          5 
36. Delivers on his/her commitments.  1       2         3         4          5 
37. Provides correct information about past behavior.  1       2         3         4          5 
38.  Follows through on promises. 1       2         3         4          5 
39. Carries out actions he/she has said would be 
taken.  
1       2         3         4          5 
40.  States future results or outcomes accurately.  1       2         3         4          5 
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Please mark next to the characteristic which best describes you. 
 
41. What is your gender?     _____ Male    
_____ Female 
 
42. What is your age?       _____ Under 21 years 
        _____ 21 to 30 years 
        _____ 31-40 years 
        _____ 41-50 years 
        _____ 51-60 years 
        _____ 61 years or more 
 
43. How long have you worked for this organization? 
        _____ Less than 1 year 
        _____ 1-3 years 
        _____ 3-5 years 
        _____ 5-10 years 
        _____ 10-15 years 
        _____ More than 15 years 
         
44. How long have you worked under your current supervisor? 
        _____ Less than 1 year 
        _____ 1-3 years 
        _____ 3-5 years 
        _____ 5-10 years 
        _____ More than 10 years 
 
45. How much education have you completed?   
_____ Some high school 
      _____ High school diploma or equivalent 
      _____ Vocational/ Comm. College Program 
      _____ Some College 
      _____ Bachelor’s degree 
      _____ Graduate degree 
 
46. How often do you receive safety training as part of your work? 
      _____Weekly sessions 
      _____ Twice-monthly sessions 
      _____ Monthly sessions 
      _____ Several times a year 
      _____ Yearly 
      _____ Less than once a year 
      _____ Once – when I started my job here 
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47. How fairly do you feel you are paid for what you do in this organization? 
         
        ____ Completely fair 
        ____ Generally fair 
        ____Somewhat fair 
        ____ Not very fair 
        ____ Not at all fair 
 
48. In general, how satisfied are you with your job?  ____ Completely satisfied 
        ____ Generally satisfied 
        ____ Somewhat satisfied 
        ____ Not very satisfied 
        ____ Not at all satisfied 
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Appendix B 
Organization and Group Level Safety Climate 
Please answer the questions below by circling the number which best matches your opinion 
on the safety climate in this organization. Mark your answers in the following ways: 1 = 
Strongly agree, 2 = Agree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Disagree, and 5 = Strongly disagree.  
 
Organizational-Level Safety Climate 
Please answer the following questions about your organization’s top management team.  
Top management in this organization . . . 1 = Strongly agree  
2 = Agree 
3= Neutral  
4 = Disagree  
5 = Strongly Disagree 
React quickly to solve problems when told 
about safety hazards. 
            1       2         3         4          5 
Insist on thorough and regular safety audits 
and inspections. 
 1       2         3         4          5 
Try to continually improve safety levels in 
each work area.  
 1       2         3         4          5 
Provide all the equipment needed to do the 
job safely. 
            1       2         3         4          5 
Are strict about working safely even when 
work falls behind schedule.  
 1       2         3         4          5 
Quickly correct any safety hazard no matter 
what the cost.  
 1       2         3         4          5 
Provide detailed safety reports to workers 
regarding injuries, near accidents, etc.  
 1       2         3         4          5 
Consider a person’s safety behavior when 
moving or promoting people. 
 1       2         3         4          5 
Require each manager to help improve 
safety in his or her work area.  
 1       2         3         4          5 
Invest a lot of time and money in safety 
training for workers.  
            1       2         3         4          5 
Use any available information to improve 
safety rules.  
 1       2         3         4          5 
Listen to workers’ ideas on improving 
safety.  
 1       2         3         4          5 
Consider safety when setting production 
and speed schedules. 
            1       2         3         4          5 
Provide workers with a lot of information 
on safety issues.  
 1       2         3         4          5 
Regularly hold safety awareness events 
(meetings, presentations, etc.) 
 1       2         3         4          5 
Give safety personnel the power they need 
to do their job.  
 1       2         3         4          5 
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Group Level Safety Climate: 
Please answer the following questions about your supervisor or supervisors.  
 
My supervisor(s) … 1 = Strongly agree  
2= Agree 
3 = Neutral 
4 = Disagree 
5 = Strongly Disagree 
Makes sure we all receive the equipment 
needed to do the job safely. 
            1       2         3         4          5 
Frequently checks to see if we are all 
obeying safety rules. 
 1       2         3         4          5 
Discusses how to improve safety with us.  1       2         3         4          5 
Uses explanations (not just forced 
compliance) to get us to act safely. 
            1       2         3         4          5 
Emphasizes safety procedures when we are 
working under pressure.  
 1       2         3         4          5 
Frequently tells us about the hazards in our 
work.  
 1       2         3         4          5 
Refuses to ignore safety rules when work 
falls behind schedule.  
 1       2         3         4          5 
Makes sure we follow all the safety rules 
(not just the most important ones).  
 1       2         3         4          5 
Insists we obey safety rules when fixing 
equipment or machines. 
 1       2         3         4          5 
Praises workers who pay special attention 
to safety.  
            1       2         3         4          5 
Is strict about safety at the end of the day 
when we want to go home.  
 1       2         3         4          5 
Spends time helping us learn to see 
problems before they arise.  
 1       2         3         4          5 
Frequently talks about safety issues 
throughout the work week.  
            1       2         3         4          5 
Insists we wear our protective equipment 
even if it is uncomfortable.  
 1       2         3         4          5 
Is strict about working safely when we are 
tired or stressed.  
 1       2         3         4          5 
Remind workers who need them to work 
safely.  
 1       2         3         4          5 
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Appendix C 
Organization and Group Level Quality Climate 
Please answer the questions below by circling the number which best matches your opinion 
on the quality climate in this organization. Mark your answers in the following ways: 1 = 
Strongly agree; 2 = Agree; 3 = Neutral; 4 = Disagree; 5 = Strongly disagree. 
Organizational-Level Quality Climate  
Please answer the following questions about your organization’s top management team. 
 
 
Top management in this organization …. 
1= Strongly agree 
2 = Agree 
3 = Neutral 
4 = Disagree 
5 = Strongly disagree 
React quickly to solve problems when told 
about quality issues. 
             1         2         3         4         5 
Insist on thorough and regular quality audits 
and inspections. 
             1         2         3         4         5 
Emphasize the importance of continuous 
quality improvement in each work area. 
             1         2         3         4         5 
Provide all the means needed to perform jobs 
in a high-quality manner. 
             1         2         3         4         5 
Are strict about quality requirements even 
when work falls behind schedule. 
             1         2         3         4         5 
Quickly correct any quality errors no matter 
what the cost. 
             1         2         3         4         5 
Provide detailed quality reports regarding 
work tasks and performance. 
             1         2         3         4         5 
Consider a person’s attitude toward quality 
when moving or promoting people. 
             1         2         3         4         5 
Require each manager to help improve 
quality in his or her work area. 
             1         2         3         4         5 
Invest a lot of time and money in quality 
training for workers. 
             1         2         3         4         5 
Use any available information to improve 
quality protocols. 
             1         2         3         4         5 
Listen to workers’ ideas on continuous 
quality improvement. 
             1         2         3         4         5 
Consider quality standards when setting 
production and speed schedules. 
             1         2         3         4         5 
Provide workers with continuous feedback 
on quality performance.  
             1         2         3         4         5 
Regularly hold quality awareness events 
(meetings, presentations, updates, etc.) 
             1         2         3         4         5 
Give quality leaders the power they need to 
meet quality goals.  
             1         2         3         4         5 
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Group Level Quality Climate: 
Please answer the following questions about your supervisor or supervisors. 
 
 
My supervisor(s) … 
1= Strongly agree 
2 = Agree 
3 = Neutral 
4 = Disagree 
5 = Strongly disagree 
Makes sure we all receive the means and 
support needed to meet quality requirements. 
             1         2         3         4         5 
Frequently checks to see if we are all 
complying with quality requirements. 
             1         2         3         4         5 
Discusses ways to improve quality with us.              1         2         3         4         5 
Uses explanations (not just forced 
compliance) to improve product quality. 
             1         2         3         4         5 
Emphasizes quality procedures when we are 
working under pressure. 
             1         2         3         4         5 
Refuses to ignore quality requirements when 
work falls behind schedule. 
             1         2         3         4         5 
Makes sure we follow all the quality 
procedures (not just the most important 
ones). 
             1         2         3         4         5 
Insists we follow quality requirements when 
fixing equipment or machines.  
             1         2         3         4         5 
Praises workers who pay special attention to 
quality. 
             1         2         3         4         5 
Is strict about quality at the end of the day 
when we want to go home. 
             1         2         3         4         5 
Spends time helping us learn to see quality 
problems before they arise. 
             1         2         3         4         5 
Frequently talks about quality issues 
throughout the work week.  
             1         2         3         4         5 
Insists we follow through on quality 
requirements even when it’s inconvenient.  
             1         2         3         4         5 
Is strict about quality protocols when we are 
tired or stressed.  
             1         2         3         4         5 
Reminds workers who need them to work 
with quality in mind.  
             1         2         3         4         5 
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Appendix D 
Safety Decision Scenario 
 
Procedures when Entering the Grain Bin 
 
You and a co-worker are emptying a bin and working to fill a waiting truck. Your supervisor 
walks by to check on your progress and notices the flow of grain to the truck has slowed. 
Your supervisor suggests keeping the auger running while someone gets inside the bin to 
release the blockage and keep the grain flowing. You are surprised because your organization 
normally follows the grain safety handling standard administered by OSHA, which require 
lock out / tag out of the bin before entry. You need to decide what to do next. You have the 
following four options.  
1. Enter Bin: Enter the grain bin to release the blockage 
2. Follow Entrance Procedure: Follow the correct entrance procedures, taking 
appropriate time to resolve the flow problem safely 
3. Confront Supervisor, Follow Procedure: Confront your supervisor, telling him you 
will follow the entrance safety procedures even if it will slow the work 
4. Follow Procedure and Report Supervisor: Follow the correct procedure and then 
report the supervisor’s instructions to management 
These four factors could impact your decision: 
1. Safety  
2. Productivity 
3. Supervisor’s opinion of you 
4. Peer pressure 
 
When you are ready, follow the steps below in order to initiate and complete the simulation:  
STEP 1: Click SELECT to view information that connects a decision factor to an option 
(decision factors are located on the left column and options on the upper row). The values at 
the bottom of each cell are given on a 21-point scale where:  
   
-10 = assumes a very unfavorable evaluation of the option for that specific decision factor 
   0 = assumes a neutral evaluation of the option for that specific decision factor 
 10 = assumes a very favorable evaluation of the option for that specific decision factor 
 
STEP 2: Based on the information you have looked at, choose the best option by clicking on 
the Final Choice button, located at the lowest cell in the column of the option you choose. 
 
STEP 3: Confirm your choice by clicking Final Decision when prompted. 
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Options 
 
Decision 
Factors 
Enter bin  Follow entrance 
procedure 
Confront supervisor; 
follow procedure 
Follow the 
procedure; report 
supervisor  
 
 
Potential safety 
concerns 
Agreeing to by-pass 
safety procedures 
could lead to you or 
your co-worker 
being trapped, 
injured, or killed 
 
-10 
No potential safety 
concerns in this case 
0 
 You have stated 
your position on 
following safety 
procedures and you 
will not be asked to 
skip safety 
procedures in the 
future 
+3 
May help establish 
new safety 
leadership training 
procedures for 
supervisors and 
new policy for 
reporting policy 
violations 
 
+10 
 
 
Productivity 
By-passing safety 
procedures will 
allow you to fix the 
problem with very 
little or no down 
time 
+10 
Following safety 
procedures takes more 
time and delays the 
filling of the trucks   
-4 
Confronting the 
supervisor will delay 
work, putting  the 
loading schedule 
behind 
-7 
Following safety 
procedures takes 
more time, but 
may allow for the 
identification and 
prevention of 
conditions causing 
grain blockages, 
preventing future 
issues 
+4 
 
Supervisor’s 
opinion of you 
Supervisor is 
impressed with your 
work efficiency and 
thinks you are a 
team player who can 
get things done on 
time 
+7 
Supervisor is unaware 
of your actions. No 
effect on supervisor’s 
opinion of you 
0 
Supervisor feels 
threatened and may 
spread the idea 
around the 
organization that 
you are not a team 
player 
-8 
There is a slight 
chance your 
supervisor will 
discover you 
reported his 
behavior, but this 
is unlikely 
-2 
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Peer Pressure 
Your co-workers are 
not pleased that you 
by-passed safety 
procedures because 
you have established 
a pattern of risky 
behavior for them to 
follow 
-6 
Co-workers are 
pleased that you 
followed safety rules; 
makes it easier for 
them to justify their 
safety behavior 
+4 
Co-workers are 
relieved that you 
spoke up and 
opposed the 
supervisor  
+4 
Although they do 
not want to draw 
much attention to 
the work team, 
your co-workers 
appreciate you 
standing up to the 
supervisor 
+1 
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Appendix E 
Quality Decision Scenario 
 
Quality Control Procedures 
Long term storage of wet corn has been a continuing problem at the grain cooperative where 
you work. The policy of the cooperative is that no member of the cooperative should be 
turned away from delivering corn – all loads are received and stored somewhere. 
A member of the cooperative pulls in with a load of very wet corn. You are directed to dump 
the load directly on a large uncovered pile of corn on the ground near the storage bins. You 
do not know the moisture levels of the corn in the pile.  
You must decide on the next step. The following four items are your options.  
1. Dump the Corn: Dump the corn on the pile as directed and document your action 
2. Do not Accept Corn: Do not accept the wet corn from the customer 
3. Dry Corn First: Insist on drying the corn before dumping it on the pile 
4. Check Moisture Levels in Pile: Check the moisture level on the pile before deciding 
where to dump corn 
 
These four factors could impact your decision. 
 
1. Storage risk 
2. Customer service 
3. Costs to company  
4. Company policy 
 
When you are ready, follow the steps below in order to initiate and complete the simulation:  
 
STEP 1: Click SELECT to view information that connects a decision factor to an option 
(decision factors located on the left column and options on the upper row). The values at the 
bottom of each cell are given on a 21 point scale where:  
 
-10 = assumes a very unfavorable evaluation of the option for that specific decision factor 
0 = assumes a neutral evaluation of the option for that specific decision factor 
+10 = assumes a very favorable evaluation of the option for that specific decision factor 
 
STEP 2: Based on the information you have looked at, choose the best option by clicking on 
the Final Choice button, located at the lowest cell in the column of the option you choose.  
 
STEP 3: Confirm your choice by clicking Final Decision when prompted.  
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Alternative 
Dimension 
Dump corn  Do not accept corn Dry corn first Check moisture level 
in pile 
 
Storage risk 
 
Wet corn will mold 
easily if dumped 
on wet corn, 
causing spoilage, 
safety hazards, and 
danger of fire 
-10 
 
No storage risk 
+10 
Dry corn can be stored 
for a longer time, but if 
dumped into wet corn, 
still has high risk of 
mold and spoilage 
-7 
If moisture level of 
pile is known, corn 
can be dumped to a 
location best suited 
for storage 
+7 
 
Customer 
service 
Customer is 
charged for high 
moisture corn, but 
has no problem 
with the level of 
discount +8 
Customer very 
unsatisfied – 
complains to 
management 
-8 
Customer is charged 
for drying and has no 
issue with discounts 
+4 
Inconveniences 
customer while a 
decision is made 
about where to dump 
the load 
-3 
Cost to 
company 
No cost short term, 
but probable 
financial losses 
because poor 
storage conditions 
will increase 
spoilage and shrink 
of grain  
-6 
Because no wet 
corn was accepted, 
no losses expected 
from spoiled or 
damaged corn 
+7 
 
Dried corn will store 
better for a longer time 
but dumping dry corn 
on wet piles will not 
prevent long term 
spoilage and increases 
potential for financial 
losses 
+3 
Measures to manage 
moisture take 
additional time and 
may cost more, but 
save money in the 
long run with lower 
levels of spoilage and 
damage 
+5 
 
Following 
company 
policy 
Followed company 
policy by accepting 
wet corn 
+4 
 
This goes directly 
against company 
policy – you could 
be disciplined or 
fired because of 
your actions 
-7 
Drying corn and 
dumping onto a pile 
with unknown moisture 
levels is not addressed 
in company policy, but 
is not recommended 
-3 
This action would fall 
outside of normal 
operating procedures, 
and may not be 
supported by 
management 
-5 
 
 
